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1&he kouse of ~ o r d s on
, Friday the 9th of May, Lord Napier
and Btrick, doubly entitled as a former Ambassador at St.
I O P temporary Viceroy
Petersburg, and as a 1-ecent G O V C ~ ~and
in India, to speak with some weight on the subject, asked the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs " whether Her Majesty's:
Government mould grant the moral and material support of Eugland to the A~neerof Afghanistan in case of unprovoked aggression
~ p o nhis dominions 2" H e 81-gned that having by uegotiations
wit11 Russia fixed the boundaries of Afghanistan, we had undertaken tho duty, strengthened by "motives of policy in connection
wit11 the welfare of India," of defending.
- those bonndaries ; and
that we had also acquired, by our subsidies and general support,
the right of controlling to some oxtent the government of" that
semi-bai%arous and semi-dependent State.',
('If," he said,
" Afghanistan should prove a restless and aggressive neighbour,
she must be restrained by some one. I f we did not rostrain hey
action, she must, i n tlie last resort, be restrained by Russia. If
Russian forces ontered the territories of Afghanistan on one side,
he thought i t would be absolutely necessary"thttt Engliah forces
sliould enter on tho olhol; and i n all pro$aldity some worso results would arise from the conflict of these forces than could arise
from an independent actio~bon the part of Eaglrti~d."
" All that,"
Lord Derby, ill .reply to Lord Napier, '(felt himself justified i n sayingJ' was, " that to mrtintaia the integrity a i d
territorial independence of Afghanistan is, and ought to be, a
most important object of English policy; that any interference
with the national independonc~of Afghapistan would be rcgarded
by I-Ier Majesty's Government as a6- very grave matter, requiring.
their most serious and carcful co~zsitleratio~;
and that if such an
- ioterf~ro*ncr,occwred, it is liig%ly probublo that this country mould
F?
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interpose." His immediate predecessor in office, Lord Granvillp, ..
entirely agreed vith Lord Dorby. Lord Stanley of Alderley, distinguished as an Oriental traveller and scholar, cougraSnlated the
Foreign Secretary on the satisfacto17y statement h: had made,
B
Lord Napier having offered a, fern words of explanation,
the subject dropped.
o
I t appears t o me that there were on this occasion srome remarkable deficiencies of expositioii. Notwithstanding. their aerfect
unanimityin aclvooating the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, m~d ..I
in deprecating the violation of that integrity by Russian ~ o o t s ,
not one noble Lord, in or oat of office, made auy.allmsion to tho
undeniable fact that such a violation of Afghan territory has been
diplomatically snuounced as imminent. Uoreovel; all the >Yarni n g ~and all the assurances referred alike and solely to the danger
of military intervention,-a
difficulty more likely to occur than
any Peer suggested, and less easily mct, when it doessccur, than
may have been supposed, but by no means the only poisible diffi*
'
cnlty me may shortly have to meet. If precautions are not taken
in time, we may soon begin to find that British influence is gradually diminishing and disappearing, not in consequence of any
military movement by Russia within Afghan territory, but by
corruption and intrigue in high and low places, at the capital aud
in the ont-lying provinces, and by the closer and angmenting
tenacity of the Russian grasp on the Oxus. I t is against a gm,
dual growth of Russian influence at Cubnl, and especially against
Russian interference, avowed or secret, in the event of a disputed
euccession, that me mght most jealoasly to guard. This call only
be done by a new co~plzctmith tho Arneer Sher Ali. Only thus
can we acquire and permanently retain that supremacy in thc
oo~mselsof Cabul which even Prince Gortsch$off exhorts LIS to
exercise, and which is absolutely esse$tial for the peace and prosperity of India. Coi~diallyagreeidg with Lord Dorby in his ex*
pressed aversion '< to establish English control over Afghanistan
against the will of its Sovereign and its people,'" I believe that
this indispensable control over the Afghan Government can be
1
I
gained, with princely anrd p o p l a r consent.
I havo heard nothing since 1869, that cau invalidate the plan
of ceding nnprofitnblc torritory tm its former possessws, as a -
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,. means of extending onr beneficial influence and c o i ~ c c ~ t r n t our
in~

.

r

milita~ystrength. Nothing has been done, or proposed, so far as
one can learn from any pc~blisheddespatch or fl-om m y Parliamentary &bate, down to that of last month inclnsive,-to nullii'y
*or to modi+ thkclifficu~cies'of the situation, as they stood in 1860.
Nothing certainly has happened, nor have any eEcient steps beell
taken by cpr Government to clear the North-West horizon *
from those two black and gathering clo~tds that harass and
m a & the . ~ n d i a n I3mpire-the
persistent hostility of the
dun&incers, and the continuous advance of Russia towasds the
Inilus.
If the measures here proposed were impolitic or impracticable
some intelligible reasons coulcl be sudy given for their rejection.
Nor does i t secxu unreasonable to ask horn those who deprecate
the policy of confidence a i d co-operntion which it is tho objcct
of these lwges to advocate, what scheme they have to offcr for
%he settlekent of the North-West frontier and the security of
India. Exceptiug the military projects for a furthey advance
beyond o w present limits, no scheme whatever has boon propounded. Not even the expression of some hope of porrnanently
pacifying the frontier and opening the Passes a t any future
period, has come to my knowledge. I have waited and searched
in vain for something to answer. I n some of the notices that
were given to tile first edition of this book, its policy was provisionally approvecl, though1 further discussion was desired ; but
where doubt or dislike was intiruatcd, there was no controversy.
Even the lamented Mr. J. W. S. Wyllk, whose interesting
essay in the Fo~hightlyRcviczu, for December 1869,-most valaable for the accuracy of its informatiou,~contai~led
some brief
strictures, left my distinctive argument untouchecl. It is true
that as he had herd an idportant post in the Calcutta Foreign
Office during*the adu~inist~atidns
of Lord Elgin a d Lord Lawrence, when the views of Sir Henry Durand, assailed by me,
were in the ascendant, his main object was to complete an apology
for the Afghan policy of that period. But if, in doing so, he
could, by exposing the nbsurdity imfiacticnbility of the assailant's own views, have monnded him in a vital qnartcr, the
. , advantage w0~11d most assverily not have been thrown away.
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The book, ~v'hateve~
its demerits, rt~ldhowever obscure, its author, .
was decidedly aggressive, and, if it mere weak, deserved and '
t
atinvited A t least a knock-down bion. Nothing of the s o ~ was
tempted, or has ever beon attempted, here or in India,%y any one.
The whole subjeot mas byought bcfbre a mee*g
of t h e East '
India Association, at which many wcll iuforined persou. were
" present, on the 18th of March last, but while support a?d confirmation of a very important character came forme~don m y side of the
question, the only objections urged were, as t l l ~ yevbywhe?e &ad
always have been, purely declamatory, and for the 113ost p e t
irrelevant, eitlzer contemptuous tomarda the Afghan peop?e, or
vain-glorious with reference t o ourselves.
No attention scems evcr t o be given to the indications of an
increasing regard for human life, and of more enlighteued principles of government, that have been manifested in the action
and p l i c y of the present Ameer of Afghanistan, both during the
civil mar and since the pacification of the country.
I n reply to the argument, based on recorded facis, that the
British Govermnent callnot reduce the Hill tribes to good ordsr,
or keep the 'Passes open, but that the Afghan Qovermuent
formerly did so, and could, with our concurwnce, do s o again, we
are told that the Afgl~ansare a ferocions and perfidious race, and
can never be trusted. This inhuman doctriuo has no foundation
in either histo~yoF ethnology ; science a ~ l dexperience equally
contrndict it. There i s not on Ghe faco of the globe, and there
ly
or turbunever has been, any race that is i ~ l h e ~ e u t treacherous
lent. There are no i p i d e n t s in the annals of Afghanistan that
cannot be paralleled i n oer omn, O? in those of the o t h e r nations
of Europe. National Eharacter grows and changes. The Afghan
Government has visibly improved before the eyes of t h e present
generation, and niay, with British Counsel Snd conntenance,
improve still more, and that very rapidly. l\%eanwhile,there is
no question of imposing Afghan rule npou a reluctant and highly
civilised popnlation, but only ono of yestoring it, o n our own
conditions and under our control, among Afghan tribes who would
rejoice a t renuion.
B
5
I t is not proposed that ,the Imperial Government of India
should rcsign any of its polver- or ipfluencc between t h e Iildus
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and the Oxus : on the contrary, it is believed that b i the means'
here suggestcd, British power would be consolidated within the
l-'unjauls, and British influence extended and stsengtdened in
,~f~hanist&
and Central Asia. Until the futility of these expectations, and th6%ullity of 'the foundation on which they rest, aye
shown, there cau be 110 serious or effectual opposition to the
policy of this book. Nothing call be more erroneous, as will be
show: furthes on in the proper place, than to say that this matter
m s decidedlome for all in 1857, when the proposal of Lord
~ & q p c eto transfer Peshawur to Dost Mohaumed was absolutcly rejecte4 by Lord Canning. That was, in fact, a very
diffeyent matter. To assert roundly that British territory must
never baceded, because all previous judgments are against it, is
simply to beg the question as a whole, all particulars of time and
circumstance being excludcd from consideration.
One gl;at object of the following pages has been to show from
Orecent experience that our local functionaries must not b e trusted
in India, any more than thcy are in Great Britain and Ireland, to
guide Imperial affairs. Almost in direct proportion to the degree
of their departmental dexterity, and the length of their Eastern
residence, they are generally incapacitated for the higher branch
of statesmanship. A clear view of Imperial operations can only
be obtained fsom the central watch-tower. At the same time it
would be premature, if not presumptuous, to endeavour to define
exactly the limits of such a transaction as this, or to enter upon
the dictation of its practical details, without a thorough topographical and technical intelligence, a perfet;t knowledge of ways
and means and persons, to which a politician at home need make
no pretension. We may give the fullcst &edit for the requisite
information and skill to the executive authorities in India. The
fullest confidenco &ay bo f h e d in their zeal and ability to perform what the Nation desires %nd the Soveyeign commands. But
a solicitude for the maintenance of British 'Cprestige" so fsequently presents itself as the sole officialobjection to ceding territory, that I must depart a little from the rule just prescribed, in
order to give a hint of the actual Froceciure that is contemplated.
The measure in question ought to be carried out i n snch a
nzannemthat no one should be able to prate of British prestige

.
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boing lost cjr diminished. No o m should bc able to say, or to .
suppose, that the restoration of Afghan territory to the Afghan
State ~Vasa symptom, or was likely to be the causo,
wealrness
in the British Empire. I t shoulci be mado the oc2asion bf a
display of our militmy power on so $raucl a &le, and on such'
a conspicuous field, that all Central Asia and all Ind% should
ring of it. W i t h the hearty good mill of the Afg$an Govemmen$--without, it may be hoped, a shot being fired, certainly
without anything worthy the name of a contast,ethe A f g b n ,
succession and the Imperial supremacy of Her Majcsty mQ n ~ n
Victol-in, should be settled and proclaimed simultaneously.
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THE%astern Question, viewed with exclusive regard to
the intercsts of Great Britain, identical in this instance
with the interests of humanity, is nothing more tlmn this,
-Shall British .or Russian influence predominate in the
regions between the Oxus and the Indus ? If all the
'Province: of Afghanistan c m be united under one strong
,Government, if the rulers of Ballch and Herat can be
enabled t o hold their own against all comers, in friendly
concert with the rulers of India, the Eastern Questibn is
settled for us. Russian agents at Teheran, and even in
Turkey, might then be left to do their worst. We, among
all the nations of Europe, need then care the least about
the occupancy of Constantinople, Baffled and checked
in Central Asia, the expansive irnp~ilseof Russia must be
drawn more closely within the mnge of European diplomacy, where Great Britain cannot be isolated. France,
Italy, and Austria, very indiffwent as -to the fate of Cabul
and Eolrl~nra,will always insist on a oontroiling voice in
b
the Levant.
In statii~gthe problem concisely, f d o not pretend t o
set forth x ~ y t h i q gnely or original. It will be seen by-andby that we have somefii-nes rnismanagecl it, that we have
very often, and very recenfly, neglected or refused t o consicleythe ~ntltter'atall, but whenever we have condescended
to give it any attention, our policy has been always the
same. The formation of a strong and friendly Government in Afghanistan was theanim 'of our policy in 1839,
when we carried Shah Xuja11 to the throne of Cabd. Such
was tile aim of our policy.in 1855, when we'innde a treaty
of "perpetu:~,l pexcc rt1-1~1
friendship" with the Ameer Dost
\B

h
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Mohammed, having made ho&i.le demonsi,rni,i611s in v:Lin
during the Punjo,ub wars, and fruitlessly incited tile llJl
year;;,
tribes of.the Peshawur border against for sever&l
perceived t h a t we held with a firm grasp our nelJr posses* sion on his fr8ntier ; add the pressure of Persia, e n c o ~ ~ ~ q iiig iqtrigues and rivalry in his own fmiily, begiliiling to
y, the Bin eer in 18Ci il: made frien dly*
shake his* au tl~orit
otiertnres t o our Government. By the Treaty of 1855,
the .Ameel* Dost Mohrtmned ,pined absolution for the
past, and a clear recognition of his title as an independent
Sov&eign. If, wliicll is very probable, this policy of reconciliation ~ i t nbe shown to have helped in the establishment 'of a central authority a t Cabul, i t was so far cnnducive, tliongh in a small way, towards the acl~ievement
of our great object, the consolidakion of Afgl~anistaninto
a strong and united State. But it cannot be preter-derl
.that t11F measures of 1855 were successf~dor sufEcient
for that great object. Before the end of 185G, ille King
of Persia had occupied Rernt with n large aruy, and
claimed Impc~ialsupremacy over thc wllole of Afghanistan. This led to the costly Persi:in wax, and t o the
secoiid Treaty with Dost Mohanlnlcd in 185'1, by 'cvhich,
without actually g~~arnnteeiag
his ('present possessions in
Cabul, and C a ~ ~ d a l ~we
~ rundcrtoolr
,"
to assist hiin
with money and munitions of war '' Lo defend and mrtiutain" tliem "against Persia.""
Persia, was coerced by our fleet and army ; and the
new Treaty with Dost Moha~ninedpiwvecl t o llave been
most olsportunely concluded, for ifow? had been on bad
terms with the Afghans ill 185.7, they might hnve thrown
their
illto the .scale agaiiast us with fearful, perhaps &,tal e&ct. But7 this accidental benefit could not
have been foreseen. The lfmited and temporary advantage
of tllese measures certainly failed to secure onr great object of an orclerly slid m i t e d State in Afglianintan, perAlanentlyamenable t o British ilifluence. The mission of'
M>;joT-General)Ha.
Eumndcn and his brother
Ml;jor
l;o Cal2dnha,r was arraaged on terms so ill considered, nncl
Otlgrllg~ r ~ f i e c ~ ~t lrqetdo, w cnroys were kept more like
*: CoIlecliou of Y'lwities, vol. ii, p. 431.
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prisoners tllan guests, and k c r e constailtly in dtwger ol'
assassina;tion. As if we hncl exlm~steclall our yesources
in this llumiliating experiment, every opportunity of inter~ e u t i o na d intercourse was khro~r-nnwaycbet&eeu the *
return of the Lumsdens in 1858, &d t h e c~en,thof Dost
_Mohammedill 1863. That greatest of all possible apportimities was not merely rejected, i t was perveqted to our
damage :tncl clisgrace.
The right of priniogeniture has never prevLiled i6 A£gllt~nisian,or in any Mohnn~rncdttnState. S11ch n,f;igl~t
mould be obviously iiicompatilrle wit11 those j~eculiarinciabsolute Jegitidents of a polygnn~oushousehold,-the
rnncy of all acknowledged sons, and t h e inequali'cy of
thcir r : ~ n ka i d consicleratiou in the f:r.nzily according t o
the position of their rnothers. Amid val-ying customs of
succession to thc throne in c1iEerent countries, ope rulc is
uiliversnlly recogniscd as perfcct.1~confo~inablewirth Mus-,
snlinan law, tlmt the reigning Sovereign may select from
niziong hi8 soils that one wl~oni110 rrmy consider most
~ v o i - t l ~t oy succeed him. I11 accordance wit11 this pnt1.iat-chal usage, the Anleer Dost Mohammed had chosen
under that
G11aln1l-i I-Iy der Khan as heir-apparel]t,-wllo,
title, collcludecl vith our Government t h e Tretity of 1855.
G11olnln I-Iyder, Shcr Ali Khan the present Ameer, m d
their more noted b r ~ t ~ h eRfoharnmed
r,
Akbnr Elran, were
a11 sons of the Ameer's favourite wife, a lady of high descent. On Gholam Hyder's cleat11,-Alcbar Khan having
died some ycars p~eviously,-the Ameer nolninated Sher.
Ali K h a n as his succe%sor; m d 011 his own death-bed, in
t h e cmnp before Remt, confirmed the selection in a family
council, a d recorded it i n a w r s t e n tastament. Dost
Mohammed died on June 9Lh, 1563. All these facts
were duly notified to the Gove"rnor-General of India.
The succession of Sher Ali Kliail is thus described in
nn article of the EcZi~2bz~~:r/h
fieview for January 18G 7,
since avowed and accepte'd as a demi-official defence of
Sir John Lawrence's fo"reign policy.
" Sher Ali Rhan it was whom Dost l\foharomed, some time before the expedition to Herat, had Publicly selected as %is suecessor, passing over the claims of both tho elder l'rinces, A f d
("

'

,
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Khau and Azim Khan. The selection, according to Fdn~ilpoustom, was anthoritakive. Slier Ali ever since had borne the clesignatioq of heir-apparent ; and when Dost Mollaln~&d died,
none ventured to question his title to succeed. Evan Azim ICLau
himself in thab 61st houls of confusion was fain to join in the
general homage due to Sher Ali as rightful Arneer of Afghanistan.':*

.

,The ca1Sture of Herat, the last and crowning triumph of
Dos-b Mohammed's memorable career, was received ivith
abparent indifference both in London and Calcutta. The
f i r n ~ s which
,
may be considered as a tolerably ft'
i ~r exponent of tlw ruling opinion in higl~places, set down the
whole affair as " a battle of kites and crows," and declared
the contest for Ilerat, " though so inexhaustibly interesting for Afghans and Persians," t o be "of no concern to
us."? It is extremely doubtful whether the same view
was talc&%at St. Petersburgh.
It may have been diffiq~111;for most Englisl~ment o look
so far east, rnllei~every eye was fixed on the gigantic
struggle of slairery and freeclom in the Wcst, from wllicli
almost every one had so muc1~-politically, socially or coinmercially-to hope or to fear. I n the summer of I S 6 3
the civil ww in the United States was at its height, and
the cotton-famine of Lancashire (the touch-stone of m o d
pr.ogress in Great Byitail]) ha8dcarried :t gulden harvest to
India. The wealth of Bornbay was boiling over, but had
not yet reached the point of evaporation. At Calcutta
financial affairs were in the ascendant ;1862 was the iil-st
?ear since the Rebellion of 185'7 it* which there had not
been a deficit, in which the Home Cl~Lrgeshad not been
defrayed fyom loans raised on the London Stock Excl~ailge.
Great was o-ffici&lex~dkationabout that time a t the newly
discovered elasticity of tlxe Indian revenue, continuously
manifested ever since in a very remarkable rnailner, though
counterbalanced in a manner equally semark-kable,by the
elasticity of the expenditure. Visions of perpetual
prosperity ruled the hour all Qver Indii~in 1863. No one
seems to have had a thought for Ceiztral Asia. The policy

6
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of 1839, 1855, and 1857, was completely forgotten, or reme~nberecloirly t o be reviled. There was no one t o ~emiacl
our G6vernmeat t h a t promptitude tmcl dceisioy -on t l ~ e i ~
part might prevent a war of succqssion in t l ~ edo~nlniol~.
of Dost Blohnulmed, :dkcep tlic A@an State unclividecl,
.coimectecl with 11sby nelv tics anc1 willing obligcztio+zs.
Never did our Government stand more in nwcl of a yemindcr, hncl it only l ~ e nn good newspape~artjcle. The11
the cleat11 of
t h e crisis poclucecl by the fill1 of EIerat 5~11~1
Dost M o h a n ~ ~ n epressed
d
most strongly for cnnsider&iofl,
t h e Governor-Gencd, Lord Elgiil, was a t piinla, ~vllicI1
he left on the 36th September, 1SG3, on a tour through
tlre Punjanb, intending t o visit t h e frontier s t d o n of
and to be at Lahore, whcre a great camp of
Pesha~v~il;
esercise mas t o be nssemblcd under the Coininancler-inChief himsclf, :tbout the close of t h e year. A11 $he members of thc Governor-General's Council were at t7alcuttLx,n
where thc routine business of Goverilirlent was carriccl
011.
The Foreign Secretary, Coloilel (al'twnwds Sir
Henry) D w m d , accoulpa,z1iecl the Viceroy on his tour.
U p to tllc clnto of Lord Eigin's Inmenlccl dentll, which
happened on the 20th NovcmLcr, 1863, a t Dlrm'maelrz
in the valley of Kangra, Sllcr Ali Khan's overtures for
our recognition had met wit11 no response. Altl~ougllthe
clesirc of Dost Moham~ncclfo'ul.o u r support in settliilg the
succession in his Gmily was imcle suf'ficiently inanifest
tvlmr the Treaty of IS55 was coldudecl for the Airleer,
" a d 0 1 ~the pc112 qf' his hei.,a," by his son, Gholam
Hyder, "as t h e rep~eseatativeof Ameer Dost Mohan~inecl
,
,
CIS Iieir-~fppa~-ent;"~
Khan, a i d in persou o n his o w ~ tnc'cozmt
and apiil, -when, on the death af Ghdnrn Hydw, the
of India t h a t he had
Arneer il~forrnedthe Goverr~in~ent
nominated one of his younger sons, Sher Ali Khan, t o
succeecl t o dl his domiuions, tile language and conduct
of tho British nnthorities, on every occasion between Dost
Mohammed's death anrJ t h e &nal success of Sher Ali IChan,
~epeatcdlyleft tlle field qflite open for a fratricidal war..
Though a11 histov, and all political scieilce might have
sf untoward events could
taught us t h a t no coln~~iilation
,
* Collecfio/~of 2'recrfics, vol. ii, p. 431, see llppenclix A.
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cond~~ce
to tlie disunion and disorder of the Afgllan tcuitories so s ~ ~ r e lasy a disputed succession, or promote so
directly.the designs of a rival Power, we ileglebtec- :~11
.the chanbes that offered, and all the means a t our ciisposal for f o r ~ d i n ga d~Gablesettlement.
There ought not to have been a moment's do111)t or
hesitation as to Sher Ali Kllan's title. We had explicitlyg
acknowledged the right of Dost Mohnlnmed to norniuate
l i s 8uccessoY when the Treaty of 1855 was mtified by the
Govepor-General,, A s e c o ~ dnomination, made by Dast
Mohainmed 11 the death of the first heir-apparent, was
duly notifiec$ to our Government. On the death of his
father, the desigilated heir ,peaceably assu~neclthe reins
of power. No one cienied or disputed his right. His
brothers professed subniission to his authority. Why was
not this erfectly regular successioii prornptly recognisecl
,
- bv the iitish Government ?
I11 the absence of the consultative Mi~mtes,-if any
were recorded,-and of the other oEcinl documents of
the day, we can only conjecture now,-as the Afghans, uf
all parties, mnst have corijectured then,-that
uncler
sorne predominant influence at our political head-ywtrters
(probably that of Colonel H. 31. Durand, the Foreign
Secretary) Sher Ali KHan was not the British candiclnte,
-that our Government for the time being would have
preferred one of his bruthers ; and though not prep;~recl
t o support our own man openly, hoped that sonlething
might turn up for his advantage, if qe cleferred as long
as possible the recognition of the le2itirnate successor.
That there are considerable grounds for itnp~tingthis
half-hearted an$ faithless policy t o one or more of tlie
high functionaries the; in -power will hardy, I tlink, be
dihuted.
A pamphlet published a t Calcutta, highly eulogistic
of Sir John Lawrence's foreign policy, and known to be of
demi-official authority, gives , the following retrospective
glance at the unworthy s~~sgiciohs
a i d ~ullawfulselfseekings
tliat
misled
the
British
authoriLies
:
d

'

i-
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Th%rewore many who Bolieved tlmt Mohammed Azim IChan
lcvos supcrior in capacity t o Sbor Ali Kl~en,mil i d d i he was more
a,

s
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loyally dispoked towards the Britisli G o v c r u n ~ e a tclnring the crisis
of 1857 than any other Afqllan Sirdiw."*

'

Herek an extract from a letter of the Cakutta, Correspondent of the Times, understood t o bc iden_ticalrwitllthe
Editor of the Prieizcl of 1T,)~clic~,hid n peison generally"
well informed as to the doings of the Indian Fgseign
^Office. This letter,.dated July 23rd, 18G3, a montli after
Dost Mohn,mmeci's clcath, appeared in the 'Ti?nes 'of
August 28th. " The nem Ameer, Sher Ali ICl~r~n,~'
say%o q ~ .
own Correspondent, " is as no tusiously llostilo tg the
Englisll alliance as his brother by a cli8erentl,motller, and
n>
~ i v dA
, z i u Khan, is in fLvour of it."
Agczin in his letter of August 28nd, 1863, published in
t h e Yimes of September 3Stli, he calls A z h Khnn "our
friend."
I strongly suspect the real origin of tllese rrunoms t o
have been that Azi~nIC1zill-1;having been for soke yearsp
Govcruor of the dist,ricts of I<ooruiu and Kllost, bordering on the British frontier, had talseil f d l a d v a n t a g e of
every oopportmnity of inte~coursewith English officers t o
sound his own pmises, and t o spread a belief that he alone
was friendly, m c l the rest of the fimily hostilc. During
his pensioned retirekent a t Rawulpindee, on Briiish t e u i tory, in 1865, he
did his best t o strengfien the
imp~essionin hi^ fhvour. I cannot help feellng somewhat confirmed iu. this view by the fbllowing passagcs
from Lord Lawrence's speech in the I-Iouse of Tlorcls on
Dost
April 19th. Spealdng of the Treaty coilcluded
RIohamncd in 1855, ke said :" Sir Herbcrt Edwardes " (then Coiuu~issionerof Peshawur) a
" pnt himself into comrunnication with a son of the dmeer, who
was then Governor of n border provigce of ATghaniststu" (this
was Azim Khan) "and th1.oug.h hialllade arrangements vitll the
father. I was then the chief civil and military authority in the
I'unjab, and with niy co~lseuthe allowed the sou of the Anieer to
say, that if his f'athcr was willing to come forward we should meet
him lmlf-way.''

And after relating tXe dd1

of d f i u l Khan, the eldest

son of Dovt MohuminedJ who Ly Azirn Khan's agency, -

*
nml,

Fweip Policy of Sir JoJm LUIUTL'ILCC
(reprinted from t l ~ e!&zgZisl~of Jnnunry 4thJ 1869)) Cnlcntta, 1869, 1). 7.
l"
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* .
as we shall see,--contrived
to dispossess the Pllmeer Sher
Ali of part of his clominions, and ruled a t Cabul. from
June 186 6, t~ October 1867, he said :" His brbther who had first sought relatious with us" (Azirn
b the thrGne. The Ameer," (a title quite unKhan) " asceucled
warranted by Aairn Khan's brief usurpatiou) " however, did not
fulfil tfie expcctations of his friends. Some of those who had.
gained himhis throne fell off, and after some months h e was expellea from t l p country."

I

'In the article of the Eclinbz~rgh Review for January
1 b7 ~p ~ z i mKhan is pronounced to have b e l l incornpar"

ably Afzul I<&an's s~qxriorin state-craft," while Sher Ali
is declared "not equal to Azim Khan as a 8tatesinan,"
&ildit is said that his " political proclivities had hitherto
been towards a Persian, rather than an English alliance."
The notions that swayed the ForeignuOffice a t Calcutta
in 1863, aoine out very clealy in the following passage :-

i

"~ith'o:ont m y r e d love for the English, Aairn Khan had yet
established a strong claim ~ i p o nour goodwill by the course he
adopted in 1857, when the whole Afghan nation elamonreci to bc
led down the passes that they 1uight join the mntinous Scpoys i n
a lneritorious extermination of the ididel English. Dost Mohammed would, perhaps, have bcen unable to yesis&the popular
ary but for Azitn I<hau's steadfast and opeuly declared advocacy
of the English cause."*

I am illclilied to attribute these supposed good offices
to Aeim Khan's own invention, or t o that n ~ t f u linani~ ~ ~ l a t iofo athe British Moonshee, or news-writer a t
Cabul, in which, as the Eclinbu~gh Reviewer tells us,
that wily Sirdar was so great ail a4ept.t Such considerations, however, even if they had been v e l l founded, ought
to have been far beneath a great Government like ours.
We could well s;H?ord t o despise the evil dispositions of
six yeass back ; while anp reliance upon what is called
the "loyalty" or "friendship" of one Afghan Chief more
than anotl~er,was a very weak pretext for slighting the
lawfd successor, a lotally inadequate excucjrefor deviating
from the ~traiglitfo~ward
coume of,full ,znd immediate recognition.
IJdii~O~rgh
Review,.No. 255, Jiiii~i~ry
1867, p. 18.
1. Ibid.,January 16G7, pp. 31, 32, 33.
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'I"lIc! Ido Inmcnted Mr. J. W. S, Wyllie, whose corn- .
tlIC:first edition of this little book call for some
,,..ti,:, 01,
lxwt, dinrncterised my snspicio~~
tlmt Azim
I < I ~ ,x::i-;
: ~ ~tile
~ Critish fii,vounite as a " ~ % s nbsu~dity,"~
s
:.jdillY..witil i't~ll~ f i i ~ i lill0~1edgE
id
of the ficts, t h a t " the
h v l ~ l l ~ : ~ c ~ l iof
c s the Incliml Government were never %tany .
'tjtliiI
- ~ ~KIlun's
i ~ ~ side,
l :~ncl,e u k m O I E B Slyr Ali had
I,{ i * ( ) i 2 ~ , ! j , , ; , w t they
/,
mere iiirnl-ially exerted 111 favpl: bf
.
slit^,. :ili, :mrl uf l h n only."* Here he does bot deny,I,(' r : ~ t l l ~S s~ ~ CvI ~t oI Sadmit,--that befo7.e Xlzer Ali Izu& been
,.lwj~j,ci.+..~~l
tha sy1i111ntIliesof the India11 G o p m n e n t had
'
1rt.t.n t.srart~di n ftt~ourof' some one else, tilough not of
i h c l I linve no doubt that while nll the
x i I
.
rt.ii:tnlt..,. { k t ' tlic ihlcutta Foreign O&ce was placed upoil
:\ ; ! i ~ r l I<Im 11, its i q p i i d cnncliclate for the Afghan succeskit
i7<.;ts,i l l : I C ~ - I O I . ( ~ : X I I Cwith
~
Elis o w ~scheme,
l
Afz$ Kllan,
tbltl:~f w liher.. In the W O I ' C ~of &!r. W y l h nhimself,,
.lt':,,rd I<II:LI~\vas in truth ;l nonentity, set up by Azim
,
li 11:r r l :IS :t con t-eliicnt xncl decorous screen to cover t h e
l l l p t l f +t)I1

I I , ~

L b

i

Nlit lwtil Dcce~iher1863, just six months aftcr his
htlicr's tlclath, and t l ~ r c cweeks after Lord Elgin's death, "
wlleil Sir TTilliam Denison, a@ seniol" Governor, had
t&nl
~~ro~ision:d
clmge of the Yiceregal office,-was Xher
Ali Kilun recognised by our Government as the Ameer of
At- mistan an, It limy be useful to see what account of
this step is &ven by the Frioiid of Imiiu, a jou~*nal
g v ~ l v ~ ; d l:rccseclited
y
ulith Qpme notl~orityas an organ, or
at hitst ~ L on
S obsequious partisan, of the Calcutta Foreigll

I

1
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Office. On December 24th) 1863, the ~ d i t o ; writes as
follows :-

.

"Whene,the late Dost Mohitrnmed appointed his son" (Sher
A l i Khan) "higlreir and succe&or, he duly notified tho fact to
our G overnmerlt.
Soalong as iL was clo~zbtf~~l
wl~ctllertlie ncm Anleer would
~nalcegood his claims," (i. c., so long as our conntezla~cew o ~ ~ l c l
have been ~ t s e f ~
t o~ him,)
l
" w e abstained from recognisiug his
yosition. BL$ now that his opponents, daim Khan and Afznl
I&au are quiet, however personally discontented, our Government
I& c10,ye ouly what is just and politic in strengt~leniughis power
by their lorma1 ccognition."
((

f

This policy has been called by me half-hearted and
$~ithless. It was half-henrtecl, because me virtually demurred to t h e succession of Slier Ali I<han without
vcnt~ringto object openly, to support mothel: cnnclidate, or &veil to impose conditions for our recognition.
-It was fAithles8, became by the Treaty of 1855 ?ire 11ttct
clistiilctly accepted the line of inheritance instituted by
Dost Mohammed, and on t h e decease of the heir nnmecl
in that Treaty, the nomination of a full brother, Sher
k l i Khan, in his place, was duly columunicated to our
G ovenment. I11 that same Treaty we had promisecl
" never to interfere,"'* c~ndnow, on the very first occnsion
after Dost 1,'lohanlmed's death, under the pretence of inpartiality and non-intervention, we practised the most
inj~wiousinterference, by " abstaii~ingfrom recognising"
the
P1inee's " position'." At thc most ~ l ' i t i ~ i ~ l
cortjuncture possible, the first succesg~iodin new dynasty,
we struck.a blow a t the very founclatim-stone of ,z strong
ancl stable Gorernment.
The F~ier~d
o$ I7zcZich talks of Sher Ali's " oppoizents."
He had no opponcizts, u$il, by "absthning from recogi~isinghis P ~ ~ i t i o ias
l " ruling Ameer, whicll the Pq*ied's
language admits he had made good, we enconraged his
brothers to cons im and rebel against him. The well
understood fact t l u t there were se ret rivals in his fkrniIy
ought to have been an adclitioifal p ea for prompt recognition, if perfect good fiaith was to be preserved.
I have said t l ~ tthe
~ t t a i d y recognition of the new Ameer

'i

E

12

TIIE O X W

AND T H E INDCTS.

-

0

in December 1363, while Sir Williani Denison was at '
the head of afLirs a t Calcutta, produced improved relations bktween the Goverilme~ltof India and t h s Ruler of
Afghanistan. But it must not be supposed $hat & coinplet~,
redress and rectification of t h e iGjury done to Sher Ali
Khan was therehy effected, or that full colificlelncc in
intentions cailrhave been
' British good faith and
tllereby restored. The mischief was in a great meas2re
.
s
done, and irretrievable, A flat denial of' Sher ~ l ? inllerent right t o the succession under his ft~ther'sauoii-ftment, and a more or less coi~cenledpreferenre on our part
for some other member of t h e family, were obviously
involved in postponing liis recognition for six months.
Unless the actual lettiel. of recognition contained soine
judiciously evasive apology for t,he delay,-attributing it,
difkilet us say, to Lord Elgis's illness and death,the
culty of moicling a, denial of Shcr Ali's right t o the in,
heritance must have beeu almost insnrmonntable. After
so long a silence, soine explanation was evidently called
for.
Whether the letter of recognitiun was o r was not
couched in some such terms as those just quoted from tile
fiiencl of I7zdia,--whether Sher Ali Khan was or mas
not told in substance, t h a t me had "abstained from recognising. his position," " so long as it was doubtfd" that he
" could make good his claims ;"whether he was plainly told
or not that the Governmeut of Inclin would not, forestall '
the choice of the A$@ Chieftains and people,.-it m ~ w t
have been perfectly clear t o him and to all &mterested
parties, that we ignored llis title, and recognised him a
only by virtue of possession. 1Te;~drnittgdl the fclct only,
not the ~ i g h t . By so doing we informed Sher Ali Klmn,
his usual advisers, and his malbontent relatives,-sure t o
the
lmve a t least one inforinant in the Durbar,-tlxit
British Government had no l.egamrdfor any law or custom
of successioa, would have recognised any one of t h e
brothers, and cared " so .little for Dost hfohammed's
nominee as to have waited six months in the expectilt'1011
-perhaps in the hope-that bawoulcl be s q ~ ~ l a ~ c by
t e d .flf
one of his rivals. The question of succession w m t,lms

F
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. degraded bv the British Government from i point of
~ir/htiuto n' point of fict, horn a matter of Mussulman
law, family compact, and Treaty engagements, into
mere ihtt~i)'of brute force and casual possession.
It followed as a logicgl consequence of this policy,and equally whether proclaimed in words or not,-that
we should,always esteem possession as the best, if not *
tlie' ozly proof of sovereignty, and that if any one of
tIw brot1zer:rs' could contrive to gain the capital, and to
makebimself Ameer ~ T Jnct
L
by the death or flight of his
predecessor, 1; would meet with no hindrance or interruption from t u r Government, and would be recognisedto say the least,-as freely and as promptly as S l ~ e rAli
Khan had been.
This may not have been the deliberate policy, or evon
the conscl;ous line of reasoning, adopted by our Govema e n t ; the lesson drawn by the rival parties in Afghanistan
may not have been what is here suggested; but most
certainly our Government acted as if it wished to teach
tlmt lesson, and tJherival partties in Afghanistan acted as
if they had learned it. And tbe subsequent action of our
Government, down to Decetnber 1868, was entirely in accordance with the lesson it had tanght. We recopised
three brothers, one after another, as Alneers of Cabnl,
solely by virtue of their holding the ca,pital. I n apparent
obedience to the same rule, we have now reverted to the
first of the thrcc.
In Decepber 1563, when tlie A m e e ~Sher Ali Khan's
letter, announcing his father's cleat11%ndhis own accession,
was answered by Sir William Denison, the Uucler Secret ~ r ya t the C G u t t a Foreign Ofice was Mr. J. W. S.
Wyllic, afterwards the acknowledged author of the article
in the Eclidmyh Bevie& for January 156'7, so oken
cpotecl in these pages. The apology for Lord Lawrence's
Afghan policy tllerein coininenced mas continued by him
in n, very interesting essay, signed with his name, in the
Po~t&ghthj 12eview for Decernbr "169, containing some
brief strictures on the fimt edition of this book, in the
justiceaf which I could not acquiesce. My reply to these
strictures was admitted int40 the columns of the Dciily

.
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iVezos,+??where Mr. MTyllieJsrejoinder also appeared. H a v i n g
access t o the s e c r e t records of his o l d d e p a r t m e n t , Mr.
Wyllie', in response t o my cl~aIlerge,p r o d u c e d , a copy of
Sir W i l l i a m Yenison's I etter, in its Englisl: version, whichr
*
was in the following terms :C

.

" To his E i g l ~ t ~ e sAMEER
s
SHERALI I ~ A Tfide~,of
N,
Cithzd, etc.
"Pour friendly letter communicating tho melanchroly tidings" of
.
your fatller's death was received by my Inmentea predeEessp,
Lord Elgin, wikh the utmost regret for the loss of so firm
aud constaut an d l y of the British G.ovcrnmeat. P S n will
have learned from m y separrtte letter of the deathr?f the late Viceroy and Governor General, an event which mas preceded by a severe and protracted illness, dnriug vliich a formal reply to your
o.nnounccn.ieut mas uecessnri1,y postponed. My separate letter will
also 11avo informed you that I lmvo assumad the offico of Goveruor
General, and that I take this early opportunity of aclmowlcdgiug
the receipt of yonr I ~ h u w e f iin
~ ~which
,
you iutimate yoar~uccession
to the lntc A ~ n e cDosb
r
Maliomed Khan, aud yomb desire, as Rnlef:
of Afghanistan, to maintain tho samc friendly relations with the
British Govertmcut as havo lleretofore existed. Yon may rcst
assured that thc British Governtneut pslrLicipate in this desire, and
I sincerely trust that under your rule Afglianistm may possess a
strong and ~ m i t e dgovernment, and that the good ~mderstaudiag
a d friendship that prevailed during the lifo time of the lato Amecr,
your preclecessor, may coutinuo t o gniu strength and stability
T
under your own administration. Moved by n sincere wisl~~ O tho
pclwsnent welfare of your rule and of the poople of Afghanistau, I
deem i t advisable to cornmend to your carefill consideration and
attention the words of the late Viceroy, whoa acknowledging, in
his lettor of 3rd J d y last, the anno~ulcementmade bg the Iajo '
Ameer of the capture of Herat by storm under yony Highness's
loading. I feel that 7 callnot too strongly press upon yoixr attention the nccossity for your taking the utmost cam t o prevent any
of yonr Highness's oficcrs on thc Persian fronkior from permitting
tlmnselves to b e led into any measures or enterprises which coulcl
justly give umbrage t o Persia. I a& confident that your Highness,
conscious how greatly the interests of youyself and tho Afghan
people are at st& in this matter, will bo solicitons to maiutaiu
penco and order on your own froaticrs, and will countena~lceno
agpression on the part of any persons over whom your Highness's ,
off~ccrshave influence."
(Signed)
W. DEN IS ON."^Decr. 8th, 1863.
Dccernber l'itb, lSG9 ; Jnnhrg 1st aid dth, 1876
Daily Arews, December 27ih, 18611.

+
+
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This interesting clocunmit very reinarbably confirms
the clmrge, and verifies the imputations, brought against
the Iizclian Foreign Office in the previous pages. Sl'though
its terms 'are pore cautious and coasicleratetlian I had
expected, they amo1mt;as I anticipated, to an " evasive
apology for the delay, a t t r i b ~ ~ t i nit,g let us say, t o Lord
Elgin's illness and death." " Mr. Wyllie himself admitted *
that it wai, in fact, an evasive apology, for he " specifiaiJly 'dissvo%ed " the " accidental " plea, and based the
defencz of Lorcl Elgin's Government, for its " apparent
dilntor&ss" bl recognizing the Ameer Sher Ali, " on
policy alone"^^ " Extenuation need not be pleaded", he
had said in the article whicli led to our controversy, "when
the means of jus-tification are ample".$ But until the
appearance last year of a volume containing ektracts from
. Lorcl Elgin's Letters and Journals, C
j we had no means of
knowing,how very evasive, not to say unveiacious, that
apology was. In the letter of recoo.iiition, the signature of
~ o r d advisers"
which, in the words of Mhlr. ~ ~ l l i e , ~ " Elgin's
"procurecl horn Sir William Denison",ll reference is made
t o the "severe and pj-otmcted illness" of the late Viceroy,
" during which a !hnial reply to your amlouncement was
necessady postponed".y[ The recently published letters,
however, prove that the illness of Lord Elgin could not
with any propriety be called "protracted", while its brief
and fatal severity can have hacl no influence whatever on
the delay i11 recognising the accession of Sher Ali. The
death of Dost Mohammed on the 9th J u n e , 1863, must
have been known a t Simla before &.end of the rnontli.
Lord
Elgin having started for his tour through the Pm,
jaub 011 the 26th September, up to the 22nd October
" continued his &arc11 $11 horseba~lc". We aye told that in
a long letter to Sir GE.la~lesmWood
of the 18th October, ant1
in " others of the same date, there.is no hint of sufTering
or of ill-health."** On the 4th November, "having with

.
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A?& p. la.
Dnil!j rVezus, DecemLcr 27tl1, 1861).
f i ~ t t ~ i g h t llieview,
y
December 18'29, paS
5 Lettew and Jozw~zalsqj' Jmzes, 3ighth Eurl of ZZgir~,editch by
Theodore Wnlroacl, C.E. (John Plillm-my), 1872.
l T Aqzte, p. 14.
I( B a b y flezos, Dccember 27141, 1869.
*" Letters and Jozi~?zols,pp. 457, 459.

1:

i~~i.-Ii:~p.
I thiri k he continues, "that the expedition" (against
t l l c ~Sit:ir):~
fhnaiics) '(will be a success ; and I labour inc ~ + w n tt lo~urge the necessity of confining itsIobjects t o
tllih firs6 intentions. P1:tnsiLle reasons for enlarging thEi
a t d , , ~ ~ l l 11f such urlvent1ures are never wunting, hut I shall
c . ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ;t Lo vI;eup
c ) u ~this within its limits."*
'I'lii.; na.; ~ v r i t , t e no n the 4 t h November. It is clear,
rlicw.~t;,l.c~,t h t the nohle s~zffe~er,
intent on duty t o the
I:tst, 1.cb111aiuedin the f~ull:wd active exercise of supreme
ii~itlicwity11)) t o ti~;ttclnte, On the 6th t h e attack was
t11:chrc~lt o be mortal. On the 20th he died. And this
is \vliat is called i n the Calcutta Foreign CJffice a "proi r:ic,t rtl illness."
Botll positive md negative evidence mag be drawn from ,
th! Letters awl Jouwznb t o show that Lord Elgin was
l d y informed npclnbndly advised as t o the affaim of
-2f$~mistttn, and that the announcement by the Ameer
Sher M i Kim of his accession was received with offensive
silence, fkonz no necessity, from nb inad;erteace,-as,
indeed, Mr. Wyllie avowed,-bnt from deliberate motives
of what was cttllecl policy. NO extract is given in the recently pul>lislied voluine from any letter t o Sir CCharles
Wuod bet\\-een June lrth, 1s6 3, when the news of Dost
3Iuhmmnecl's dent11 c&ld hardly have arrived, and August
30th, when the lhne for a gracious and cordial greeting
I H : L ~be said t o have passed aw~qy. And in a lettw of the

-

Y
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Uettem a d

Jozn.nnls, p. 458.
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lie l ~ a "
s nrrallged
with the Coininal~der-in-Chief"to hold a " cams of esereise" a t Lahore, as lie coiisidcrs that the "state o ] ~ ~ ~ f i ~ i , ai , ~
AJ:gImnistctn, gnd on ozu~j.o&w, would rendor a demon'stration, which would ;t?t once afford evidence of our military ~ttrength,and gratify t h e pride and self-importance
of the Sikh chiefs, a t this moment especially opportune."* '
The distlnct mention here of "oz~~~fio~ztier",-mens~~res
t y b8 talce el^ against the Hiadostanee fanatics of Sitnnu
being then imminent,-shows that '(the affairs in Afghanistan": separately referred to, can only have been tile
internal affaii2s of tllat country. I t is not apparent how
that country's afEnirs car1 have rendered a c'dernonstration"
opportune and advisable, unless the Aineer Sher Ali Khan
was, indeed, supposed t o be " hostile to the Eaglish d i ance.".f. Whether such redly was the supposition a t
.political &ad Quarters in August 1863, or not, me certaiuly learn in a despatch clatecl the 9 th March 1SG4, from
the Government of India to the Secretary of State, reporting on the Umbeyla calnpaign against the Sitana fmatics,
that the secret enmity of Sher Ali Klxm was in fact
assumed wl~ilethat expedition was plainled and in progress,
though no grounds for such ail assumption are given, ant1
its erroneous nature seeins to be admitted. For while it
is said that " emissaries of the Arneer of Cabul mere nt
one time suspected of encouraging the coalition and the
hostility of t h e tribes", we are told in the same sentelm
that the Amees " has sent troops agzinst the Moinnnd
Chief, and taken steps to cocrce hi6 qfractory fc~ther-inlaw."$
In September 1863, when the orders for the Sitann expedition had bee; given:Lord Elgin mote to the Secretary
blow to check
of State, " I wish by a sudden and vigoro~~s
this trouble on our frontier while it is in a liascent condition."
" The Af&ans in their distracted state might fbrnish
sympathisers ; we should bo i a v i t d to interfere in their
1- h t e , p. S.
. * Lettws and Jozcrncds, p. 459.
. j: Papbrs, Late DisturOances en t l ~ eNorth-Vest frontier (NO. 158 of
s

1864), p. -124.
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ilLtel'll:tl&irs, in arch 10 o p p e those among t h c ~ nnrllt,
,vl.rc :tllcttillgour il10h:ir~netlanadvemwies.""
'Llkree lllollt~ls,tllol-&re, after receiving from Sher Ali
~ < l tLl
~ : llcss
~ ~ ~of 11is pcncefi~land unclisp~tec~
accessiou,
tllc:T'ireroy of Ixdia l i d muclc: 110 r-esponse t o t h e Alneer's'
f\-itql,llS't , ~ e r t ~ lescept
r ~ ~ , by :z meaach1g display o$ force
llis' iYuliticrJ and nrns ex1)ressing some anxiety as to
,i t+,
" abetting our Moha~nfnedanad. ;;ylul~~tl~isers"
0
6
\'~l'>ktrlL!s.
r
2iTjclit' n.c luulr back t o the previous year, when Dost
~ I I ~ ~ ~ : ~\VitS
~ I Ienteriug
~ I I c ' I I011 his final and v c t o r i o d millI ~ : ~ i : _ I:il~(l
. ~ ~ , tr1,hcrve tlie Viceloy giving " a good deal of
I ~ a , l l ~ i , l ~ ~ r : t;LS
t i ~t ~o lIIOTV
~ ' l , lle can "with t h e least risk of
$,:.c.tti,lg t /)is(hvtwmlent illto tlmble, p u t a spoke into the
1 ) , ~ , t wl
' ~ I(.YI ill his progress towt~rds1.eratJy,fit can hardly
tl, itd,ttd t l ~ a t like
,
several other Viceroys in their first
yt.:ir, lie 11atl fillcn under the benlilclering spell 8£ str:mge0
it.ri11s; ~ u c f details, and hnd allowed himself' t o be fettered
I K tlw evil spirit of t h e Calcuitta Foreign Otfice, embodied
iLi i t h l,~*st
mcl highest for111 by Colonel Dnrand, who act t
i 11
v e r l e r e 'I'hat cvil spirit. of haughty
:tvt>r&tnt o :dl i~hlereutenergy, t o every natural effort, t o
t ~ . ~ social
ry
unrl spiritual force of purely Easbern origin
:t11$1 gluv4h, pervadcs uud prompts more or less every de~ ~ ; i ~ * t n01'
~ vons
f i t Incliall adininist.rntion, is pre-emine~ltin
virult..~lctb:it C1:~lcntttr,: L I chuncterised
~
in a very mni.lred ,
tltyxcbc t l ~ c
politicul career of the late Sir I-Ienry Dur&nd,
'She long list of a.rrors con~initted by this respect&b
c~f-liuCr
cli~rhgt w e n t j fc a ~ s 'elnploymellt in civa and diplo1l1i1tic ~ l ~ ~ t i ~ ' ~ , - tarising
d \ ~ i ~froin
p t h e same bald sectaria~l
~ ~ s t ~ j ~ ~ t l i c c i s , - c ~ ~ lin~ ~the
~ i i ~persistent
~ ~ t e c l imgortullity,
wllicli l~arclpfhiled, with which h&sou&{ t h e co&catiolz
~f I J h r : ~ the
d extinction o p t h e dynasty alld State of
;\.IS'S"'".
7)
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W l r t h e r the Ali~ewa]$ the B&i& Elnp& jvere inr l e l ~ t dfor the restoration of friendly intercourset o tile

" I;tit(-r.s~ 7 1 t Jl c ~ w M ~ I s 1).
, 454.
1. 'So Sir C'11:wlcsWood, Aag~tst9
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sound j ~ ~ d g m e noft Sir William Denisoa, or to the resumption of control by the Members of Council, from whom
the Foreign Secretary, Colonel Duraad, had beell separated during &is tour with Lord Elgin, cannot be a t
'present ascertainecl. It is abundantly clear, hovever,
that $us deferred recognition of 8th December, 1863, did
nut, and could not, really produce the effectin strengthen-a
irrg the Arheer's power, that it was probably intended by
Sjr William Denison t o ~ ~ o d ~ ~ cThe
e . " happy moment
was past. The recognition that might have conveyed an
expre8sion of respect for the last- wishes of Dost Mohmnmed, and a ~ % r of
d congratulation and good counsel for
his sdcc~ssou,now carried with it an air of scoru for
the father's memory, a persolla1 insult for the son, a n
effectual incentive for his rivals and enemies.
Sher Ali Khan was ~ecognisedby our Goverament,
with a d$bbt implied,-if not expressed,-as t o the superiority of his claim, in December 18G3, six montlm after
his installatioa. Early in 1864 his elder half-brother,
Molzammed Afzul Khan, who, as the Friend of India
tells us, had remained "quiet " till then, displayed the
first signs of disaffection, as if he now felt himself let
loose;.
I n January 1864, one month after the recognition of
Sher Ali Khan, and just about the time when Afzul Khan
was beginning t o show his teeth, Sir John Lawrence
arrived a t C a l c ~ t t aand
~ assumed the office of Viceroy of
India.
The first battle of the civil war,*destined t o last, with
but little intermission, for fonr yea% and a half, was
fought between the Ameer Xher Ali Khan and his halfbrother Afzul E%an in' J ~ l n e186 4, when the latter was
defeated. Immediately after this battle, Afzul Khan
made a show of sub&ission to his brother's legitimate
supremacy, and a reconciliation between them took place.
Witl~ina very short time, however, his son, Abd-oor-

* "But now," said tfie*Priencl of India, '<that his opponents, Azim
.Khan and Afzul Khan, arc quiet, however personally discoi7tentcc1, otw
Governmnt has clone only wh& is just and politic, in strengthening his
power. by formal recognition." Ante, p. 10.
c! 2
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Ralmnan, having snddedy fled t o Bolrl~n~n,
Afzul Xhall
IVRS :~srcstedby the Arneer's orders, and kept for a short
tinle in close confinement. It is some slig11C illdication of
tile progress of Inore humme views, thnt, n ~ t w i t h s t a r ~ d i n ~
aClvice
w g e d on the Ameel-, and numerous pre-'
cedents in the Afghan annals of thc last half-cepturp,
- A h 1 K11:1,n was ueither put to death nor deprived .of
sight. Ris i~nprisonmentwas very soon mitigtted into>
sort of hor~o~urable
~ e t i r e n ~ e iu
n t t h e Anleer'& hoasel~old,
wllere he was trented with respect and indulgence, and, "
tl~ouqhconstant$ attended and ~vatclied,allowed fo Lalie
n
escrcise OIL 11orsebnck.
It desrirves, also, t o be ~*ecordccIto t h e credit of Sher
Ali I<11an, that he had previously treated his brother
Azinl Khan, " our friend," and p c r h n p the most formidable of his rivals, with clemency and generous conficlence,
although Azim Khan had fully betrayed his knlsitious,
designs, and had fallen into t h e Ameer's power. I n
August 1863, ns the 3cli92b111'gh Reviewer tells us, Sher
illi by a r:@d n~arch,
('Compelled Azim Khan, who was hardly p i ~ p r e c lfor sucl~
j~ornptaction, to tender a formal snbinissioa. The t w o L K I ~ I ~ P ~ ~ s
thrn embraced : Azim I<ha11 swore fealty t o the Ameer, a r d in
~.otntmobti~iilcdn coufirmation of all tho dignities and emoluments
I I U 11:lil enjoyed during the late reign."

*

111 April 1864, Azim Khan again brake out in I-ebellion,
and was artin overpowered by t h e Ameer. I11 the words
of the f i d z ~ ~ b z ~Jieviemer,
~gl~
,

"Azim Rhnn's vcnt~wentterly collapsed. Abandoued by his
troops, Azitn Khan %TI May lGth, 3 86b, fled for refuge illto
British terrritoiy, and became a pensioner of Sir John Lawrence
at Rtiwul Pindee."t
P
f-

The P~mjcm1)A d m h i s t ~ a t iRepoq~t
~~
for 1863-4 says
that Aeiin Khan was "forced t o take refuge in British
territory, where he met with a private b u t honourable
reception, due to one who, during the worst times of the
mutiny, 11ad discouraged, any violation of i t by the
A fgllans."$

'
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Afzul Khan's arrest, amply justified by hi's previous
conduct and by s~~bsequent
events, was, of cou;se, denouncecl-by his adherents as an act of treachery on the
.part of tlie Aqi-teer Sher Ali. All the hostile elements exploded in rapid success'im. I11 a battle before Cand;~ha~,
fougld in June 1865, the ~rneer'seldest son, Mohammed
Ali, a young man of great promise, was killed. This was'
iterlible 6low to Sher Ali Khan. For many months he
rernarnecl a€ Candahar in a state of despondent aplztliy,
nlcnosj amounting to melancholy madness, while his
encmies were gathering strength from all quarters. His
brother Azih Khan, " our friend,"" returned from his
pensioned refuge 011 British territory,-only seventy miles
from the Afghan frontier,--and joined his nephew, Abdoor-Rahman, son of the imprisoned Afzul Khan, with all
the troop he could muster. The united forces of uncle
and nephew marched upon Cnlsul, and occupied the place
without much difficulty in February 1366. The loss of
his capital roused Slier Ali from his gloomy lethargy.
H e took the field once more,-his brother A f z d Khan
accompanying the camp ~ m d e rthe usual restraix~t,--but
was completely defeated by his brother, Azim Khan, on
the 10th of May, 1866, and compelled t o retreat upon
Candal~ar. The Chiefs in whose charge Afzul Khan had
been placed by tlie Ameel-, went over with their troops to '
the enemy. The victors re-entered Cabul in triumph,
and proclaimed the released Afzul Khan Ameer of Af@
glianistaii.
Heaceforth, up to October 1868: when Sir John Lawrence sent a congrttt~11a;toi-yanswer to the letter from Shcr
Ali Khctn aancpcing his decisive victory near Ghuznee
and re-occupation of &~bul, our Government seems to
have been betrayed into"a series of errors, partly from
trusting to false information, partly from imperfect appreciation of the undisputed facts before it, but chiefly from
the defective moral basis on which its policy was founded.
Let i t be granted for the pi%sellt, that a t the period a€
Dost Mohammed's death, it was neither just nor expedient

.
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for uu to ~ t t e i n p any
t
active interfe~cucein the a&irS of .
Afghnnjstan. What ought t o have bee11 our policy ?
We were still bouncl to the A f g l m ~State by t1:e o b l i p
tions of the Treaty of 1555, under which, ~s alE.eacly ex-.
pla.ined,# the British Goyernnleut Bad explicitly &nowleclgecl the right of the reigning Ameer to nomin;ke Ilis
'own successor. This prerogative, Gmiliar and racceptnWle
t o Mussulman nations, was obviously the mpst e&qti&
process for sec~uringa peaceful transfer of po&er, and fcr
preventiiig the disi~ltegrationof the united A f g h a ~Provinces. The non1il1ation of Sher Ali Khan was folmally
conmuuicnted to our Government. Yet when the time
came for giving effect to this nomination, instend of mising
our voice proniptly and emphatically in its fhvour, our voice
was so late m d our langua.ge so ~~ncertain,
as t o excite
strange rumours of' our red wlshes and inteatioils, Instead
of' upholcliag the wl~olesomeprerogative whicll we*Imdlxeviously helped to establish, and which offered the only
security fbr peace and good order, we contrived to unsettle
everything, and to give the sigunl for war.
For when it v a s seen that the great British Government,
which had ~nacletreaties with the A~neerDost Mohammed
and " his heirs", refused its mo1.al s u p ~ o r tto the Anjeer
Sher Ali Khan, and refrained from friencUy intercourse
wit11 him, the natural assumption was that we would have
preferred, t t i d shonlcl still prefer, another member of the
f'amily. This 1nay or may not have been,-I am inclizecl .
to think it was,-$ trne assulnption, but a t any rate it ~mc
irresistible, not onlg iii the bszars of Afghanistan, but in
the streets of Calcutta. It mas proclaimed by the press *
of India. Azim Khan was not called "ourfriend" by mere
guess, w i t h o ~ some
~ t leakage of sa$ugs and doings in the
Couix5l Chamber and the Foreign OfEce.
Let us, however, take a fresh depar.ture,-set down our
dilatory recognition as an unfortunate :~ccident,-and observe what was the course of our Government after the
arrival of Sir John Lav?renGe a t Calcutta, w11en Sher Ali's
tro~~bles
had commenced,
Slier Ali Khan, pi1blicly chosera by the Ameer Dmt Mo-

-

-
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hammed, and formally announced to o u r Government as
heir and successor t o the State, had t o wait, as we have
s e e n , six,montl~sbefore his position was r e c o p i s e d . His
&, b r o t h e r , Afial, Kban, raised from captivity t o t h e throne,
had only t o wait six *eks t o be recognisecl as "Walee of
CabuL"
'On May 21st, 1866, Afzd Khan was illstalled a t Cabul,*
n R e r the dvents already described. On July 1lth, d e n
t h e ?Lneer %her Ali Khan had reigned for three years,
and y bile he still, in Sir J o h n Lawrence's own words,
"retamed his a u t h o r i t y a n d power over a large portion of
Afghanistan," still "ruled in Candahar and in IIerat," t h e
British Viceroy addressed his rival as " W d e e of Cabul",
i n a letter which breathes in every line w h a t may be
t e r m e d t h e spirit of partition.
The entire letter, which 1extract from t h e demi-official
Ir axtide ia? the Edinbwgh Rcviszu for J a n u a r y 1867, runs
a s follows :,

"I have received your Higbiless's fricudly letter, giving an nccouut of lato events in Afghauistan. I t ~ L B Sbeen to me a source
o f sincere sorrow that misfortunes such as yous Highness describes
Lave bef'dlen the great house of the Barukeycs, and that calamities
s o heavy and protracted have been experieuced by the people. I t
was, and still continues to be, the hcarty desire of the British
Government that the hfghnn nation sho~lldremain under the
s t r o n g nucl nnited rule of the Bardmye family, and that this family,
endowed by the Creator of the wodd ~ 4 t hwisdom to be at pence
a m o n g themselves, shotild be respectecl both in their owu country
a n d by snrrouucling nations. Wherefore it has been a souroo of
distress and a n x i ~ t yof 1@1cl to me that strife and division h a v ~
arisen among the members $ your Highness's family.
'(My friend ! your Highness alludes to the fi*iendship which
cxistccl betwccn your Highness's renownod father and the British
Government, aild yonr EIigliness says that f ~ o mthis Gove~vmnent
y o u r Highness expects similar treatment. I t is the earnest wish of
t h e B~~itish
Govenlmmt that that fgieuGhip s h o ~ ~be
l dperpetuated.
3 3 n t while I am desiro~qthat the alliance between the two Governm e n t s should be firm and lasting, it is incumbent an me to tell
y o n r Eigl~nesstlmt it woilld be inconsistent with the fame and
hl.epntation of tho British Government to broak off its alliance with
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up t h e semhimce of central and supwrne authority. This
may have imposed on the vulgar, and probably brought
recruits aad resources to t h e insurgent cause. But it
p g h t not Yo hnve imposed on the Imperial Governmeat of
India. With whatcverFesei-va.tions our Government may
have cloaked their recognition, Afzul Khan was hailed by
tlieh as "Walee of Cabul," within six weeks of his reappew "
anEe 91the'sceue in that newly assomed character. They
c u e d not foF his qualifications or claims for the part ; it
was en~~1g11
for thein t h a t he had possession of the stage.
Andl after all, what did t h e reservations of this letter
amoimt to ? S2mply to a refusal "to break off the alliance
wit11 the Ameer Sher Ali Khan," " so long as he retains
llis authority and power over a large portion of Afghanistail.)' " My friend," says the British Viceroy, " the relations of this Government are with the actual rulers of
~ f ~ l ~ a n j s t hyozw
.
E i i g h m s s is c ~ b kto consolic~ctteyour
po~im*
i n Cc~bzd,cmd i s s i n c e w l y d e s i ~ o u of
s being a f ~ + ~ z d
urzd c ~ l l yof the B r i t i s h Govemme7ztJ I shall be ~vmdyto
cccceyt Y O U Y H i g l m e s s CLS such."
I11 plain terms :--Go in and win ! If Afml Khan and
his followera tools: this letter as a broad hint that they must
follow up their first success, and finish their adversary, SO
as to furnish the British Government with a decent excuse
"to b7~mlcof its u l l i c ~ ~ z cwith
e the A m e e ~ Xher
*
AZi I ~ ~ K L I L
it was the only~naturalconclusion for them to draw. What
a tone, hat an attitude for a great Government like ours
t o assume ! Called by its vast respoasildities m d interests as the Imperial Power of India: t g arbitrate between
contending parties, and appealed t o from Lotl; sides, it
bids them fight $ out'.
Meanwhile, untmilAfzGl Khan could get the better of
his brother, and " consolidate his power in Cabul", t h e
British Viceroy recognised him as " Walee" or Ruler "of
CabulYn--the very title that his father, Dost Mohammed,
had assumed in his treaties with the British Government.
#
The Viceroy says i i his
~ letter :-" I cannot break t h e
existing engagmeats wit11 Ameer Sher Ali Klzan, and I
must continue to treat him as the ruler of that portion of
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Afghanis;~anover which he retains control." I am n o t .
aware t h a t there were then :LIIY other " existing e n g a p
ments" with Anleer Sher Ali Khan escept, thc.Tre:tty of
1855, concluded for " his I-Iigl~nessA m e g DoBt Mohn~l~,med Khan, Witlee of Cabul and of' those co~untriesof
Afghanistan n o v in his possessionJJ,by Gholam $Cycler,
" "in person on his own nccourlt as heir apl~arent."* Slier
Ali l i d , f i ~ s tsucceeclecl
,
t o the position of "he;. apparelit",
with t h e knowledge and assent of our ~ovZrn~.nmeot
nud,
seconclly, to the position of " Walee of Cabul anci ~f those
countries of Afghmistnu now in his possession." How
then could w e profess a desire not t o " bred< existing engagements", when on the first revcrse of our ally, in t h e
crisis of i: civil war, we ~~ecogniseil
his rival as Walee of
a \ b ~ l , a i d treated t h e Alueer llimself only as Lord of wlnt
lie stood on-"as t h e ruler of that portion of Afglm~istnu
nvcr ~yll$l h e retains control" 2
n
M%en t h e Viceroy's I c t t c ~was written, the Anleer Sller
Ali I<han retained control not merely over " :z 1:~rg.eportion", but over by fixthe larger po~tionof Afghanistan.
Itsviewer, the Ameer was t1ic.n
According t o the E(li?&uyI~
in possessloll of "the distrilts of IChelat-i-Ghilzge, Candabar, Glliris111c, Furrc~11,and Her:~t",while "Fyz Riohmnmecl
mas in open insuwcction" i n his ~ : L V O"at
L Z ~Tukhtnpool"
,
i11
Bnllrh, and his I - i d , Ali111 I(l~itll,held "notliing but Cabul
t~lidGl~uznee",txncl hnci. only held t h e for six weeks. Yet ,
this was tlie time chosen, with strange nlncrity, by the
J3~itis11Viceroy, E3r ariclressillg Afzul Khan in the ter~ns
prescribed by the J'rEaty of 1855 , as " Walee of Cal~ul".
Nor was the more high-sounding tikle witliheld very r
long. Tile Pzcnjnzcb ildnzinistmt i t 12tpo~tfor 1866-7,
infonl~sus that when Afznl IChafi annotmced t h e defeat
of the Anleer Sher Ali o n tllg 1 7 t h January, 1 8 6 7, near
Khelat-i-Ghilzye, a, second letter was addressed to him by
Sir John Lawrence, in mhicll the Viceroy congratulczteci
Z l ilTI~aa,
" His Hiyl~ness the A m w ~ I ~ o I ~ c m z ~ i z eAcfzz/
FlhZee of CCL~ILZ
cmd CCCC?tidul~~~~,''
up011 " an event which
,
l

"

'"Iz~E,

.f.

p. 6.
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P

EtEi~dwyhEeuieza, J n n u a ~ y1867, pp. 30, 31, 33.
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'seemed likely to bring a b o ~ peace,
~t
and t'he e~taFlisl~inent
of a strong government.""
This smond letter was dated February 25th; 1861.
Mr. Wylli6, refwring t o this document in his I-io~.tm@tZy
Revz'ezv article, did not give the exact t e n o ~ of
~ rthese cong-rat~~lations,
but said that they "were tempered wikh a
reiret, and $veil a p~efereucefor his rival, so nakedly de- *
clare4that t)e records of diplomacy might be searched
in vain for a pa;l.allel." H e then quotes what he calls "the
most important clauses " of the letter, in which-strange
t o say !-we may " search in vain " for any expression of
" regret" or of "'preference." On the contrary, the Viceroy
thus emphatically and apologetically repudiates any leaning towards Slier Ali Khan :"My fi~ieiicl! The British Government has hitherto maintained
a strict ueutrality between the coiltending parties in Afghanistan.
&hnours, I a m told, have reached the Cabul D ~ l r b a rof assistance
having been granted by me to Ameer Sller Ali Kllan. I tnlro
this opportunity to request your I-Iighess uot to believe such idle
tales. Neither men, n o r arms, nor money, nor assistance of any
kind, have ever been supplied by m y Goverilmant t o Ameer Sher
Ali Khan. T o u r I-Iigh~iessa n d I*, b o t l ~eqnnlly xumided by me,
have fought out the battle, each upon j70ur own resources. I pnrpose to continue the samc policy for the f~ltnre."t
*

In plain terms once Inore :-Go in and win !
A belief has been already expressed in these pages that
our Government really supposed, when the former lettel.
oS 1l t h July 1866, was writken, that i$ was holding the
balance evenly between the contending parties. Credit
may, perhrtps, be claimed on its behalf,"-liotwithstal~di~lff
the natural purport of the words wl~ichI have pointed
out,-for not haqing inknded t o stir up more sti.if'u, or to
encourage Afiul Khan to gursue the advantage he had
gained, iu order to supply us with a pretext for " bre&ing
off the alliance " with Sher Ali Kh~xn. Xo much cmdit may
be given, but only on the ground originally t&ea 1111 by
me, that both letters breathe tke spirit of partition. Sir
John Lawrence's only, iden of acting as peacemaker was

,-
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.that of stggestiug a n amicable division of territory anlollg.
t h e rival brothers. The po1ic.y of his itdmiuistn~tionrrras
that of looking on, and gently aiding, mheoevw a ch:mcc
offered itself, in some such arrrtngelnent w tthnZ prol~ose~l
i n the following passage from 19% Cr~lcuttndelni-o%ciul
m
pampldet :"For ourselves i t has been our opinion that the pzogress oftllc
war u ~ i g h thave been more than ouce averted Ly the partitiolf of
Afghnuistan b e t ~ ~ e etwo
n or mow of tho rival Ch'icfs, whfist Jllo
British Governu~ent assumed the. position of tllc Pnramoont,
h
130~vw.''*

.

This was a policy, in my 11uld.de opinion, neither upright,
nor dignified, nor prudent. T ' V h t ~ to u r policy ought t o
have been, wit11 due r c g n ~ dboth for our own interests and
for our treaty engiigements with the Afghan State, s e e m
plain enough.
We had formdly recogi~isedt h e Ameer as s€~cessort~
llis fixtlux, and therefore,--under the Treaty of 1865, mncle
with Dost Moh:lmlned and "his heirs"--as "Waleen (Rnlcr)
" of Cabool and of tllose countries of Afghanistan n o v ill his
possession;" smcl we llnd bound ourselvcs "never to interfere
in those territories." Jy S ong, tlierefore, as m y of those
countries were in his possession, *he British Govemi~~ent
ought not to have recognisecl any other Ruler. That cluestion ought never to have been raised by anything sllort of
his death or utter dispo.;session. It was n o t consiste~lt
wit11 good fhith towaucls the acknowledged head of a
friendly State to a g g r ~ v aiti~; ~di~trnctiollsor t o aid in i t s
clisnl embelment. Slfzli a course was equally inconsistent
with an enligliter&d r e g a d for om- I~nperiaI interests.
Such a course was, however, adopted by the British a ~ ~ t l l o rities in India.
Afiul Khan died in October 1867, and his brother,
Azim Klmn, "our friend", was recognised by our Governlnent as Ameer, not oiily withont a moment's hesit at'lon
or delay, but with a remarkable denlonstration of renewed
confidence. The P Z L ~ ~Rcpoyt
C L Z for
L ~I S 6 7-8 states that
" his succession was recognised by the British Government,
b

*

Polieign Policg of Sir J o h t Lnzu~mtce,Calcutta, 1569, f 11.
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who lzud been hitheyto detained at Pes7zawur pending the
civil wu~~s,,fbZlowi~zg
on the death of Dost Molzammed, again
took up I& resgence at Cabul."" The Punjaub Repovt
does not, however, tell as t l q t the Vicesoy's letter, dated
Nover~ber13th, 186 7, recogiiising Azim Khan as Ameer
of Cabul, was despatchid without that Prince having even
announced the fact of his brother's death or of his own acceesioil, tlmt !he never made any reply t o these voluiiteered
congrat~lations,and that he treated the British Agent
with marked incivility. Mr. Wyllie, however, in the
Foorttnightly Rcviezo article of December 1869, says that
before the death of Afiul Khan, Aziin Khan, t h e real
rules, "had made a habit in the Cabul Durbar of railing
?pilist the British Government iu a strain of unbridled
n~solence",indulging on one occasion in " a fi~rioustirade
ggainst l$hglisli ingratitude and selfishness", and even
" doing his best by actual deeds t o stir up against us, in
an orginised league of holy war, the numerous predatory
and fanatical tribes whose mountain fastnesses overl~anp:
our North West frontier."T On his brotlm!s death, how"ever, " he felt", Mr. Wyllie says, that he " ought t o be recognised by the British Government, and the sooner the
better. Accordingly", conti-ilues the demi-official apologist,
" he took early occasion to hint in rouizdabout fashion to
our Moonshee that he expected from the Governor-Cleneral
some expression of condolence for the death of his brother,
Blneer Afzul."$ H e got even more t k + n hc expected,,
not merely condolences and compliimnts, but the immediate recognition of his title, and tlie restbation of a British
Agent at 1zis~Court. The Calcutta delusion as t o Aziin
Khan bcing " o h - friend " a t bottom, was evidcntly not
yet extinct. Mr. TVyllie admits that '( etiquette undoubtedly required Azim Khan hiinself to have made the first
move ; lze ought to have claimed British recognition Ly a
special letter to the Viceroy, formally announcing his
iiistallation." But he pleads, '%3irm John Lawrence lrnew
" Pz~y'aub.Repor!, 1867-8, pas. 45, p. 14.
*i. .Fortnigl~tlyReview, December 1869, pp. 592, 593.
$ IM., p. 611.
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for a f a c t ~ t l ~the
a t submissioil to Azirn Kh&l liad bcen uni- .
versal."* MY. Wyllie, nevertheless, in another part of the
same scrticle, explains that whatever " submissipn " there
was in Cabul to Azim Khan's usurpxtion was only enforced
by " EL reign of terror", by "$he penalty of dent11 adminis'tered to batches", ancl by filling the prisons with the adherents of tlie A~neerShcr A1i.T' I n a subsequel& essay
n Cabul mas
he acknowledges that the return of Sher Ali i
" a god-send" t o its inhabitants, as a relief fro& '"the
frightful tyranny of Azim Khan. t Nu testimony could
more effectually prove the blindness and incapacity of the
Calcutta Foreign Office. A t the time of. Afzul I-Chan's
death tlie cause of Slier Ali was evidently considered hopeless by the Government of India: In the Bombay Administration Report for 186 7-8 -every word in which regarding a political subject of such importance mnst*bave
merely echoed the instructions of Ca.lcutta,+after thg
statement that " by the death of Afzd Khan, Azim Khan
has become Walee or Ruler of Cabul", Sher Ali Khaa is
termed " the Ex-Ameer."§
During the long struggle of four years awl a half, XBer
Ali Khan sued frequently, but in vain, for assistance or
support, in any shape, from the British Government.
Setting aside for the moment all consideration of his rights
and of our treaty obligations, it ought t o have been as
clear as day, a t a very early period in the contest, that the
Ameer was fighting our battle, that his cause was more
popular than th%t of his rivals in all the provinces ,of
Afghanistan, and that he alone could hold the country as
s compact State. '
At almost every important crisis in tlle&vil war, even
after their most signal successe%, Sherr Ali Kl~au'sopponents made overtures to him for peace,-i. e. for a partition of territoTy,-but the b e e r firmly refused all terms
except those of entire submission to his autthorityas Sovereign of all his father's dominions. 11 Even thls significant
(r
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* J'o~tniy?ttlyReview, December 1869, p.

612.
$ &id., March 1870, p. 282. .
$ Aclr/~z?~~.zstrcttion
R e p o ~ tof the Bombgy GYovernncelzt, 1867-8,cp. 108.
11 See Allen's Indian Jdnil, November 2211d, 186G ; and Pu~tjazcb

j- ILid.? 1 y . 593, 594.
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-fact C O L I ~noZ
~ dpen tlie eyes of o u representatives at C ~ I cutta.
The cnr;eut newspaper reports ~manimously testify to
the prevailing*unpopularity of Xher Ali IClzan's opponents,
a&d prove that h e i r temporary and nnstable ascendsncy
was solely due to the superior geaeralship in the field of
Aziin Rhan and his nephew, Abd-om-Ral~man,and t o the
help which *he latter received from his father-in-law, the
1
1 this is pretty well epitomisecl
A ~ e e P o fB~khara." 8
in the $ l c ~ ~ t t apmnphlet, eulogising Sir John Lawrence's
administrati on, evidently coinpileclfrom a~~tlientic
sources,
which we ha.ve.nlreztdy quoted. The writer tllus desc~ibes
the state of affairs while Afznl Khan was in power a t
Cnbul, between June 1 8 % ~and October l S 6 7 :" Mtantime the grossest oppression chari~cterisedthe new aclministratioq, Money mas required, and little scruple was dis.
were
-played i u wringing i t out of the peoplo of C ~ ~ b u l Ca~avans
at; an end ; a i d
stopped and plundered until trade was
loans and contrilsutioas were exacted. A t the same time, clisnffection at Cabul was p u t d o ~ nwith a high hand by M a h o l ~ e d
Azim Khau."
" T h e oppressed people of Cabul now began to yearn for tho
return of Shere Ali Khan f ~ o mCandalmr, in t h e hope that h o
would redress their tvrongs." t

The Edinbzwyh Reviewer, speaking of the same period,
says
;-" All power centred i11 the hands of Azjln Khan,
*
who ruled with a tight
- hand, feared by many and loved
lq none." $
And referring to the period between October 1s6 7 aid
August
1868, when Azim Khan, recog%ised as Alneer by
*
our Goverlzinept on the death of his brother Afzal Khan,
held possession of CabuS the Calcutta writer mys :0

Adn~inistmtion.Repor~t,for 1866-7, par. 297, p. 95. Mr. Wyllie, also,
says thnt in November 1866, " messengers were sent" from Afzul ICIr~hail
and Azim Khan to Sher Ali, proposi~lgpeaae 011 t e r m of a partition
of the country,~SherAli to retain Cnndahar nlld Herat, and the conBeview, Decernfederates to keep C n h l with Bdlch addPil."~07.t?zigI1tly
ber 1869, p. 594.
Z d i n b w y ? ~Review, ~ a u ? ~186
a r 7,
~ pp. 21, 22.
$'OW&Z
Policy of Sir John Jawrence, cnlonttn, 1869, 13. 8.
Edinbwyl~IZeviezu, Jnuilctry 1867, g, 31.
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- ing effectual measnrw of clircct resistance or co&oion.

3

If

Herat were once fairly incorporated witli tlie .Pcrl;;i:~u
manai-chy, and a Russian Consulate estnblished there, i t
would no€ be so easy t o detach it again as it might have
been t o defend it.
Thetomn of Balkh, now called Tulclitapool, is not twenty-,
fi& miles from t h e river Oxfts, and hardly two hundrerl
rnhs.from '~$nt is now the Rirssian city of Samnrcnnd.
The Province, from the year 1520 until it was reconquerecl
by Do& Molxmmed in 1850, formed part of the Kingdom
of Bokhara. The Ameer of Bokharn, is nov a vassal of
Russia. I f BAllrh were a petty Principality, independent
pf Cabul, or if it form@ part of a distracted and divided
Afghanistan, tlie petelisions of Bolcl~artt.t u its forlvier dependency would veqTsoon be revived.
It is oldy as constituent Provinces of a strong Afghan
State. witli its chief resources a t C d ~ u land Canclahar,
that ~allc11and Herat, Koondooz and Badakllslinn, can be
preserved intact from t h e ,encroacl~mentsand a~gressions
of their neiglibours. It is only while their polltical connection with Cabul and Candallar continues, that Great
Britain cull exert its influence, for protection or tutelage,
over those outworks of its Tnditln Empire. It is only by
virtue of t h e Treaty of 1855 wit11 the Aineer Dost Mohammed Khan and his "heirs", that Great Britain has any
diplomatic intercourse or reciprocal engagements with the
Walee or Ruler of Cabul. Under this Treaty there n7as
t o be " perpetual peace and friendship '$between the British Government and the W d e e of (31ahul; and the latter
undertook " t o be the fiiend of the friends sad the enemy
of the enemies of the f o p ~ e r . "
Though so many imporlmt steps had been t&en between 1855 and 1863 tow&& fully realising our main object of a strong and united Afghanistan, amenable to
British infl~;ei~ce,-Dost Mohammed having reduced the
more distant provinces of Ball&, Koondooz, and Herat t o
obedience ; Lords Dalhousie a d amning having established relations of deTeasive and oFensi~ealliance with
the Wadee of Cnbul,--the, Govel.nrnel~tof Sir John Law-
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.rence, between 1864 and ISG9, woulrl have t l i r o ~ ntlirsra
~
great a,dvnntagcs to t h e winds. At tllc snpreiiw crisis c,f
the civil war, d i e n hoth payties l d :rppcdcd f i ~ rnllr
1-ecognitim, the Cro.i.crrimcntof' 1ndi:i I,c,siti\-c~ly"sngFt~st~tI
;ind encourngccl u re-partition of' tlic State, that . ~ \ . r > ~ ~ l t {
have destroyed British irifluencc, that ?~-oultlliave I;rol:cll
' up Afgllniiist:~11into se~-er&lietty Pri~~cip:~liCi;s,
c.nc11 imc
1mwerlcss by itself, a t ennlit,y ~ v i t hthe otlwss, :ind $oai;cs
or later clcpencleut for mere esistciice on the lxii,ron:~g~~l'
o w busy ccst-i~petitors.
c
Shc~
Rli 1T;h:tn himself has s:~~-ecl
u s for the tirne ~ I . O I N
11ttcr discomfiture, frcm a miuev:~blcrct,roqh*ssion, AIo~rrl
lie did it. If tlie Afgllnn P r o v i ~ me stdl ~ulitctl,ns I),!
receivecl t l ~ l nfiwn the wise
vigol-ous 1 ~ 1 eof his
father ; if British influcncc in Central Asia still sri1)si:.1s a t
all ; if' tlic c l ~ wof o w I~nperinlpolic~,i l i i ) \ ~ $clrppped,
~
calk
still be recoverecl.; a a servant of Grmt Briti:u~,:I+limnc ow
:tbroacl, a p p a r ~to deserve any credit whntcver firr tliis
I~ecioum
s d fortunate reprieve. W e owe i t t o S l i c ~Mi
Rlinn.
13efore his second instd1:~tion at CaLul in Septcn11rt.r
ISGS, ant1 the decisive victory near Gliuznee over t l ~ c
fiwces of his brother, Azim Khan, in L)ecembcr of tllst
ymr, t h e A~llcerShes Ali owed us nothing. Tlml 0111.
Govcmlnent, roused a t last to somc sense of its lost c y
portunities, oiYe'el.eclhim some little assistance in money and
warlike stores. He o'ivecl us nothing up t o the date of'tliat
oKer. On the col~t~a;;).,
bnt for our ambiguous bella.sio~rr,
the intrignes and, insnssections of his brothers-if t h y
had ever been set on foot-~ould have been much lcss ,
formidable.
o
The dehy in recognisirlg Shes Ali Khan's accession ni:ly
be chiuitably imputed by sonGpeople, though not by me,
to an oversigl~tor misliap. Short as .nTas the clclay in recopising Afiul Khan, it was yet ,z cleliberate act 011 tlir
part of our Governnlent. VTe illcited the Ameer's r i d s
by delaying to rccopfse f;is title, and we recognisecl his
rivals ~ i t ~ l i oany
u t title a t all.
Those who were allowed to .guide 1n1peri:il affairs at
Calcutta, and ~vlioseadvice w : trust
~
ccl in Lnnclnn, ber r

m
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tween 1864 nhd 1869, failed ntterly to master-the situation. To ts~11.ethc best view of their policy, it mas no
policy at. all, but mere be~vilclerinent,-as if they *hadde.tided to look on, and see who would win. To take the
worst view of it,-an& one, I believe, nearer the truthi t wag a policy hostile to Sher Ali, but covertly hostile,a t first inclined towards Azim 1<11:~11, "our friend," as a*
c%ndidatefor power ; more decidedly aftermwds, in favour
of p&i-tition.'A gpmpse at the foregone conclusions on this point may
be obtaiaecl from vol. ii of the Collection oJ Treccties,compiIec1 by Mr. C. U. Aitchison, then Under Secretary (now
S e c r e t a ~ of
~ ) the Foreign Department, and published at
Calcutta by authority Ifi Jnpuary, 1863, six n ~ o n t l ~before
s
Dost Mohammed's death, while Colonel (afterwards Sir
Henry) Durand was Secretary to Government. W e read
as folIo~$ in the pl:climinary rema& to the Treaties with
Af@$anista,n :-" The recent invasion of t h o Cabnl dominions from I-Ierat, rasulting in the siege of that town by the Ameor, has excited much
speculation as t o t h o future of Catsul. Them s e e m Zitfla doubt
t l ~ a t7~c
t IGi~zyclonris o d y keptfi-om t i i s m r n , b e ~ m c by
~ t tho personal
injZzmzce of the A~nce.1;who is now of great age."*
"Thy wish mas f ~ ~ t h e rIla~ry,
,
to that thought.'"

,

There wonld have been no danger of " dismembennent",
if the British Government had known how to do its duty
to itself and to its neighbour, and had determined to do
it,-if it had encoun~gedthe reign of ,,Law, instead of ret
counsels prelying upon "personal influence." & ~petty
vailed a t the most critical tlmoment, 'Imperial traditions
were forgotten ; the professional policy of Calcutta came
into play uncllkcked. good faith and good will towards
the slowly forming State of Afghanistan were wanting,
because the lawf~dRuler was understood to 11nve a will of
his own. Without avowing our preference, a negative
support might be given t o the pretender, whose personal
influence was imagined to be favowable to us, by simply
tvitl~l~olding
for a time our yecognition of the regular succession. ,Sir John Lawrence, though not responsible f o this
~

.

*
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CoEIection of [I'vercties, vol. ii, p. 437.
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first error,*didnothing to rectify it. On t11; c6ntraV, lie
recoguised the first pretender who contrived t o seizc on
the capital, and thus converted the negative support of
disorder and confusion into positive support.
The o6cial apology in the Edi~~lmyh
Review, was
written about the end of 1866, when symptoms of the
Calcutta policy having broken down were beginning to
raise ~mpleasantremarks. The False informatioir and f,t;lsa
inferences on which it was founded were explbding iii au
directions. The Ameer Sher Ali was proving hirmelf to
be neitl~erso weak nor so unpopular as he had been represented. Afzul Khan, recognised in July a s Walce of
C a h l , was not getting on at all. Iu six montlls he had
made no progress, notwithstanding 'the Viceroy's exl~ol-tations, in "~ o ~ z ~ o l i d chis
~ t 2Jozuer
i ~ ~ y in Cubu 2," OT in driving
Sher Ali Khan from " a large p o d o n qf Afiylzanistc~~t." The
British Government were still u ~ ~ a btloe "b w a k ogC
i t s alliance with Ameer Sher AZi K J K ~ ,zcho l ~ a dgiven it no
qfence."" The Reviewer writes :"At Cabul nothing of any importance occurred after the instnllation of the rival Arneer, Afml Khtlb. Bat tho prospects of

-

*'

the party have sensibly deteriorated in the interval. They Iiold
nothing now but Cabal and Ghuanee."?.
To make out n good story for Sir John Lawrence's

Government, under these circumstances, was no easy
matter. The Reviewer has done his best. He evidently
anticipated the dtimate success of the Ameer's cause, and
is dimly conscious of the worst point in t h e case,-the hasty,
recognition of Afzut 4111an. Carried away, however, by
loyal admiration fog the distinguished person whom he
has undertaken t o defend, and by natural solicitucle for
the credit of his own Depal-tment, he taIcerj"t11ebull by the
horns, decla~esthat the British Goverllment has been
faithful t o Xher AX, and " has given n o counte~zunce" t o
Afzul Khan. X-Ie speaks of t h e "pertinacious efforts of
Azim Khan t o lure us from our fidelity to the Anleer
Ali's cnzlse." R e assures .,is that " t h e relations of the
Ailleer Sher Ali remain o n the old footing of mutual trust

e
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and good-will."* H e characterises the Viceroy1; letter of
tbe 1l t h of July, 1866, as " the frank avowal of a preference fsr the Arneer Slier Ali."? "Above all," he says,
:' the repitation of being the ally of the British Government was a tower of s&ength
- to Sher Ali Khan-

I s r though, since the commencement of the strife, innutner-,
atlo proofs have been given of our determination to let the Afghans
fight oul; theh own battles without the grant of a single musket
on rupee to o h side or the other, Sir John Lznvrence has takcn
110less gains to let i t be known thronghout the length and breadth
of Afghanistan that Englaud does not depart lightly from her cngagements, andCt h a t mo p ~ c t e n d e r cule h o p f o r awy c o ~ d e n a n c t ~
jiorn 1 ~ m ;so long a s the Prirzce zul~omshe has ouce ~ccagnised cis
Sovereign vetccins any tlnznte~*idhold q o n the cozu~try."I
He protests invain : his own scrup~llouslyaccumte narra(l 1

tive, and $he Viceroy's letters, contradict him.
In order to maintain our condemnation of the policy
-pursued 'at Calcutta in 1864 and 1 5G 6, it is not at all
necessary to insist that the Arneer ought to have bee11
supplied a t first with muskets or rupees. If the moral
support that was due to a frienclly Sovereign had been
extended to Sher Ali a t the outset of his troulsles ; if no
countenance had been given t o the pretenders, Afzul and
Azim Khan ; the material help that seems to all India and
Central Asia t o have been a t last extorted from us, would
probably have never been required. Money is the great
want of the Afghan State, Every one, great and small, in
that poor country, knew what effective aid we could give
t; its lawful Buler, without moving& single battalion,such as we had given to Dost Mohamlfied in 1567, snch as
we have now given, a t the eleventh hour, to Sher Ali Khan.
If the British Viceroy kad taken his stand on the line and
rule of succession instituted by Dost Mohammed, approved
by our Government, and recorded in the Treaty of 1855,
-if he had declared that he would deal with no one but
the Ameer Sher Ali, on the ground of his absolute right,
and had taken suitable meansto p a k e this decimation
public, it would havfj found its way to the hemt and
reason of all Afghanistan. Conspiracy and rivalry would

*
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&linburg?~Review, ~ a n u h l y1867, p. 31. See Appendix B.
t Ibid., p. 34.
$ Ilid.,pp. 30, 31.
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. Viceregal &a.ir of state. The most able a d cxpcricnceri
member of our permanent Civil Service would hardly s h i m
as Prim? Minister.
I n p u l d y Imperial matters we rnnst do our statesman011
'ship at home, and @LIP plans inust be coiistr~~cted
British principles. W e must beware of official experts.
13mq%,ct their achieve~nents; chronicle their information ;*
distrust their conclusions. Thcse are too frequently clict@ed by thb generous restlessiless of special and sing~~lar
qudifiptions, by a noble ardour for work audg1oi.y. The
measures they recommend, whether of masterly interference or of masterly inaction, are too often tahitecl, also,
by a certnin touch of contempt and antipathy for tlic alien
races wl~olnthey may affect so deeply, to ~vhichwe are less
liable i n the l a t i t ~ ~ dofeLondon.
Even as far back as 1S:38, we should never have thought,
on any ;%lcul;ztion of profit or security for ourselves, of
forcing a twice expelled Kiny upon the iviost insignificant
State of Europe. Nor would Lord Palmer.ston a i d Sir
Jolm Hobhouse have directed such an enterprise against
Afghmistan, unless it had been previously clcvised aucl
collcoctecl i11 Calcutta, unless they had been assurecl by tllc
Inclian Executive of its advisability and practicability.
The Court of Directo~smight, indeed, most reasonably
coin~laintlmt they were not collsultecl a s t o tllc invasion
of 1839,. andVdeclare that they totally clisaly~rovccf.of it.
The East India Company may be fidly absolved ; b u t the
Jnclian Government who
the expedition, r ~ n dthc
Lnclim Services, who iiailed i t witlz.enthusiasm, cannot esem-cape their &are of the bltme.
L o ~ dAucklnnd, the Governor-Gcnerd of those clitys,
not a very strohg i n a ~
a t his best, had been three years
in India, and was completely subject t o the illflucllce of
tllree clever Bengal Civilians, the Foreign Secretary and
his Assistsnt, and his own Private Secretary."
There is so much danger of even the best possible
Viceroy succumbing more or less to the official atmosphere
midst ~ ~ l l i che
l l lives and works, that far from giving him
credite for greater experience, the Imperial Goverunmnt

-
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IZayc's Tar in ~ ~ $ c ~ n i s l a 1857,
n,
vol, i, pp. 312, 315.
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ougllt t o .tiglltcn its vigilmt snlmvisiou ':~~iclc o ~tr0l,
r
rather tllxli relax tllenl, aftcr evcry ac1clitiun:~l yc:tr t , (
Viccrepd residelice i n India.
During tlic five yews preceding IS(ii), our clca1iAgs wit],
Afghuistan grievously clalnaged tlmt coulltl:)., and lhcecl '
om. Govcrinnent in a position of grecit tlis:~dv,zntu~c
tint1
discredit before all India m c i C'e~1tl.dAsill. Our Bat&tiom1 policy of lwolnotiag a strong,. orclerly, :i~zcl fi.icnrlly
C~ovemmentover t h e mnted Provinces of A f g l ~ m i s t : ~ ~ ! ~
though occusionnlly talkcd about, was ueglected in Loncltrl~
e the
~ ~ 1 ubnrlcloilecl
1~1
in Indit~. Trusting for g ~ ~ i d a n c€0
ofi?ci;lls of Cdcuttn, t h e Secretary oi' State c ~ d never
d
ncc
his way t o my cleciclecl line of action. And so we driftccl
on, a t the mercy of events. And although the worst cu.11sccjuences liavc been for the time averted by t h e persevering gallantry of' the Amecr SherAli, nucl t h e popularity i d '
his cause, the t e r m of our connection with thcf A f g l ~ n l ~
Xtatc were left 011 a very loose ancl nl:~kesld%foo?ing.
I t relliains to be see11 whetller Lord M;LS'Oredly got
i,eyoncl a makedlift. These has been no visible symptoul
ot' anything better a t present. H e certs~inlysucceeded. to
;L pitiful political inheritance.
A t his Lo~.dship'sassunllltion of the Viceroyalty, the attitude of t h e Imperial Power
of Inclia, towards Afghanistan,-so fhr as our past actio~,
inciicatcd,--was something like this. Our successive piwj e c t ~uE fkvouring "our friend," and of bringing t~Louttlic
1x~rtitionof the country, Iraving f'nilecl ; Hussia having
uttedy subdued Bolclmra, and llaviiig ~ d v a n c e dtoward?
our frontier much mow rapidly than we exlsectecl ; S l w
Ali Khml having p~coveclmore able a i d more pop~ilartailnil
me lmcl been led to believe,-showing hiillself capable of
standing done without us, or seeltklg tiid ~lsewherea t his
own discretion, -the British Goygnment at last felt ituclt'
obliged to propitide his good will by delicate nttentious
and handsome presents.
Our statesmen must lesnl, in their treatment of Easter11
aEairs, t o trust their ~ ~ 1judgments
1 ,
and t o believe in
theh, ow11 doctrines. W e can offer p o instruction or example t o Oriental nations, if we lower om. stsndnrcl of
political morals to their level. *Wl~eneverour GovernF

I

x

%

THlrIE OXUS AND THE ZNDUS.

I

L

41

*

ineat, co~nprolniseclor persuaded by its local q r e s e u t a tives, has deviated, in its dealings with India, China, and
other semj-civilised couutries, from the iutenlationcil rules
and maxims generally accepted in Europe, it has always
made a blunder, and mb have geiierally had t o pay for it.
Sooner or later, in one way or mother, we shall have t o
- par for every one of these blluldew.
The sen11-official Bdi?iburyh R e v i e z ~ w ,extolling the
.cvkclom of "61astedy inactivity," protests-very superfluously, J! sllould imagine,-against a "re~occupatiouof all
Afgh:~nlstan.~
I can see no special military obstucles t o
n campaign i i Afglianistan,
~
with or without the Ameer's
leave and concurrence, sl~ouldany just provocation, hostile
intrigue, or iueaacing. movemeilt from m y cparter, render
such a costly expedit~ondvisable or unavoidable. Every
year of friendly relations will diminish jealousies, dispel
d e a r s , anrfreduce the political difficulties of purely niilitary operations in that country to the vanishiug point.
But the so-called peaceful occupation of any part of the
country would be quite as costly as all openly-wowed
cxmpaign, and every year of it would only multiplg a d
qgl-avate the sources of disgust and arinogunce to the
people of the co~ultry. There are defects in our inode of
aclmiuistration, as well a8 peculiarities in our manners and
ways of life, of which the Afghans would be more imimtient than the I-Iindoos have been, and which arc yet :i
constant source of irritation in o w longest-settled lrldian
P-rovinces. Besides, the ASg11ans have tried it already,
1
and they clicl not like it.
I clis~nissthen at once all idea of securing our position
in India, and spreading our influence in Afghanistan, by
what has been ;nlled "'the forward game,"-whetl~er our
advance were to be conihed to putting ganisons into
Quetta and other straiegical points, or extendecl into
more direct political domination, by the actu:tl possessiou
of certain districts. Both of these plans have been brouglzt
forward under distinguished auGpices. It has been urged
that by a very littleepressure, or. as an equivalent for s
subsidy, the Ameer Sher Ali might be incluced to conscll~
1

.

..
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to the introduction of our troops, and e i t i e r i o cede the fertile districts of Koorum and IChost, and perhaps Jellalabad: or to allow us to hold them as his tengats at an
aaaual rent. The occupation of any point or part of
Afglzanistan, whether we entered by the Bolan or the
IChyber Pass, would be an immense mistake. y e as' srweclly shodcl not- sit still when we were there. The
temptations to further encroaclments and vkxatious interference would be incessant and unavoidable. In pcoportion t o the extent of our territorial holding, p d the
efficacy of our management, the a ~ ~ t h o r i tand
y dignity of
the Ameer would suffer and decay, untilmhe was either
driven from the tl~rone,or forced, as an act of self-prese~vation, to head an inswrection against us. Whichever
form the crisis assumed, the British Government woulcl
be reduced to the alternative of either once more withcll.awing from Afgllanistan, or of attempting th&firesponai-,
Lili tics of conquest and scvereignty. I n either case the
prospect would be appalling.
And yet the urgent ilecessity for strengthening British
inilapce in ' Afghanislu into an exclusive allisye and
virtual supremacy, becomes every day more evident. If
we do not assume that position, another Power will do so
before many years have passed. Whatever we may think
of the policy towards Afglmnistan pursued by our Government during the last five years, it is obvious that the
~ o l i c yof Russia in the adjacent regions has not failed.
I h e B d i ) ~ h y Reviewer
h
treated with some degree of incredulity the prec$cfed subjugation of Bokham and the
occupation of Sainn~alld. Since that semi-officid essay
was ~ ~ ~ ~ b l i sthese
h e d , events liave come to pass ; and a province of Bokhma, including i t 8 aneicnt ca$ital, Samarcmd,
bas become Russian territory. @Evenin January 186'7, the
Beviewer hesitated to declare himself of that contented
pwty of politicians ~ 1 1 0stiginatim what they call^" Ruswhose ('vision of the
sopkobia " as an "exploded
future is $hat of the Gossack a i d the Sepoy lying down
like lczlnl~stogether 011 the banks of the Indt~s."t g e t he

"

* E d i ~ ~ b w gReview,
h
Januaqw 186'7, pp.
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pronounced that, "with respect to Central India the Iniiian
Government can do no wiser'thing than fold its lxqds, and
sit still."* Meanwhile the Russian Government has been
etretchiae its legs, andamoving onwards. The advance of
Russia towards the frontier of India, steadily pursued for
thirty years, has been slow but sure. If any one sllould ,
ask me what the plans and objects of Russia are, I can only
i.dswer t l ~ ado
t ~not know, but I am quite certain she d
l
list tell them t o us, if we put the question to her. Nor
do I bfdieve that safety is to be sought in the "neutralisation" of Afglianistan, or in m y other fruit of that ' friendly
uaderstandin~with Russia" that has been so much talked
about. Nelxtralisation is nonsense, The neutmlity of
Switzerlancl is protected by the physical conformation of
the country, by the free instit~~tions
and noble spirit of the
people, a ~ by
d their adinir"ab1e military organisation. Bel-giurn
caliwot rely upon treaties, but is forced in self-defence,
i
d fox the maintenance of her guaranteed neutrality
and independence, to keep up a very large army in proportioii t o her population.
There is still so much of weakness and instability in the
footing which Russia has obtained in Central Asia, that
any diplomatic overtures in this matter will probably be
received for some time with perfect complaisance, and met
by the most friendly professions. She may seem to be
more polite in form, but will hardly be more pliable in
i'act, than she was about Poland in 1863. As t o her ret2ring one single step, or giving agy more than verbal
" assurances on the subject of further expansion, it manit'estly appears that it would be useless to expect any such
concession, or taplace $he slightest reliance on any specious display of the sort with which it might suit her for
the time t o amuse us.t It is already clear enough that
the assurances given by the Russian Government t o
Lord Granville that Khiva is not to be annexed or per1n;~nentlyoccupied,$ are of about y much value as were

-

-
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+ Appendix C.

I

$ Pupers, Cent,*alAsia (C, 699 of l873), pp. 12 13.

?4

s

THE OXUS ,AND THE INDU8.

*

h

those g i v h t o Lord Clareudon in 1869, and repeated in
1870, that; the El~perorwould not retain Samarcand.*
I t is by 110 means necessary to assume that Lt~ssiahas
ally designs distinctly and deliberately hostile t b the Bri-*
ti& Empire. Perhaps she has no" fixed design, because
she can form no certain estimate of how m~tchis feasible,
and how soon, until she has tried. She may be
watching events, but she does not sit still wi$L her han&
folded. She goes 011 step by step, and secures every step
she
One thing is certain,-she is not gring to
plant herself firmly on the Oxus, a t a vast expense in men
and money, for nothing. It is no very ext"l.svagant supposition t o n~ake,that she wants revenue t o pay for her
soldiers and establishments. And there is more revenue
to be got on our side of the Oxus than on hers. She
wants, also, to obtain complete control over all,the lines
era
of commerce.
The commercial and political attractions and interests
that have led Russia so far towards the frontier of India,
are suEciently obvious, natural and legitimate, without
our seeking for any occult or malignant cause that particularly concerns ourselves. Still we have undoubtedly
stood in Rnssia's way som.etimes; her determination t o
recover a i d repair all that Vas lost or damaged in the
Crimean war, and to resume her traditional policy that
was then interrupted, has been proved suficiently by the *
manner in which she has shaken off the restrictions on
her naval power impgsed by the Treaty of Paris. Without actually planning the invasion of India, or contemplating open war with us, she may think i t convenient t o *
have constantly at her disposal so$e ready meals t o clistract our attention, and divert our resources at the next
great European crisis. It is &r own fault if we allow
her t o succeed.
The actual state of the chcssboard, and the peculiar
nature of the check that threatens us, were well ilndicated
some years ago by on$ whose wide observation and keen
discernment are now, we may hope: applied towards the
solution "of some of those problqns which he d e h e d so
clearly. The followiilg detached sentences from the Section

* Papers, Central Asia,, No. 2 (C.

704 of 1873), pp. 9, 48.
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'PRE OXITS A N D TILE INDUS.

o n " ~ e n t m d ~ n "kin Mr. Grant DUFSP o l i t i ~ a l * S u ~ ~ ~
do scanty justice t o his lucid exposition, b u t they &e
sufficient fjx this p a r t i c ~ ~ l point
ar
:r C The po&on of affairs ;at this moment is then this,-Russia
11nsgot very consicle~ableinfluence over Khiva, has incorporated
with he$ own territory a large pal% of Kholrand, and has BOB11nl-2 within her gripe.
"*Come ili shw, or come it fast, tlie end will come, and Russia
will,de.i.ourtheflholp of what we usually understand as Central Asia.
" When Rnssia is fsidy established in Bokhsra, she will come
illto uece&ary coilliexion with the little-known country which lies
between Bokhnrt and those parts of Afghanistan with which we
are familiar, and she will pass almost involuntarily within the doy a i n of Indian politics. Already she is said to have a body of
Afghans in her pay."*
Since t h a t m7as w i t t e n Russia has become "fairly es-

tnblisheci in BokBara." She has passed "within t h e domain
Inilian*politics." It is now our business t o counteract
and nulllify her obscure b u t growing influence in t h e region
from whence it spreads towards India.

f-,

-

To promote a n d facilitate trade and travel, t o make o
Northern frontier secure a n d inviolable, a n d t o shut o
from India a prolific source of wild hopes a n d injuriou
panics, there must b e a strong-and orderly Government
Afghanistan, exclusively s~lbjectt o British control.
m u s t not b e open t o t h e Alneer Sher Ali, or t o any f11tul.e
Ruler of t h a t country, t o intrigue or t o negotiate with
Persia or Russia, or with a n y of their dependeats.
Wow is this constant a n d exclmivg control t o be exer? The Ruler of Afgl~anista,nis not at present ill
cised
*
actual contact with t h e Im 3erial Power of Indi~Y. H e is not
w ithill our immediate r e p 1, or exposed to direct co'ercion,
Unless we decide on t h e f p n i d a b l e operation of forcing
the Passes, we cannot get a t him a t all. Bwt h e will very
soon be i n actual contact with Russia,--if, indeed, h e b e n o t
so already. The great Northern Power may n o t as y e t feel
11er foohing sure enough t o decide 02t h e n e x t step ; b u t
- when Bokhara a n d Rhiva have been reduced t o unresisting
obedience, and their 'resources organised i n subjection

i

'

*

*

A Politirctl Xulsey, 173' bl. E. Grant Duff, b1.P. (186S), 131). 64, 66.
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t o Russhn sulwcmacy, n solid base will be provided for

-

Sonthern expeditions. Whatever extent of noiniual, and
oste~ls%lesovereignty may be left t o the Amel;r of Boklzare and the Khan of Khiva, the Afghan State will theg
be only separated in fact from the Russian Empire by :t
river,-that river navigated by Russian steamers& Thc
" British Empire is separated from Afghanistan by Cremendous chains of mountains,-every pass" and valley
occupied by llostile tsibes inured to mo~u&ain warfare.
Under these circ~zmstmces-sl~ouIc1the relative @tuation
remain unchanged,-it needs no
insight to foretell which of the two Empires must xvi~lda predominating. influence over the poor and coinpamtively weak
State interposed between tllem. No Afgllm force could
coinpete with Eussian troops ; am1 roubles will go as f a ns rupees, We had better not rely on the i%rzbu~$b
Reviewer's opinion that Russia " cannot nffo$ t o subsidise". *
How, then, is the relative sit~mtionto be clzangecl ?
As it does not seem advisable that we should go to the
Afgl~ans,suppose we were t o induce the Afghans to comc
t o us? Instead of making a more clistant froatier for ourselves beyond the Hills, suppose we wwe to make n nearer
frontier for tlxm on this side of the Hills. Anticipating
the time,-not perhaps very distant,-when the Oxus
~ v i l be
l the Russian bo~uldary,suppose we were to make
the Indus the British boundary. For OLW purposes a river
is better tliail a chain of rnounLains. At present we have
in fact 110 frontier ntW1; and are in contact on tlie Afghan
border with no responsible anthority. Let us bring the
Ameer in contact with us, and then make hirn responsible.
We hold vast tracts of Afghan territory, much regretted
by their former possessors, which are a heavy bwden to us,
but would be a precious boon t o them. If our Government were t o cede tlie Division of Peshawur, on certain
conditions, to the Afleer Sher ,Ali Khan, we should make
the most by the transaction. Besides the increase of rerenne, he would acquire much dignity and autbo-rity by
0

r
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having reg,.incd for the Afghan people those lost fragments
of the Uooranee Empire. The stronger 1le is, the.greater
his credit& the eyes of the Afg1x-m nation, by vlrtue of
.
QIE good offices, t h e better for us. Our profit, after having
parted wit11 Pesham~u-:would consist in the reclrzction of
our eixormous establishments, and in the concentration OF
ou? military strength in formlclable and clisposable masses, '
tlidugh in si$ller numbers, on a redly stronger and more
healthy line, lnsteacl of a t least twenty-five thousancl goocl
tro~ps*,~beiag
frittered away in more than s hundred forts
and fortified posts, scattered along an undefinable fsontier
of 800 miles, oh the skirts of lofty mouytain-ellains. Even
a t Peshczw~w,where a force of about 3009 British soldiers,
and as many Natives, with more than twenty field guns,
axe constantly stationed, we learn that a great fortress is
to be cons$!tructed '' at a cost qf zyzua7ds of I~ulf-c~-~~~illiolt
-steding," $-nearly five years' revenue of the whole PeS ~ C Z T V L IDivision,-to
~
protect " our magazines", and t o
afford " a place of refuge for non-combatants, women, and
chilcken." And then we are told of "hostile tribes a.ncl
unruly neiglibours." Surely this intelligence should strike
us with a sense of humiliation. Who are these unruly
neighbours, against whose attacks our magazines are to be
protected in this expensive stronghold ? The Afghans ?
Not t h e AFgllans who are under the Governmeat of the
Ameel*,-but "the hostile tribes" who we under no Government at all, md can be brougl~tuncley no Government,
so long as we insist on occupying am untenable position
on one side of the Hills, ~v11ich prev8nts their investment @or effect~~al
invasion.
The following lisl; of expedition8 against the vnrioas I-Iill
tribes along our border hf 800 miles, since the annexation
of the P ~ m j a u bin 1849, gppears in a Parliamentary Retun1 of 186-1 :-

*

I include in this rongh estimatc 9,000 IleguIar troops in the Peshnmcn of the Pur~jnub~Irregnlnr
Force, and some
thousands of Military Police, I-Iorso and Foot8.
The l'inzes, November 24th, 1868, Letter from Cnlcuttit, dated
October N t h .

W L I ~Dist~ice,10,000
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1850
1651
1852
1852

1858
1852
F

1852
1852
1853
1853
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Tribe.
Troops.
Afreedoes
. . . . . . 3,200
Meeranzai
. . . . . . 2,050
flornunds
. . . . . . 700
Rnnizni . . . . . .
.. 2,000
Oatnankhoyl
2,000
Kaghan
650
Oluerzd Waziris
1,500
Hnssnnzais
. . . . 860
Sheoranees
2,800
Kusranees
600

......

......
...

......

......

C

Teav.
Tribe.
1853 Boree Afroedees
1854 Michnee Mo~uands
1855 Meerazai ...
1855 Rnobenlth.ey1, 0r&zais
1856 Meeranzal.. . . . . .
1857 *Bozdar
1858 Sitana fanatics
1858 Kabul ltheyl Waziris
1561 Muhsood Waziris
1863 Sitaua fanatics:

Troops.

. . . . . . 1,500
... 1,600
... 3,700
... 2,300

. . 4,5563

. . . . . . . . . 2,640
. . . . . . 4,877
.... 3,991
... 6;106

. . . . . . 5,1330

To make the calendar complete, three "more recent
FC
expeditions must be aclded :1866 Af~eedees
1868 Bezotees

"

-

k

v F

C

. . . . . . 6,000 1868
. . . . . . 1,000 I

y

Sitana fanatics and Rnssunzals n
20,000

......

Twenty-three little wars in twenty years, besides innumerable blockades, embargoes, reprisals, and fines on Chieftains and Clans, enforced by military executioll ! There
was a n o t l ~ elittle
~ excwsion under Colonel Rezes against
the Bezotees, on February 24th, 1869, hardly ort thy of/
beillg ranked with the above, for our loss was only thirtytllree killed and wounded.-fAnci while the first edition
of these pages was in type, the mail that left Calcutta on
the 27th of April, brought the intelligence, quoted from the
ikdiun Daily News, that " there lias been another raid
into British territory on the North West, and about 2,000
head of cattle appropriated." " A handful of troops have
turned out", 'it adds, " and we shall soon hear of another
dashing retribution. Of course, the raids are very annoying, but the splendid army on t h e Punjab frontier wants
occupation, and these occasional expeditions are excellent
discipline for our t,ro6ps."$ As some one said in the House
of Commons regarding the Abyssinian expeditios,-" it *
keeps our men in wind."
According to the official list tllb-e we;e 5630 men engaged in the expedition under General Sir Neville Chambcrlai~l,against the Sitana fanatics in 1863, usually called
the Umbeyla campaign. Yet from a previous paragraph
in the same despatch we learn that when the Bonair
tribes, who had bccomc involved in the affray, a t last gave
in their submission, " our force was now in a position to do

'' P q ~ o ~East
s , Inrlirr (North-West I h n t i w ) , No. 168, I ~ G p.L 130.
~
-1 Apl~cndixD.
:I Daily Mezos, h l y 24tJ1, 1869.
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snythii~g';bi?if~ia2om than 9 0 0 0 stmng. "* Five BI.itislr
Regiments were included in tliis small but eEcient army.
I n the cnqpaign, from the 15th of October to the 16th of
Qecember,.1863, our casualties amo~ultedto fifteen British
of%cers killed, twenty-one wouadecl, and 847 killecl and
tvoundecl. of all
If we consider this heavy loss,
a i d observe the progressively increasing number of troops *
employecl, until we find General Sir Alfred Wilde a t the
head of SO,000 inen in 18 GS, this chronic little mar seems
quite c,yalsle of growing into a great one.
the borSince the first edition of this book was p~~blished
der raids can hsrdly he said to have fallen off either in frequency or virulence. The large body of troops put in motion
a.gainst "the Hussunzyes" in IS68 seems to have produced
a very ephemeral impression, for in the EIofizezvcwd &!ail
of November 13tl1, 1869, we find the following nasatisfac--tory
intelkence.
r r ABritish force is at this momeuti more than halfway up the
Black Mountain, and a severe retribution has been taken for the
petty, but politically important insults which the Bussunayes
have offered us so frequently or late. Last week a large village
was burnt, its crops were wasted, and a hundred aud fifty head of
cattle carried off by our troops. This vigorous measnre will prove
a significant warning, at the very comlluencement of the cold
season."

The " significant warning" does not seem to have been
effectual, for after a lapse of six months we hear of a new
outrage almost in the same locality.
"The DeZhi Gazette has an account of another raid by a Black
Mountain tribe into the Agror valley. ?In April 9thJ a strong
p a ~ t yof Akasyes came over the crest, surprised the village of
Unrcha, slew its head man, busat some of the houses, and made
off with all the catt2e they aould collect. This village, and scveral othcrs dotting the face of ,&he slope, cannot bo protected by
the force in Agror, as there can be no reliable information as to
thc point of attack. Almost every night troops were posted in
the villages nt the base of the hill, but the enemy did not dare to
molest t h n . On the 16th they again came over and plundered
and burnt the village of Xirnbleboote. No livcs were taken ; one
woman was wounded. Next day they pluudered another village,
and the rest were deserted by the inhabitants. They have

a
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actually driven off e v e q inhabitant on tho sGpe 'of tlie mountain.*''

T h e e is an encleavour t o account in some degree for
these incnrsions, and for the failure of our Govisnment t o
check them, in the following extract of a letter from '<od'r
own Correspondent," dated Calcutta, May 1Sth, 1870,
which appeared in the Thnas of June 13th, 1870.

-

"The frontier campaign of 18G8, in the Huzam districtJChtween Peshawur and Cashmere, is not yet forgotbn. The Indian
press, mith a rare unanimity, declnved it t o be a fiasco, and tho
verdict has been confirmed in a manner as humiliatidg to our
wisdom as it is flattering to our sense of justice. That campaign
Tras caused by disturbmces in tho Agror valley, which wero
traced to Atta Mallornod Khan, the Chief. W e deposed him,
and sent him off a State prisoner to Lahore. But now the revenue
settlement officer has discovered that we had provoked the rebellion-as m m y hold that we did in Oude-by stripping the 1111foytmate Khan of his villsges. 0111 ' ~ u m m a r ysettlewnt,
~
left him
only l G 7 tenants out of 1,044, and but one-third of the r e n h - f r e e
estate given hinl by the Sikhs, as a warden of the marches, and
tllen we held him to be no less responsible for the quiet of tho
frontier than he mas before. And all this mas done with the best
intentions, in pursuance of that dead-level policy which has given
birth to the New Tonaucy Act. After investigation by Sir
Donald Madcod, the facts were reported to Lord Mayo,when he was
ou the spot gazing at the villageswhichwe had bnrnt in the so-called
campaign. Immediate and full restitution has been ordered. The
Khan has boon permitted to return to his restored estates, after an
explanation of the mistake and its origin. The local sympathy
with him is great, and led to the disturbances. It is to be hoped
that he will henceforth prove a most faithful buffer betmeennus
and the wild tribes w l q m we fomerly forced him to s u m m b to
his aid."

The Khan may have been a " most faithfril" brri does '
not seem to have been an infaQible " buffer," for just n
year later, " we have the r e p o ~ of
t another raid by a border tribe irlto the territory "o Agror, on the NortliWestem Frontier. It occurred on the night of May 4 thy"
(1871) " and seems t o have been an insignxcant exploit."?
The raids and ret$iatory expeditions just mentioned,
all occurred t o the North of the citynofPeshawnr. We may
now glance at some recent events of a similar nature in

" Homezua~dMctil, May 2lst, 1870. "
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4. Tbid., Julie loth, 1871.
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the Southern district of the Peshnwur Division. * Here is
a piece of news from Bmnoo,--or Edwnrdesnbfid as it is
now officidly called,-da~teci 13th Jtme, 1S 70. The 'cantonment of Bunnoo is a l ~ o midway
~ ~ t Between Pesha~rur:incZ
Dehra Ismail Khan, nettr the Koorutn river, and five nliles
from what is termed the Western frontier.

I'

Intelligetce has been ~eceivedthat the Waziris on the Bunnoo '
frontier are ' up.' For some time they havo been ripe for miscllief,
and have beeu fanning their excitement to fighting pitch by solno
grievancp, peal or imaginary. This feeling has at last culminatcd
in a raid upon British territosy in which we regret to say they wero
only too success£~~l.
On the morning of the 13th instant, a strong
body of the Mahomed RLail Waziris waylaid a relief party of
troops of the Pnnjaub Frontier Force proceeding from Eii~vardesabad to an outpost called IIoosum, and cut them up nlmost to
a man, six being killed on tho spot, and uearly all tho sost
wounded. The Waziris then retreated to the hills in safety, vith
the loss, a$far as ascertained, of only one man. As the ambuscade took place only a few milcs out of the cantonment, the efi~ir
has caused intense excitement dl dong the
"It says very much for the alertness and discipline in tho Bmlnoo cantonment, that within an hour a European officoT a d :t,
troop of cavdyy were in full pursuit; but the affair was over.
The avengers went rapidly up the Kclorum valley, but did not
see a soul."*

It may be taken for granted that retrib~~tion
fell sooner
or later on the guilty tribe, or some of their neigllbonss,
b u t in this instance it does not seem to have been very
promptly administered, for on July 4th of the same year
there was mother indecisive affah mith the Wazi~isof
the
Mabomed Kliail near the same' Koor~zmoutpost, in
"
which our troops were commanded by Colonel Gtlrduer
and Captain Mc&ean.t
Then, two montlis hgving- passed, we find in the I~Zicin
Public Opinion of Beptebber 6th, 18'70, a, paragraph
headed " The Mahomed Khail Waziris again."

.

"Late on Sunday afternoon, a small party of hIahomec1 Khail
Waeiris succeeded in driving off seventeen Lead of cattle, which
had been allowed to remain behind aftet the rest of the herd had
returned to the Pill0,ge with the guard which accompanied them.
*
8 I~dzdirr?z
Aiblic,Opi~tioz,June 21st, 1870.

t.
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Ou the 3Qt.hnlt. :I. party of about 140 men mew seal by a patrol
near tho dam wliiclt dwerts a stream from the Roornm for the
supply crf the post, which they had succeeded in destroying before
they were observed. A fowe of Cavalry and Infanrrry started,
and soon drove off the euerny, who ytreated into the Idls.
aepoy of the 4th Sikhs was slightly wounded, and three of the
BiInhorned Khails received wonnds."

-

But just a t the time that the Mahomed Kbail ~ a z f r i s
were cutting off o w patrols, and insulting Bur outposts,
their lriilsmen of the Bajir Rhail were showing their
defiance of the nominal authorities on the othe1"side of
the nominal Punjaub frontier. In June $870, the Bajir
Khail Wmiris slew the Afghan Governor of I<host" and
fifty of his people, including ten head-men. Whereupon
Ameer Xher Ali is said to have given orders to "annihilate
the m ~ ~ t i a o uvillages
s
of the Bajir K h d , " and to that end
t o have put in inotion three regiments, 1000, irregular
-4
6
horsemen, and four guns.
The extracts that I have preserved are not sufficiently
complete to show how the Afg11an brigade aped on its
avenging enterprise, nor to what extent, and on what
esact occasions, punislimeat was inflicted on the Waziris
by the British Government of India. There can be no
doubt, however, that they were punished. The following
account given in the Times of March 21st, 1872, in a letter
from " our own Coirespondent," dated Calcutta, February
23rd, describes the penalties enforced against a tribe wl~iclz
had given aid and corufort t o these inveterate Waziris of
the Mahomed Khail, in some of their freebooting i n ~ ~ k sions, nearly two years after their ambuscade against our
tmops near the outpost of Koorum.
"We have recently succeeded in anoperatio% after the manner
of our older deeds in India. I t&graphed you that brilliant
dash of Brigadier-General Keyes from Edwardesdmd. The origin
of the expedition was a simple one. The tribes of the Dour
Valley had been ordered to pay immediately a fine for having
harboured theMahomedKhails during the late disastrous outbreak.
The reply from the valley amounted to a defiance, and the next
morning Brigadier-General Reyea was on his way to the valley, as
direct as an arrow from a bow,with a force of about 1,300 sfantry,

" See &I&.
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300 Horse, and two howitzers. A small party which was puslied
on to reconnoitre lost heart, and at last ran, and the Brigadier on
the following morning had to begin his advance by a pass, which,
by the rule> of mar, ought to have been occupied by the enemy.
The little force was asseqlded a t four o'cloclc in the morning,
and, after four h o u ~ s ' hard marching, arrived at tho Lochee
Pass. There was a slight deteution here, o,nd rations mere served
out. At 11 the men wcre again in motion, and an hour's hard
ulgrchizlg and dragging of guns brought them to a platean on
which were thi-ee of the refractory villages, Haiclerlcail, Solrail,
and Haisee. Eere demands for submission were made, but
klaiderkhil showed a decided hostile spi~it,and our troops were
fired upon. Tw? Sikh regiments-the 1st a d 4th-were then
pushed on; the village mas stormed and fired; the 1st Punjaub
Infantry and tho 2nd Punjaub Cavalry completed the work, and
the village was destroyecl. This decided the other villages, which
at onco gave security for tho fines, and submitted. It was tlie
work of one day, and a couple of hours before midnight the last
of our gallaat little force was in camp, with a loss of half a dozou
men and many horses."
The report of the same affair in the Times o j ' Indict of
Febrmry 1gth, 1 8 72, says that " the tribe, on finding the

*

.

frontier force upon them on the morning of the '7th instant,
professed reacliness to pay the fines demanded. This they
did, however, only t o gain time to collect a force. They
were severely punished for this, for after waiting a,
short time for the promised paymellt, our men made
their advance, and ill the engagement that followed the
Afghans lost forty or fifty men, while the casualties on
oyr.sicle were only six wounded. Moreover, their village
was completely destroyed."
And yet in the Times of Ivzdia of June zoth, 1873,
(letter from corsespondent of the Pioneer, dated Pathanpore, June IOthj, we axe told,-more than a year after
the severe punishment iiltbicted on this tribe,.)

The Waziris, notwithstanding their professions of peace,
remain incorrigible. Eight camels of the 5th Punjaub Caval~y,
stationcd at Dchre Ismael Khan, were a few days ago proceedir~g
with supplies to the Tank detachment. Just as they neared Fort
Girnee, a party of Waziris,pounced upon the prey,mhich apparently
was without a military escort and in the sole chayge of two camel
drivers. One of these they $ound with cords to a, tree, the other
mas compelled to accompany them, and to drive his camels across

.-
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the bordex. The sowars of the Girnee Fort p&sl;ed, but their
efforts mere useless, for the brigands weye safe within their awn
lavless land. A small drove of cattle mere just about the same
hime stolen from the village of Jutta."
Again the Pioneel- of April I s t , ~
1874, says :
"We hear from Kohat, under date the 24th March, that a
In~gopart of the force at that place, comisting of two Regiments
of Infantry and one of Cavczlry, with a battery of Artillery, was
to march for Thull the following day. The object of the expedition is to punish mamuding Wasiris."
r p

C

At the same time a "frontier Cowespondent" diites t o
the same paper, that
+

f

-

-

'' The Bezotee tribe, who are snbsidized by OUT Govenlmeat;
for their services in keeping open t,he Kohat Pass, have been
giving the British authorities some annoyance."

q

No one can refuse the meed of admiration to our officers,
both of Che Civil Service and the Army, in i&e border
districts of the Punjauls. No one would question their
zeal, their talents, tl~eir.devotedgallantry, or the beaevolent objects they have in view. The question to be
asked is, what is the result of it all? What have we
gained,-what has the cause of oivilisation and progress
gained,-by all this bloodshed, by dl this lavish expenditure of money and rnmitions of war, by all this display
of valoul-, military skill, and laborious energy ? What
profit or glory do we get, what benefit do we confer,
what exalkple or lesson do me give, by periodically burning the villages, cutting down the fruit-trees, destroying
the crops, and taking the lives of our turbulent and treacherous neighhours '2 Of course these unruly borderers *
are always in the wrong; they are incorrigible marauders, hereditary brigands, and recpire pe"riodical chastisement. BLI~this periodical ch~stisementhas worked no
cure. The infliction of such punishment by n great,
powerful and enlightened nation may be a just and necessary act, but it ought to be effectual. There seems to be
little glory and less profit, when the revenues of India,
and the blood of British solcliew me annually wasted in
carrying oat a penal process that is neither exern-j+ary nor
reformatory,from which we reap'ncither reparation for the

1

t

*

p s t no; s&nnty for the futnre. The rctribrrtire mi&
mldcrt:~kena t every provocation during the last twentyl;)w ycal>TJat n vast espense of blood and treasure, l i ~ v c
1;ecn barren of rcfonnatory results. All that we cml say
is, t h a t by means of twenty-five thousnncl good troops,
:ud the occupation of 11101'~than a hu~idrciiforts m d
fortified posts, ~ v lmnnge
c
t o hold our own, t o reprl the
octnsio~ialag~rewionsof the Hill tribes, :uid t o repay
thcm in kind. The same story is repeated, offici:~ll~
;mil.
privately, by every one of local esperieuce, tlut our
relations wit11 the iuonntaineers are more embittered t11un
ever. Tlie slopes and valleys held by the border tribes,
cspccislly between the Khgber r q g e and the Swat
country, arc becoming n sure asylum for despewto outlaws, political refugees, niicl religious fanatics, all llostile
t o tlle British Government. The tnrbalent population of
this dcba$able Itmcl is 11ow incessantly recruited, instructed a i d infln~nedby crimixinls and nclventurcrs froin onr
cnvu Provinces, subsiclised, iLs lms been clearly provcci, by
the W a l ~ a l m smcI other Bloliammednn sects of Beugal
: ~ n dIlindostan,
I n short, the stahe of our North-West frontier is utterly
intolerable, and pomises to become worse instead of
better. No one holds o u t any hope of pemmment improvement, or offers any plan for the pacification and settle, ment of the Hills, except t h a t which amounts t o the
invasion and conquest of a part of Afghanistan, n. bloody,
tdious, and costly enterprise in itself, with endless cornplicntions and incalculable consecperites.
*
The late Gencrd Sir Sydney Cotton, an excellent
i d i t m y authority, who served on the North-West frontier
in several important mmmands, including that of the
Peshavnw Division, between 1552 and 1562, who led
several expeditions into the Hills, and had unequalled
opportunities of observing the morks and mays of the
unsubjectcd Afghans across the border, and of their
kindred on our stde, holds Peshaww in utter contempt as
a strategic position, 2nd advocates the immediate and
perlnaasnt occupation of Cabul, Candnhnr and I-Iemt.
7
H e says :-

8
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" 13esh;/wur, our nmin frontier post at present, ?vlli& I& hastily
and inconsiderately fixed upon as such, is, for us, in a false position.
J t is bad in all respects, nnd certain it is mc shall some day or
other, and probably e m long, have either t o recede Srmn it or to
progress.
r
"At Peshnwul; a n 4 on our presentyiine of fruntier, willl restless and wai-like tribes in our front, on onr right and left flanks,
and our right and left rear, we are engaged in continual mars, and
the mountain fastnesses, which were to t h e Afghans a s u p p y t
and refuge, and consequently n security, are t
o us the very
reverse, being the source of endless trouble and inconvenience.
('The heavy al-m of oui8 power has been con ti nu all^ felt by
these deui-savages of the Afghau ~nountains,without any salutary
r
or moral effect.
" We have not even caused them to respect n s ; in Fact they
hate us mom and moye.
" W e are contiuually disturbing our empire from one end of it
to the other, by hasty movements of troops, for the purpose of
inflicting punishment on these border tribes, and no sponer is our
object obtained than the troops return t o their quarkers; whilo
promises are made only 40 be broken, and the withdrawal of our
forces leads to fresh indications of hostility. Raids and deeds of
blood, on a small or large scale, are the almost immediate, and
certainly the eventual conseclnences of such proceedings. Often
such raids remain unpunished, for fear of disturbing the country,
to the manifest injury of our name and cause."*
Another distinguished officer, General Sir Henry Green,
for many years Political Superintendent and Commandant '
on the North-West frontier of Scinde, referring t o the
"bold and fierce Pathan motmtaineersJJ iahabiting the
passes leading to Jellalabad, and the borders from Peshawur down to Debra+ Ismael Khan, " nulnbering perlia@
200,000 men," says, that " to deal with these tribes with
any hope of success would be most diEcult. They are,"
he continues, " t h e most iutraatakle people of the whole
border country. The necessitlv, of sencling such frequent
expeditions amongst them has proved this ; and, notwithstanding, they are as unyielding and as little aineilable t o
OLX rule as ever."?

C

" ( P b e C'e&al Asimz Qz&ion, by Liei1t.-General Sir Sydney Cotton,
1C.C.B. (Iicrshaw, ?Ifanchestel.), pp. 6, 7, 8,,,9.
I. The Defence of the No&-?fTes6 P'i'ontler of I d a , by Colollel Sir
Henry Green, K.C.S.I., C.B., Honorary A.D.C. to f he Viceroj* of Irlclia
(Harrison, 59, Pal1 Mall, 1873), pp. 16,'17.

0

"

Sir 1-ieGYGrce~lrecommends tho p e l r m m ~ ~t d n b l i s h
of ti jkitibll force : ~ Qnett:~,
t
close to the North e ~ l d
of the Eolan l'nss, within the doioiriions of our nlly, tIlc
l h n sf mICllclat,but overlooking the Southern provinces
'of At$miistnn, and conzt~in~~clincr
the roads t o Cantlahar
;ud Herat. We shodd, he tBitIks, continue t o hold
Poshnwur in force ; and the tosvu of D d u r , also within.
tlte territoi*y of Khelat, situated a t the South entrance of
the Bokm Pass, slioulcl he connected by a State r a i l w : ~ ~
with t i e town of SdtLrur in Scincle. Sir Henry Green's
l ~ r o l ~ ~ xare
d savowedly bnsecl on the plans of t h t chivul~ o u sa1113 noblc " soldier political," the late Geiicral Jolin
Jncob, whose worthy pupil :d snccesvor he 1 ~ 1been.
s
General Jacob, iu the estrszcts given fkom llis letters t o
Lords Canning and Elphinstone, in 1 85 6-5 7, suggests
that " ill cotnnlencin~the arrangements for est&1islling
onrselves".;vt Quettn, 111 addition to the s~lhsidynow pnyable to the I<hau of lilielnt, nuder the present Treaty, me
should take into our pay a body of liis troops, both llorse
and foot, t o be elltirely under their ow11 officers, m c l
~nanageclin their own fashion. Such wild irregulars are
invnlnd~letvllen there is a certain force of our OWI
solciiers t o form n nucleus of strenwth and give tone to
the whole." " This would make n$ he says, " in a g e n t
measure independent of the Afghans, svhile the enjoyment of regular pny by the Ichelat people would l ~ n v e
great influence on the Afgllsns generally." " W e might
tkn," he continnes, "if we pleased, and it weye necessary, safely: and with adv:tntage, subsidise all Afghmistan
with money and mms."*
r
Sir Henry Green admits tlmt "to carry into execution
the poposed ar%slngetaentswould, beyond doubt, be very
costly a t first."^ For my part, I do not see where t h e
cost would end.
It may be that Sir Henry Green's plan would be less
costly than that of Sir Sydney Cotton ; but then it does
not pofess to deal with the Afghan Hill taribes,--it passes
lncllt

1

.
I

*

2'10 Defence ?f the North-West Frontier of I~~tlin,
by Colonel Sir
Grecn, IC.C.S.I., pp,
28.
t ILid., 17. 35.

Henry
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them by, as hopelessly " intractable," and lea<& us burdened with that humiliating system of strongholds and
razzins en which we depend a t present for suchopeaceas
we can maintin in our North-Western marches5
Captain 3'. Trench, one of that rising class of accomp-'
lished and thoughtful young officers, of whom our army
cmay well be proud, and whose book is an indispensable
store-house of the historical, statistical, and 8"eo
,:grap.h i c ~ ~ l
facts relating to " The Russo-Indian Question, considers
that we must "rectify our present bo~~ndary-ling,"
and
that, on the whole, the best step would be the occupation
by a British garrison of " a strong fortress a t Candal~a~."
" One thing," he thinks, " is clear. To subsidise an
Afghan Prince may be the cheapest and most politic expedient for a time, but sooner or later (probably within
the next five or six years) an onma~dmovement will be
found to be the only course that is possible, havi&,gregard
to the futuse security of our Indian Empire."
H e fears, however, that " there is but little chance of
m y such. decisive action being taken, as it wotild entail
an additional burden on our Indian Exchequer ; and as it
seems to be a peculiarity of English policy to prefer the
most lavish prospective outlay to a present moderate disl)~~sement."*
The disbursemen-ts required for the construction of a
strong fortress a t Candahar, and the introduction of a
British garrison into it-necessitating improved communications and transport service-might
be relatively
" moderate," but couM not fail t o be a,bsolutely large ;
and " the prospective outlay" for the maintenance of the
garrison and its contingencies, though not, perhaps,
deserving to be censured as r r lavi~h,"woad c e r t d - y be
large also. Admitting the strdegy t o be sound, if all
advance were unavoidable, I do not like Captain Trench's
plan, for several reasons besides that one reason which I .
hold t o be all-sufficient, that it "would," as he says,
" entail an additional bmden on the Indian Exchequer."

-

r

r

* TJL~
Russo-Jndian &zrestiom, by Captain I?. Trcach, 20th B~~ussart;
(Maomilln~~,
1869), pp. 161, 163.
(I
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capdin Trelch and Sir Sydney Cotton a.re, proLably,
much of the same opinion, 011 the financial p r t of the
question, as Sir Hcnry Green, who thinks that akllougll
'' the pr6ibed arrangements would, beyond doubt, be
costly a t first," they might, "by proving t o Eussia
tlmt we mere prepwed t o meet her with every advantage
ongour side, m e s t her progress, and prevent n fearful
struggle fol-.supremacy-a struggle that wo~~lcl
certainly
cost untold ~liillionsof n~oney."*
I do pot believe tlmt we should be better prepared t o
meet Russia by nlaliing ourselves progressively more disagreeable to the States and tribes that lie between her
frontier and orus. This we should assuredly do if we
statiolled British troops close to the chief cities of the
Afglmns-near Cabul or Candahar, for example-or in x
conimanding position at their gates, and among their
babitntio$, as in the vaJ.lcy of Quetta.?
Our mllitary politicians and a large number of OLW
Anglo-Oriental statesmen will not see that ;t, sstste of war
is only justifiable as an open and strenuous effort, directed
towards a definite end, attainable within some terminable
period. Such a military occupation as they recommend,
~ v i t h o ~the
l t consent of inhabitants or rulers, or with only
R c010~1~able
consent, of territory which me clo not claim
t o possess or propose t o govern, would at once constitute
, that unendurable condition, a state of covert war, of vrar
without an end. Each British cantonment, mith its
exceptional and independent jurisdiction, would be a
frettbg sore, a husy centre of prosrocation. We should
* not be able t o stand still. The causes of irritation would
m~dtiplydaily. The rights of employing Afghans and
giving asyl~lrnt o them, of traversing the country in all
directions, of freely buyi8g and selling, of importing and
transporting, that we should claim, insist upon, and be

;cry

" D@me of the No~th-VestT v o n t i e ~oy Indiu, p. 35.
i('On entering the (Rolnn) Pass, yo8 are in IChoras~nn'~-i. e.,
Ope7wtions of the Army of the lizcZzrs :Allen,1841,
Afgllli~tuistaa.(IZbz~g1~'s
('The proviriocs o'f Shawl rind Mnstoong, formerly subject to
11. 49.)
Cabnl, ccm bin a largo Afghan populntion." (Pottilzger's Ilcloocl~istcin:
Longmau, 1816, p. 31.6.)
0

r
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p r q ~ : l r ~to
~ I( d o r c 4 h r U I I ~ ~ P I V Ciwd
S iiLI fonGectcd wit11
US, wtiul~lswm iwclt~rour c~ccnpntionuntenable, cxccpt
1,y a Itrigo rlevelolrmeut u f military strength, :-i$ 011 the
:rvonretl. f;~otiugof absolute supreInncg, if not of actual,
:xclmini..;triltion. Far froin nrre:sting the progress" of
ltu& ur en:d&ig 11s to imct her with aclvautnge, any
r ~ ft l fi~rwartl
~
iuovc~ncutsthat h a w been proyosecl woulcl
slnootll the progrcss of Eussia by ln:&ng herewelcome 'as
;z liheratus, and ~r~oulcl,
sooner or later, t h o + IIS, in spite
of onrsclws, into t h e rlisoclrnutageous position of intruc l t w nucl opprwsori'. I11 all probability, the longer open
I~&ilitirs were rlcfel.n.et1, the 1nore extended, the more
~ the contest.
tqnld.ti?rc(lT I - U I ~he
i i r ~ c lyet, ~vitlioutrcikrence to ihe progress and tllc
l,rul,:J,le tlth>ig~iscrf' Itussi:~,:tud with sole regard to the
1)rm~otionuf 1mce ;ud good orclel; and n secure course
f i r trtde, ill clistricts where we 1 1 : ~assumed
~
-&e duties
of ~overr~ulent,
our iuilitnry ndvisers are quite right in
saynlg tlxlt we ought not to re~iininas we are. No one
cmi d e f i ~ ~trll~ esittmtion as it is a t present. Our frontier
svstumn has fiilcd liitl~erto,and there is no prospect what4-er uf its fi~turesuccess. The ulountaiir barrier, through
d i c l l all the coinmerce and correspondence between
rrldit~and Ri~hanistnnmust pass, is in the possession of
1;~rvlessfreebooters, ownin$ no imler, recognising no
iutewsts, duties, or responsibilities beyond the limits of
tlleir ow11 piirticulnr tribe. What are the real difliculties
~ ~ i wliicll
t h
we h t v e to contend ? We are on friendly
terns with the Mghkn State. But neither the Afghan
nor tlic British Governmerit can rule the mountain tribes,
or cmnrn:ind the Passes, because neither Government can,
in 1uilit:try language, i)zvest thcnt. * Thus %e entrance to
the IChyLer Pass on our side, mnrked by the fort of Jumrood, is in our possession ;the exit, after a march of tl1irt.y
miles, is fairly ~vithin the Afgllan jurisdiction. The
transit between these points lies through a natural fortress, which neither Cbvernntent can sunormd or blockade. If the Rhyberee tribes asstme a hostile attitude,
the road call only be made safe for a single journey by :t
military operation on n large scare.
b'

.

.

A leading wt;lcle in the Timcs qt'luclin of Wcpter~lber
12th, 1673, avows " mc3r.e tlzan rt suspicion that the K11y
ber has been as freqneut;Lg closed as open during the lust*
year or two."
. But, it may be said, these operations against the IChyberees. which, as me have inst heard, have been unctertaken 'by the * ~ m e eSlrer
r Bli, mnj*be com~letelysuccessful. Certainly they fray be successf~d,as many of ours
have been, t o the full estent of what was espectetl or
intended ; t h e offending tribes map bc swcrely p~unisllccl.

C'
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But until there is a Government occupying both sides,
and thereby ruling within the Hills, no possible punishment Gill ever be permanently effectual. Whenever
sufficient inducement presents itself, or a good oppor.
t ~ n i t yoccurs, the doors can be locked again by those who
have never been deprived of the key.
The same topographica1 and political diffic~dties,inchrable without such a rectification of frontier, 2s I ventGm
t o propose, prevent t h e fertile Swat country-now
an
impenetrable Cave of A d ~ U a mfor d rebels and refugees
from Afghanistan or British India-from being brought
into subjection and order by either of tKe two Governments. Here Eve8 that m ssterious ascetic, Abd-ul-Ghafur,
the Akhoond of Swat, w lose influence extends over all
the Hill and Plain tribes on the Peshawur frontier," and
"as far as Kohat," who is "regarded with rexerence by
the Pathails generally," and "fills towards thaw a position" which can only be described " by comparing it with
that of the Pope at Rome."*
Swat is the headquarters of the
Yusufzye tribe,
inhabiting, with its numerous clans and subdivisions, a
great extent of British territory, as well as many settled
districts under the Cabul Government. I n the Umbeyla
campaign of 1863, "when the Akhoond of Swat, so
superstitiously regarded, so wild1.y reve~encedby t,he
people, joined the confederacy against us in person," "the
impulse of fanaticism brought distant tribes t o join in
the war," whose " open opposition" had not been " antticipated" by the most :xperienced officers in the Punjaub.t "
Sher Ali's refractory nephew, Ismael Khan, who conspired against the Ameer's life in 1863, took refuge ill
Swat,, when hc eluded the escort "tiat was conveying him
into British custody a t Lahore." Feroz Shah, one of the
Delhi Princes, who escaped capture iu 185 9, having been
one of the boldest and ablest leaders in the rebellion, wasn
heard of in the Swat country, a t least as late as 1.568,
and may very. probaMy be there now. We read in the
* Papers, Distuvbcmces on the Nort7~West Prowtier (No. 158 of 1864),
pp. G8, 132, 133.
1. P q m s , iVort1~-Westfi,ontiev (158 Gf 1864), pa, 170, 130.
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Times 772d;a of July 4th, 1873 :-LC
The Cabul correspondent of Indiun Public Opinion states that Syud
Mahmood Shah, having got annoyed with the*Ameer,
Jias left*C a b ~ dfor Swat. The Ameel; on his departure,
addressed a letter to Bhah M ~ u dKhan, the Governor of
Jellalabad, telling him to be on the look-out for Syud
Mahmood Sliah, and on finding him, to urge him to "
return to &bul, because, should he not do so, great disturbances w 5 d d be likely to take place. After searching
fbr him a good deal, he was informed that S p d Mallmood &ah was with the Akhoond of Swat." It was to
Swat that Bellram Khan, the Moinund, fled aCter tlie
m ~ ~ r d eofr Major Macdonald, neay Fort Michnee, in
March, 1873. The h e w Xher Ali has proclaimed IGm
an outlaw, and has confiscated the land wliich he held
within reach of the Governinent of Cabnl, but the assassin still fikds in Swat an asylum absol~~tely
secure from
the -possi?dity of capture or molestation. And so it must
be : the Swat country will remain a menacing Alsatia on
our border,-to become, perhaps, the central stronghold
of some new f~naticalmovement or coaliticn,-because
its green valleys, though hemmed in on all sides by British
and Afghan districts, can be turned or blockaded by
neither Power.
In the I-Iouse of Commons on J d y gth, 1870, Mr.
Grant Iluff, Under Secretary for India, referred to the
advantages which he hoped a good understanding with
the, Ameer Sher Ali would give us for checking the raids
of tlie mountaineers. But there Ltre many reasons for
believing that such a combination as lie suggested would
prove to be utterly impracticable. There are many reasons to doubt wPlether $he routes of communication could
be kept open permanently, and the Hill tribes brought
to order, by m y concerted action between the two
Governments. The Ameer Sher Ali might agree to s ~ d i
action in perfect good faith, though perhaps with some
m i s g i ~ h g s ,and yet t h e desired object might prove as far
off as ever. His interests in unrestricted commerce
would ;pot be so apparent,--at least not to him or his
people-as o ~ w sare to us? Coercive measures carried on

.
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in common with an infidel Power agninstrthe'ir kindred
and co-religionists, would be viewed with great aversion
by the Mussulmau Afglians-the more so because throughout those operations their own Arne? vonld i&%festlyc
hold a secondary and subordinate position, while the
expected results would appear t o them of great benefit
t o us, and of evil omen t o tl~ernselves. The utter subjcction of the mountaineers and borderers wodd seem 'to
break down the last efficient banier betwe'en their free
Mahoinedan State and t h e formiclable Empire of Bphmins
and Christians on the other side of the Passes. They
would only so far appreciate the a d v a n t a p of an undisturbed road for commerce, as to believe that the profits
would chiefly fall to the haughty Europeans whom they
fear, and the idolatrous Hindoos whom they despise.
While the Ameer was supposed by his own people and
his own intimate advisers to be labouring for t'& benefit
of British trade, he might find opposition rising at home ;
religious doubts and scruples might supervene, and the
i~npendingloss of power and popularity might cause his
co-operation to slacken, witl~outits being politic or even
possible for him t o ma.ke a candid confession of his clifficdties. Even at the best,-if harmony were outwardly
peserved,-all
the work and expense of t h e coalition
would assuredly fall upon the British Government. The
Ameer's obligations would be vague ; the extent of his
resources not easily measured. W e should have no means
of stimulating his languid efforts except by open war., Kf
we became embroil&d with our ,4lly, all that we had
gained would be lost.
. The situation would be very different if the Auneer Sher
Ali were constit~tedSovereign owboth ddes of the Hills.
All objections to a closer contaet with British India would
vanish before the brilliant prospect of regaining the lost
provinces. There would be no more scr~uplesas t o t h e ,
subjugation of the Hills, when it was known that they
were to be brought m d e r t h e direct control of Cabul,
and not of Calcutta-that they were to form a constituent and connecting part of t h e renovated Afghan State.
The Ameer's right to clajm thers~ubmissionof the mouu-

'

'
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tain tribe; ly5lg between two parts of his Kingdom, the
advantages of maintailling discipline among them, and of
securing $he free transit of ,goods a d traveUers 'through
,the Passes, would then be quite intelLigible and indisputable ; while his power 'to obtain these objects, with ternporary aid, perhaps, from us, would soon be sufficiently
1
manifest t u innke resistance hopeless.
'So long 'as Englrtnd and Xcotlilnd remai
Kingdoms, excursions for lsluilder were incessant among
the boqlers on both sides of the frontier. Many landowilers lived more by blaclr-mail than by rent or agriculture. Castles" and towers marked out the boundary-line,
and every habitation was constlxcted with a view to
defknce. Deadly blood feuds inflicted miseries worse
than way on great and small. The fierce m d unsettled
habits arising from the break of j~u-isdiction prevailed
without jptermission or mitigation, until Jaines I becnme
King of Engla~ldas well as of Scotland. Soon after his
accession, the ofsce of Lord Warden of the Mar&es fell
into disuse, the garrison of Berwick was reduced, and the
frontier lost its military character. Border fkuds, degenerating into private quarrels and petty marauding expeditions, gradually died away, and were suppressed as
much by improved public opinion as by combined public
force.
Peshawur and the DerajLt are Afghan Provinces. The
1311s between our undefined frontier a,nd the settled d i e
t A d s of Cabul can never be reduced to regular government by any one but an Afghan SEvereign. Whatever
I
myihical accounts they may give of their origin, diverse as
may be the names adopted by the clans, and fieclueut
their feuds and ?action$ they all-if we except a mixture
of Beloochees in the Southern district of the Derajiit,speak the Pushtoo or Afghan language, and all we identified with tlie Afghans in religioil, manners, and socia.1
economy. It would be the greatest mistakk to suppose
t h a t tlie Hill country is irreducibleyor that the Hill people
are irreclaimable. Wb kuovi from recent and authentic
in
records,* thak much progress was made-doulntless
somewhat rough style-tmowar& the settlement awl sub-

.
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jt~gatiorrof the Afglian borderem during the prosperous
clays of the Dooranee Empire. Xleasures for the maintenance o"f good order and :i11open thoroughfare in,tlle Hill
regions were taken in the reign of the great AllmedSha11, founder of the Suddozye dynasty, between 1746
and 1773, effectual to a great extent, so long as a Government 1asteJI~vhichheld both sides of the mountain rangks.
His soil, Tunoor Shall, resided a great deal 6i Pesha~v6r,
ancl there it was tlmt, in 1809, the ill-fated Shah Sujah received, wilh splendid courtesy, the memorable ,British
mission conducted by Mountstuart Elpl~instone. In the
disastrous battle of Nomshera (13tll of "March, l823),
wllicll opeued the road for Rnnjeet Singh up to the mouth
of the Khyloer Pass, the brunt of the fighting on the side
of the Bfg11a.n ICin@om fell t o the Yusufiyes, fi-om the now
ungovernable districts of Swat and Bonitir. " P e f o ~ ethe
engagement with thc Sikhs in 183'7" (the battla of Jamrood), " the Khyber Pass did not cost Dost Molx~mmed
more than 10,000 rupees a year, b u t after the above affair
lie paid 20,000 rupees yearly. Subsequently he paid, i t is
said, 32,000 rupees." "It wodd seem," continues Captain
Hough, " that under the Kings t h e Khyberees did not
collect the tax or toll levied on t h e passage of animals,
laden or unladen, and on passengers; but under Dost
Mohammed this was permitted."*
During the c o n f ~ ~ ~caused
i o n by the civil wars in Afgh- ,
anistan and the conquests of the Sild~s,the Hill tribes
f d l y resumed their predatory independence. Since that
period all their worst temptations and ancestral animosities have been revived and stin~ulatedby political circum- *
stances on both sides of their mountain home. Religious
fuly and a rude feeling of patrFotism kept them incessantly on the alert, first agaidst the Sikh rulers of the
Punjaub, and afterwards against ourselves. Internal dissensions made the Afghan Govenlunent weak, while the.
loss of Pesllawur clirninished a t once its resources and its
inducements t o cont~olthe mountaineers. A strong
Afghan Kingdom, on good terms %ith our Government,
* Jfn7rgh's Operrrtiow ?f the Awn!/ o[ the I n d m (Allen, 1641), pige
317.
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would find those resources restored, and those -inducenlents redoubled, by the peaceful possession of the TrailsIndus Prp,vjnces. With a friendly and civilised Clovernment like ours in the Punjaub, able to afford effectual
assistance, and t o presc'ribe an enlightened and humane
method of procedure, the good work could be steadily
a
car~iedon without danger of failure or relapse..
It is clear"+lso, if we look a t the q~zestionfrom another
point of view, that the Ameer would be brought more
closely 3ncl m ore directly 11.11 cler British influence and
control. His duty and his interest would run in the
same path. His responsibility to the British Government would be very clearly defined, and very easily enforced. The territorial aggrandisement of the Afghan
State would place a matterial guarantee within our grasp
for the coqstant observance of all our conditions. Illstead
of a tough and rugged hide, Afghanistan would now present a sensitive cuticle to the hand of her tutor and
physician. Intrigue at Herat or Balkh, scandalous oppression at Cabul, an outrage in the Passes, would be at
once felt, and could be at once checked a t Peshawur.
It has been soinetiines most erroneously suggested that
the location and habits of these unruly Kill tribes are not
withont Borne countervailing advalitage to us, inasmuch
as any invader of India from the North-West would have
, to fake or to buy his may through them. Any Christian army, such as the Russian, would, it is said, excite
thi?r jealousy and fanatical hostility as much as the
' English, would find in tlle~na fom:dable obstacle to its A
advance, and a terrible engine for its destruction, however dearly it +ght have bought an unmolested march
forward, if compelled to make a retrograde movement.
Rut this is to misimclerstdn,11d the mere elements of the
case. No invader from Turlrestan or Persia wodd ever
.tl~inlrof entering the Punja~lbuntil he had in some manner secured on his side the Afghan Government of Oabul.
A Power that is placed in imin&iate contact with the
Afghan State-as Iii~ssia soon will be, and as Grant
Britain-is not-must thereby acquire, according to the
pressure it can bring t o bear and the temptations it can
P 2
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hold ouh, tlic ~nesiisof exercising s cestaln 1~lVue11ceover
all tlle Afghan tribes, even over those in the Hills and
within "the Britisli dolninions.
The chief danger t o be gua1ded against is not opeg
encroachment on Afghan territof,~,or the annexation of
Afghan dist,ricts, by Russia, acting either i n her own
name or in that of Persia or of Bokhara. It is the
g,rl.acl~~al
growth of Russian ilifluence at C$f~ll,till it becomes actual doinination wit11 all the forms of friendship.
A well-infonned writer has recently
ont &hut " in
General Duhaniel's Memorandum on LL divemioll against
British India, recently published by the Allyenxeine
Zeitzmg, on nothing is so much stress laid as on the necessity of an Afghan alliance."*
Some g.1-eat aclvai~ta~gc
over Russia, that 1a m incapable
of' perceiving and appreciat,ing, mczy have beep gained in
the course of our cliplomatic action from 1869 t o 1578,
respecting Central Asia, as it appews in the Pasliarnew
tai-y Papers tlzat have lately been printed. To the ordinary reader t h e nett 1.esults of the correspondence and
conferences would seem t o he t h a t Russia consents t o recognise as the limits of Afghanktan the actual possessions
of t h e Ameer, and inakes a great merit of doing so, declaring, however, that she is " the more iilcliiled t o this act
of conrtesy as the English Government e n e g e s t o use all
her influence with Sher Ali, in orcler t o mduce him t o
rnainiain a peaceful attitude, as well as to insist on his
giving up all measures of aggression o r f ~ ~ r t h ecsnicluest."t ~ l m s - w i t h a patssing sneer at our "subsidies"
-Russia secures good grounds for a grievance a ~ a i n s us,
t *
and for interference i n Afghan affairs, whenever ~tpleases
her t o sct up s dispute as t o b&~nclarik~,
or as t o river
navigation between herself, or%ne of her vassals, a n d the
Ameer of Afghanistan. A t the same time i t is observable
t h a t no present cause is given the Ameer Sher Ali for a
grudge against Russia, wliosa desire t o keep on good
torma wit11 him is fmther manifested by General Kanfmann's conciliatory letter on t h e gubject of the intrigues
F 7
,

c-

-

*

P
April i S 7 3 , p. 518.
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of the hiuecr'w ilepllew Abcl-ur-Ral~mZn." Meanwhile,
Abd-ur-Rah~niin rernaius as a guest a t tbe 12endquarters
n
of Rnssiap, Turkestan.
The well-infbrmcd Prussian Correspondent of the Times,
in a letter dated Juue ;il.d, 1513, writes as follows on the
s~lbjectof the Kliiva campaign :" ~ h e principal object of the expedition is the explorirtiou of
t h l ~ m o o$118 (3x11s) Delta. I f one of the valiouu arms prow
navigable, or can be made so, Rnssiau steamers, arter tlie coercion of I<$va, will soon ascend from Ldce Aral as far as Kooudooa
and the borders of Badakhshan. The scientific expedltiou wliich
Iras already reaclwd t h e mouth of the Amoo, may be destined to
mndc an epoch in tlie history of Ceutral Asin."-/-

.

Since that date the military expedition "has proved
completely successfill. The defensive strength a i d resources of the I<!m1 of Khiva have been found t o be
utterly in,$guifica.nt. The capital was talcell almost without resisthce. By the I st article of the Tl-eatg that
closes the war, the IUmn " pl.ofesses himself the obedient
servant of the Emperor of All the Russias," ancl "renounces the right" of ullalcing ww or " entertaiiiii~gclirect
relations" with any f5overeig.n or Chief. An indemnity
for the war expenses is imposecl, which, as it can never
be paid-tl~ough the Treaty stipulates for its gradual
payment by instalinents, ending in 1893-makes the
State of Khiva, if allowed t o exist at all, tributary aud
subordinate f'or ever t o the Rnssian Govenment. The
Rbqn cedes t o Russia all the Delta of the Oxus, and all
llis territory on the ~ i g h tbank of the river, with power
to establish " factories," " harbours and piers," on the left
bank. Then there is the extraorclinary stipdation that
the free navi~atibnof that river is reserved to Russian
steamers and other ships, Xhivese and Bokharese boats
being only permitted t o navigate the river with the
special sanction of the Russian authorities.$

" P a p s , Central Asia (C. 704 of 1873), pp. 43, 44.

i Letter dated "Berlin, June 3rd," Timeq June 6t11, 1873.
$ The ,qttbat,ance of tha Treaty, which is clated August +$th,
1873, W R ~telegraphed from Berlin by " O w Yrussian Correspondent",
a n d :qq,ei&ed in the Times of N o p n b e r 25th, a d the terms of a similar
Treaty with l3olsharrt, clated September 28th) 1873, were puLlisllcd in
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The Prussiaa Correspondent of tlic Times, in a letter
dated 26th July, 1873, says, " It is believed that the
largestmannof the" (Oxus) " Delta can be easily, sleepened
by closing some of the ilarigation canals. Further np t l ~ a
Amoo is a deep and magmficent itream as fiw a s Koo11cl00z.~'*
,From the snme valuable source of infornution we %re
told, in a telegraphic message dated " Berlih, UecernLer
Bncl," t h a t Russian oflicers have heen colnrnissiol~edttr
investigate the feasibility of' constructing a ~~nd,bctweeii
tlie Amoo Darya and the Caspian Sen. "It is intended to
utilise the ancient bed of the Amoo, the" most westerly
portion of which comm~u~icutes
with the Bay of I h s n o voclsk. I f the scheme is practicable, a direct cominunication by water will be established between the city of
Tvel; six hours from Moscow, and t h e town of,Koondooz,
on the frontiera of Badr~khahan.
"t
,Tllus Khivn is completely cut off from t h e sea of Aral ;
and A f g l ~ t ~ i ~ i s t a ~ ~ - a l t the
L ~ ~sources
~ g h of the Oxus and
t h e navigable part of its course for at least a hundred
hencemiles from I<oo11ciooz, are within her limits-is
forth cut off from the free navigation of t h a t liver ; while
Russia, m7e.ma.y be sure, has no intention of cutting
herself off from peacefhl access "as fllr as Koondooz" by
t h a t " deep and magnificent stream." Should any brigands or mwauclers he heard of on its 'badis, s gun-boat or
two might make an occasional trip in the interests of
peace a i d cornmerep. Herc are all the materials for a
very pretty quarrel, or for a n~agnanimoustranssctio~~
with Afghanistan, wl~ichevermay, a t some future period,
best snit Russia.
We may resign ourselres t o ?he +fa& thnt the Oxus,
formerly navigable domn i o "its mouth, and the main
stream of which is sajcl to be cnlsable of' improvetxeirt or
diversion, has fallen under the exclusive control o$
a

C

,.

the Times of January 6th, 1874. The Troaty between Russia nud
Khivn mill be found in the Parliament,nry-Papers, CclztmL A s k , C. 919
of 1874, pp. 1 t o 6.
P
" The l ' h e s , Tr~csd:yr,J u l y 2Dtt1, 1j73.
j- I b i d . , W e d I I C S C ~ : { ~1)ecemhcr
,
3rr1, 1873.
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Russia. TCveil if i t should prove impossible t o open the
OXUSfor boats into either the Caspian Sea or the Sea of
Aritl, Sir Alexander Burnes declares the river to he navig:~blefroih"the Afghan district of Koondooz t o a point very
'near Oorguizj, the old capital of IChivn, a distance of
about 550 miles ; and says, moreover, that the river
a ~ t u a l l yis navignted by '' boats of a superior description"
--some of owhicl~must surely belong t o Afghan subjects,
inen of Ballrh or Koondooz,-fifty feet in length by eig.11teen in breadth, " con~tructedof square log: of wood,
each aEout six feet long, Formed of a dwarf jungle tree
called 'sheeshum,' which grows in great abundance
throughout the banks of the river."* Besides this tree,
he mentioils having seen " filrze and tamarisk," and also
"mulberry aud white poplar ;" "tlie last," he adds, "is
floated down the river from Hissar" (within Afghan
territory)' " t o Charjooee, slid applied t o purposes of house
building? " There is," he continues, "every facility for
building a fleet of' boats, tlie supply of wood being abundant, and, fortunately, found in single trees along the
valley of the river, a d not growing in forests in any
partial spot."? This even distribution of the timber would
make it peculiarly available for the supply of a very pressing want in the strategy of these days-unfelt when
Burnes wrote-ftlel for steamers.
If the frontier of Russia thus virtually advances to the
Upper Oxus, while the Hills continue t o form a debat&Je land between British India and Afghanistan, Russian
influence a t Cabul will be absolutaly snpreme. Russia,
firmly established on the Oxus, would not only overawe
the rulers of Cabul, but could sway them at her will hy
displaying befo~ethem at any convenient crisis the bright
prospect of recovering the Afghan Provinces conquered
by Ilunjeet Singh, and held against them by us. If we
neglect to use that lever for the &iendly subjugation of
' the Afghans, we shall have it used against us whenever
the occasion wises. A doubly fayourable occasion would
I

* T~avclsin,Bokh~u-CL
(John hIurray, 1834)) vol.
.F Ibid., p. 198.
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be prepased if we should ever be tempted i i t o 5 military
occupation of any more Afghan territory.
Withethe Afghan Goverament at her. beck and call,
Russia would not have to force her way tl~rouglithe Hill,
tribes. She woulci be able t o push them on a long way
before her. Any Power that woulci arni them and prorvide them, and push them on towards Dclhi, would be-a
lawful Power for them, even though Eumpean alrd
Clzristian, even though engaged at the time in the conquest of Constantinople. What d o they know of the
Sultan of Turkey ? Their most inspiriting traaitions,
their loftiest notions of religious glory and worldly renown, their ballads and tales, their debates by day and
their dreams a t night, are of the daughter of iclolators
and the plunder of Hindustan. I n order t o make the
mixed multitudes of India surpe and quiver, from North
to South, with a strange canflizt of wi13 hope an? equally
wild panic, it would be enough t o insti1 some organization
and concert into the raids of the border tribes, and to
spread abroad t h e rumour that they were acting under
the instigation and guidance of the Afghan State, and of
a still greater State i n the background. By some such
nlanmuvres, and without marching a single battalion out
of the annexed o r protected territory of Turkestan, Russia woulcl be able to paralyze our military power by
giving i t full employment within the frontiers of India.
,
Nor would the situation be much improved for us or
impaired for her, if, by long-continued intrigues a ~ d
affronts, 'we were at k ~ s tdrawn on iuto a Central-Asian
"
-expedition, before which Russia might retire without
giving u s any materials for a triumph, knowing that shc
t p Elear, and calcucould come back whenever t h c o a ~ w
1t~f;ingthat, meanwhile, every day of our campaign or
occupation would add to our expenses and increase our
political difficulties, bo%l in Afgl1anistaa and in Inclia,
. Ally one or some one of the plans for advancing beyond
o u r present limits mayebe perfectly sound from a strategic point of view, if the Russians were likely t o accept
battle a t a short clate, so that the struggle mkht be
l~riefand ciecisive, B u t we have no reason t o expect that
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any such "s1~1%io11
W O L I ~ follow
~
the enlargement of our
m&tauy mea. The strategists themselves do not expect
it. For cxample, Sir Sydney Cotton's plan of stationing
y h a t he 'c'alis " snbsidiarv forces" a t Cabul aud Canclalmr,
and holding other strollg places in Afghanistan, may be
quite unimpeaclfable as a military movement ; but the
g d l a ~ i Geueral-in
t
common with all those ardents spirits *
and local axperts who recommend what they lightly
term the " forwarcl gameJ' of an advance, whether by
Qnettn y'Jellalabad-means much more than a military
m o v m e u t or campaign. He means a great political
aggression, tho permanent occupation of a free country,
anainst
a
the will of the inhabitants and their rulers ; the
institution of what I have called a state of covert war
without any definable end. This is perfectly clear, because
t h e General says that "the establishment of British
envoys i n ' s e c u ~ i t yst C a b d , Candalxw, and Herat," which
h e consi8ers t o be "essentially necessary," would be
'' i~practicnlJle,"unless they were " supported by subsidiary forces at Cab111 and Candahar."
A subsidiary force, properly so cdled, is a force the
annual cost of which is provided from some tribute,
cession, or territorial assignment, granted by the State
w l d ~
accepts the service. But in this case there would
be neiLher acceptance nor grant. Even if the Afghan
Goverl~mentwere a, consenting party, and willing t o do
its best, i t would be iltterly unable to rn&e any apprecia b k contributiou towards the maintenance of a British
contingent. The ccluntry is so poor that no regdlar supplies worth having, either in money o r kind, could b e e
levied by the s trictcst requisitions. Whatever subsidies
were tvantbd fol' a British Army of occupation in Afghan~ d the Indian
istan, would have t o he f ~ ~ r n i s lfrom
e
might keep the Afghans
revenues. A p r o f ~ ~ sexpenditure
quiet for two OY three years; but how would the additional drain-the aniiual2,000,0002. or so, t o be cast upon
t h e stony ground of Cabul- be ,liked in India ? The
Indian Exchequer could not p~*ovicle
for it without Home
now inl;ond, whic2l would have t o c u t more deeply than
@

n

-

B

the relinqui~heclincomc-tax; into the scanty r€?sources of
an under-fed and almost unclothed population.
Tliat misapplied term, c'subsiditzry force," ~wninclsus,
therefore, that the plan of occupying strategicmEositio~1se
in Afg.llanistan cannot be considered merely as a military
question. The political effects of " the' forward game"
n would extend far beyond the coinfines of Af )hsnistauar
the Poinjaub. All India would be a ~ e c t e i It is au
Imperial question of supreme importance. *
But if an onward movement be rejected, something
must be done. So far our military advisers are ? q n e s tioiialdy in the right. W e cannot sit still. while Bussia
creeps towards India, securing every step, improving her
comnlunicatioins, clestroyiilg our exi;eraal iinfluence, and
making tlie very weakness and disquietude of' our present
boundary-line a source of her own strength. W h a t
remedy can be devised except thnl; which is %ere prom
posed ?
Our North-West frontier system, wl~ileit is enormo;sly
expensive and burdensome, has lnithert,~signally faiied,
and there is no prospect whatever of its attaming a saSe
or steady equilibri~zm. W e have, in fact, no frontier at
all, and are in contact along the border with no ~esponsible authority. The mountains that divide us from t h e
Afghan State are inhabited by lawless free-booters, subject to no government, owning no ruler, recogniciing no
interests or duties, beyond the circle of their separate
clans, who forin a barrier against peacef~dintercowae
from either side, buO set up no obstacle in our fjvour
--,
against hostile operations. Thcir interposition enfeebles *
our influelnee beyond them, leaves the Afghan S t i ~ t e
exposed to pressure from other quarters: and'relieves i t
from wlnolesonie responsibilitie~~that
are iuclispcnsable for
the safety of India. I prol)ose t o break down the barrier
by making it an integral part of the Afghan State, which
wo~ildthenceforth be in close contact-with the I i d i a n
Empire, and could always be called tc:, a prompt account
if Britjsli interests were in?jured o~ Cllreakenecl.
The only plans offered for tlie improvement of o p Sron-
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ticr systeG b t the experienced local officials wllo fullyat'lmit
its failure, involve a n inlnlense increase in our expenditure, whil%every lxoblein, political and military, beyond
.and w i t h our pceseut frontier, would, as I have endeavonwd to show, not omly be left unsolved, but would be
still more complicated than before.
* B y ceding to the Afg.han State, on caref~~lly
devisedcimditions; the Peshawnr Division and the DerdjRt, most
of our difficulties wouid disappear, mcl all of them would
be siqlified. It is diflic~~lt
t o foresee wlmt objections
that will bear u. lnoinent's thought can be adduced againit
this measure? It cannot be shown that Ly adopting it
we shoulcl lose any stock of strength or wealth, in possession or in prospect. It is not, from any point of view, a
self-denying ordinance ; it is not a relinquivhn~ellt of
revenue.? Thc expenses of the Peshawur aucl the Deraj5t
Provincp are immensely in excess of tlie receipts, alid
the proposed cession would, clear the way for material
and immediate economies. It is not the abandonment of
a good military position ; i t is a retirement from a lllost
deadly and unmilitary Dontier-which is, ' in fact, no
frontier a t all-to a stronger and more healthy line, where
our troops, tllough in smaller numbers, can be couveniently concentrated in formidable and clisposable
mmses. By the same operation a doubtfd friend and
possible enemy is drawn out, cl~ee~fidly
and gratefully,
from an inaccessible region into a position so weak and
a0 open t o o w power, that he is a t once reduced, very
much to his own benefit, into political subodination and
pupilage. It is not the avoidance of a troublesonm duty^
or the desertion of a field of benefice~ltwork ; it is, on the
oolitrary,' the Zdoption and application of efiicient means
for perfbtining our duty and carrying nut our work, the
means llitllerto employed having utterly fbiled. Having
for more than twenty years endeavoured in vain to
induce t.hose Afghan Hill tribes with whom we are in
immediate contact to walk in o w ways, or to treat us as
friendly neigllbours;. we give them up, sec~lrelyenclosed
on alhsicles, to their own brethren, and ask the reunited
~iationto coilst ct an orderly State, according to our

principles, with our counsel, and to some Bstc%li, under
our control, but by their own methods, with their own
sppliauces, m d on their own foundations.

..

No support can be claimed for the policy advocated ip
these pages from Sir John Lawrence's propost1 in June
1557 t o withdraw our troops from Peshawur, id to pre-,
sent the District to the Aineer Ilost Mohammed. I a m
witldield fi-om pleacling the great authority of Lor8 Lawrence on my side by two distinct consider~,tions,-first,
that the measure suggested in 1857 appears to me t o ha.vc
been iimpportune and impel-fect; secondly, that w e arc by
no means justified i n assuming that Lord Lawrence would
approve the measure supgested in 1869,
W e are hardly as yet ~npossession of su6cient nmterials
for a find judgueut, or even for a cornplete criticism, on
Lord Lawrence's policy in Central Asian affairs. Ellough
has, perhaps, beell ncld~lcedin these pages to prove that it
was not aclequately described in the demi-oficiczl :uticlc
of the E d i d w g h Review as a policy of "masterly inactivity." Nor was much light thrown upon the subject by
thenolsleLord's speech of the 19th of April 1869. Nobwithstaiding the general tone of persoml recollection and experieilce runniilg through this interesting speech, we crtn
find no thread of fixed principle or design birding together
the events of the last fourteen years as therein recapit?;
lated. Lord Lawrenceremincls the House of Peers of the
A+rge sha.re he took in these transactionsj and virtually
promises the Viceroy a full nleas~n-eof encouragement
and supp0l-t.
Q
c
"I believe Lord Mnyo has doue n s m o r e than act o n the principles I suggested; I believe there is n o intaution arid no desire
t o do otherwise, but; quite the contrary; and I believe it is the
wish of the Government in India and of' L D FMayo
~ t o pursue a
course strictly in accordnnce with that hitherto adopted."
F

-7

But he says nothing to make t h e " course hitherto
adopted" appear less crooked. He fills up none nf the
gaps ; he mends nono of the broken li s. I n q~e&i~-g
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of the ~?eat,f concluded with Dost Mol~nmmedin 1854,
eful tribt-ite t o its real author.
res on the part of the l ~ t A
e ~ I CmC~ ~G bc
t attri,hutecl to the wise a r i d zealo~isexertions of t h e l u t e Sir Berbc1.t
Rdwardes, n n offjcer of great mmlr, whose dcath was one of t h e
gredest losses thLt could be i n f l i c t d on the I n c l i u n Service."

Bilt he does not allude t o the sing~darfact which we learn?
Goin Xir JGlm Kaye, a, very safe informant, that Sir John
Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Puujmb, ol3jected to
both tbe Treaties wit11 Dost Mohammed, that of 1555 as
well as that of 1557.% NOYdoes he say a word in explanation of that Will more singnlar [act, his own proposal in
Jmle I S 5 7 t o cede Pcshawur to t1:lst very Ameer Dost
Mohammed, with whorn in January he had objected to
make a Treaty.
The plpposed cession of 1857 seems to have been based
on no principle whatever, and to have provided for 110
future course of action ; bnt to have been-as usual-a,
mere mltke-shift, calcnlated, as was supposed, to meet the
immediate emergency. The siege of Delhi was then in that
critical stage when there was even some t l ~ o ~ of~ hraist
ing it. Peshawur was therefore to be handed over as a
peace-offering to Dost Mohammed, -while the troops at
Peshawur were t o proceed to Lahore and join an army of
reserve to reinforce the besieging force before De1hi.t
The combined remonstrances of General Sir Sydncy Cottroops a t Peshawur, Sir Herbert
ton, commanding. tl-IP,
Edwaxdes, Commissioner ofthe L)ivi$on, and General John
Nicholson, Deputy Comn~issione~
of the District, appear to
have averted this retrograde step, whi011 was also totaI1fdisapprovgd by &ord Gaming. Yarious opinions may exist
as t o the relative advalltagea of holding Peslmwur and of
cedir~git t o the Ameer of Afglmnistan. The same direrences of opinion may exist as to the retention of Gibraltar
or its restoration to the Spanish Government. Bnt there
are times and seasons. To have surrendered Peshawur to

*

rn

Raye's Xepoy JPar, vd. i, pp. 433, 445;44€.
1. Nine Yeurs on the North-West Frontier of India. By General Sir
Sydney Tlotton, R.C.U. (Bentley, 186G), pp. 190-197; ILiyo's Seppoy W u r ,
vol. ii,pp. 607, 608, 612, 617~018,619.
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Dost Yol,ilau~inetl,wldo we n.erc cugnged il?tllilt life and
death strug-le, and wllile thirty tlrausaud
sadcllingatllelr horses for a raicl on Hindosta
been as if we hucl given up Gibraltar to the Spaniards, c
while the French and Sl>anishfleets"ror1e ip Algesiras Bay,
while the allied armies were in the lines of San Roque. It
'would have been a capitulation without terms. It woufd
not have conciliated the Afglmns o r the borc1e"rtribes ; ;t
would have united them against us, 2nd would have destroyed t h e power of Dost Mohami~~ecl
t o restraip thein.
The Inclus wodcl not have stopped them, if they had once
got throngh the Passes. They mould havencome upon us
like a flood. The Lumscleils wrote ikom Cai~dahar:-" If
Peshawur a d Mohat are given u p at this mounent, we
shall have all Afql~anistnndown upon our backs.""
Supposing, however, that the cautious and ,moderate
policy of Dost Mohainined had been proof against the
temptation of our avowed weakness, and his injunctions
had sufficed t o keep the Afghans on their omw side of the
Indus, the actual danger might have been tided over, relief migllt have been given for the m o s ~ e i ~tot our overstrained military resources, b u t no permanent gain would
have been acquired, no perinanent good would have been
done. On the contri~ry,there would have been an absolute loss of power and a real dcsertion of duty. The aggressive spirit.of the Afghans would have been gratified
a t our expense, and t h e very &cumstances of the cession
woulcl have preclilde$ conditions being imposed by a m
Government for the a,clvaucementsf its legitimate influence
and interests, and for the maintenance of an orderly ndministration in the transferred Province. ~i~cI~,condii;ioll8
could now be imposed without pr8ssure, slid maintained
n
without effort.

h

One fatal defect has hitherto possessed and poisoned all
our communicatidi~swith $he Afghan St ate. To whatever
extent, and in whatever direction, we have endeavoured
to control its course, our aim has been sll~vuyst r a n ~ p r e n t l y

selfish, T o this it must 1.w adclecl that our nletl~oclhas
beeu ~isnallyclcstructive. Our action has been so purely
negativec;?,nbsrqxrlicisl, that it has ncver prochced, at
,$he best, anytlling rnore thnn s superficial and negative
effect in our L ~ o u r .'Too often it has recoiled against
US.

pWlletller the British agents i n Illrlia lmve adhered to "
o& traditiofd policy of promoting t l e~ uniou m d strength
of the Afghan Kingdom, or whether they have departed
from it,,tlzeir vision has been always fixed on the outwsl-d
aspect of ;tff'airs,and their object limited t o some irnmecliate exigeuoy of our own. JVlien we assisted Dost Mohammed with a sulssicly and n supply of amus in 1857, that
assistance was given beca~~se
the1.e was " weer b s t w ~ e nthe
B ~ i t i s hccml Persian Govem7,~ents," ;lmd was t o be continuer1
on certaili conditions of active co-operation "clzwing the
tcrw with,Pe&x"* VIThenwe delayed for six months the
recognition of Alneer 811erAli Khnn, and prolnptly recoaP
nised two successive pretenders, i t was-at least all Indl:~
and Afghanistan believed it was,-because we s~~pposed
Azim Khan, the most able and energetic leader of the insurgents, to be " our friend," to be " more loyally disposed
towards the British Governrrient than any other Afgllarr
Sirdnr."jI n 1639, when we violently deposcd Dost Mohammed,
and restored Shah SujsLh ; in 1563, when we superciliously
ignored Sher Ali, the lawful successor of Dost ~ o h s m i n e d ,
f w 4 x months ; in 1866 and 186 1,
we hailed with
perverse alacrity the trai~sientsuccesg of his rivals, a i d on
several occasioils during the civil war when we counselledc'
and encoupged a partition of territory, we never evinced
the slightest cok4dora~ionfor the wishes of %hedfgllans
tl~ems~lves,
or any desireto ascertain what their wi~hes
were. W e bent ourselves to the inglorious tat+ of setting
up or abetting somepe~~so~~,-~110,
if' ever s o firidy seated,
could not live for ever,--w1lo ~vasexpectgd to be grateful,
or " layal," or manageable for our purposes. I11 every instance our project hiletl, as such petty nrakesliftfts deserve

.
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a n d are destined always to fail. Our policy' wih assuredly
fhil again, sooner or later, if it rests on the expectation
t h a t t h e Anieer Sher Ali, in person, his hei? a p p r e n t , or
any of his successors, in person, will be "loyal:' p t e f u &
or rnailagea,ble, on account of the assistance that has been
g-iven to him and t o liis branch of the fimily. W e must
not hope t h a t the Ruler of Afghanistan can long be kept
i n t h e path of faithful alliaiice and orderly governmeilt,
b y means of au ailrlual subsidy or occasioid fiuplslies of
money and warlike stores. W e must have s o ~ n e t h i n ~
mar? solid than a personal basis for our policy. We must
worli. for t h e organisation of an Afghan State, aid make
its s e l ~ t i o i ~with
s
the British Governineilt definite and
dursble.
In ,zcknowleclging the conlmunication of s copy of the
Treaty with Khiva, Lord Granville poii~tedly~says,
in a
despatch to our Ambassador a t St. Petersburg, dated 7 th
January, 1874, that he sees ','no practical advantage in exnrni~~ing
too minutely how f : ~these
~ arrangements are in
strict accordance with the assurances given in January
last by Count Schoundoff as t o the int,eiitions with which
t h e cupedition against Khiva was undei%rtken."* Though
i t may have served the puq2ose of t h e Russian Chancellor
t o be perfectly callous t o this imputation, the meaning
cannot be misunderstood. Our Foreign Minister declares
that we have been duped, bnt sees no present reason for
showing resentment. He is " not disposed to share i n the
exaggerated apprehensions which have a t times beenexpressed in this countEy as to t h e danger t o British rule in
-India whicli may arise from the extension of Itussian
influence in ~ e n i r a lAsia," but he considers it " not, unnatural ?that the Ruler of Afghnistan "should feel and
express some uneasiness a t the* rapid advance of Russian
power towards his frontier. 1 3 s a,pprehensions have been
more especially roused by the reported intention to send a.
Russian expedition to capture Merv and reduce the Turcornan tribes of those ~ a ~ tand
s , he has applied t o t h e Government of India for advice on th~?subject."^

" Papers, Ce~zt~al
Aeia (C.

.
I
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1' Tbicl., p. 8.
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Prince ~ol%chalcoff,in a despatch dated January 21st,
1874, expresses his " entire sat,isfaction." In his "opinion
the undpystanding is complete." H e has "rep&ted to
Lord Augustus Loftns the positive assurance t h a t the Imperial Cabinet coptinues't o consider Afghanistan as entirely
beyond its sphere of action."* B u t he by no m e a h undertalcss so t o " continue t o consider" for any vel-y *
le&gthened, 'or for any very limited period. On the contrary, he quietly Knts in the following paragraph that
this period of abstinence may possibly be a very short
one.
t
a

"As regards the eventual danger pointed out t o us by Lord
Granville, and to which Sher Ali appears already to have called
the attention of the Government of India, namely, that nomnde
tribes of T~ircomansdriven off by our troops may return to seek
assistance or refuge on the territovy of Herat, and may bring
about a con3ict betwccn us and Afghanistan, I have told Lo1.d A.
Loftus th$t we had no intention of undertaking an espedition
against the Turcomans; it depended entirely on them to live 011
good ternls with us, and even to derive profit from our proximity
and from the outlets which we are endeavouring to make for
peaceful commerce ; bnt if these turbulent tribes were to take to
attacking or plundering us, we should be compelled to punish
them. This is a necessity vhich Her Mejesty's Government know
from their own experience, aud which no Crovernmcnt in contact
with wild populations can avoid. We are in any cam the Erst to
wish that this punishment, if it becomes necessnry, should be inflicted as near as possible t o our own frontier."+
*I n plain terms, the Russian troops will certainly invade
Afghanistan to inflict pnishlnent *on the Turcomans,
whenever such " a necessity" may arise, but wid1 not-at
least " wa are in any case the first to wish" they should
not,-penetrate &rther,into Afghan territory than they
choose. It is, of course, doubly satisfactory t o hear that
" Lord A. Loftus has received the same assurances from
the mouth of our a u g ~ ~Master,
st
and has ddnbtless re'ported thetn t o his Government." Prince Q ~ r t s c ~ l r o f f
proceeds to observe that "althgugh the eventuality
pointed out by Shere A& is scttrcely probable, t h e Ameer of
0
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Cabul can assist in removing the possi~1ityof it by
making -the Turcolnans understand clearly beforehand,
t h a t if they provoke rigorous measures by acts ,qf depredation against us, they cannot count upon any assistance
or protection from him. The Indian Goyernment is certainly in s position t o give hiin this advice in a form which
will ensure its effectiveness." The Russian Minister has
previously taken credit for having always aceed towa<ds
" the Khai~atswhich lie upon our borders," so as " t o
deter them from all aggression", and to prevent any ' C ~ i ~ lent rcollision from dist~~rbing
the peace of Central Asia,"
and adds :-'( We have a full assurance th'at the Government of Indin will act in the same inanner with regard to
the Anleer of Cabu1, and we have no doubt that it possesses the means of making itself listened to."*
But the Govelminent of India certaiidy does not possess
the same "means of nuking itself listened to" as,tfie Russian Government does. I11 order " to deter the Khanats
tvhicli lie upon her borders" from "all aggressionJ', and to
prevent any "violent collision from disturbing the peace
of Centra.1Asia,",Russia, has forced those Khanats t o give
up " the right of eatertaining direct relations with any Xovereign or Chief." When exhorting the G~ve~nrneilt
of
India "to act in tlle same manner with regard to the
Amcer of Cabul," Prince GortschakoE, perhaps without
intencling it, really suggests a similar measure. If the
Emperor of Russia, after stripping the Ameers of Eol111ara
and Khiva of a greatt,part of their territory, has compdled
them to $enounce by treaty all external relations with ,
other States or rulers, he cannot be surprised and ought
not to complain if' the Queen of GreatBritajp and Empress df India, when ceding teBitory t o the Ameer of
Afghanistan ahodd require iA the treaty of cession a
similar reixunciation. Still less could the Russian Goveri~rnenthave any ground of complaint against our ob- taining by treaty the right of control over the external
relations of the Afgh8n Ameer, when it has already declared the British Government moially bound to restrain
fl
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the Ameer ?n " a peaceful attitude," to "insist on his
giving np d l measures of aggression,')* and " to give aclvice in, 9 form that will ensure its effectivene&." Our
actual influence at the Court of Oabul is not really so
supreme, or so, easilf applied, as Prince Gortscl~akoff
chooses to assume it to be. If, however, it were broughtm
u J to the requisite height by the policy suggested in
t lese nge3, Eussian influence at Cabul, and the rumours
of suck influence now current througlmut India, would
soon die away and disappear. W e should then be, for the
first time, in a position to make Af&hanistan easily responsible for kee$ing her engagements with us, and also t o
hold Russia down to a less equivocal interpretation and a,
more consistent observance of her freely proffered pledges.
When we have once installed a n Afghan Governol., with
a well-chysen British Envoy close by him, a t Peshawurin forinej clays a favourite winter residence of the Afghan
Sovereign-the Russiails may be allowed to embank the
Oxus with their forts, and eucouraged to navigate it with
their steam-vessels, fbr British influence thronghont the
Ameer's dominions will then be paramount and irresistible.
The Hill tribes will then be subjects of the Afghan State,
Afghanistan, richer and stronger for our profitable retrocession, will be an unpaid outpost of the Indian Empire, a
willing basis of operations if it should ever be necessary to
wage war beyond our frontiers.
Among the details of the terms of transfer, on which
nwdecided opinion need be @ven liere, there might be a
condition in the Treaty reserving to the British Govern;
rnent the right of holding a camp of exercise,'at its discretion, in, any ?art of the Afghan dominions,--in ordinary times, perhaps, @everysecond or third yEar, and
within the Peshawur Prdvince,-when an efficient force,
i t matters not how small, of Afghan troop@,might be
, bound to appear, to be regularly mustered, and to take
their place in line, under the command of the English
General. The irritations and entfiglements that wait on
a stcznding garrison 2 cantonment, need not be feared
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during t h e three active months of a rnovabblk camp of exercise.
0"

I n a second article which appeyed in the Fortnightlj/"
Review of March 18'70, under the heading, " Mischievou~
,ActivityJ',-the former one, of December 1SG9, having besn
entitled " Masterly Inactivity",-Mr. J. W. S. Wyllie condemned t h e policy of supporting Sher Ali, initiated in tho
last days of his Viceroyalty by Sir John Lawrence, and
carried out by Lord Mayo. The strictures of Mr. Wyllie 011
the pageantry and negotiations of the Uqballa c a l ~ pin
April 1869, are wonderfully characteristic of the spirit of
hopeless contempt that has long reigned supreme in the
Foreign Office of Calcutta. " Lord Mayo erred on the
side of excessive complaisance to his Afghan guest." I f
"the duty of meeting Sher Mi had fallen to thc retiring
Governor-General, it probably would have been psrformerl
in very different style". Sir John Lawrence " would httvc?
run up to Peshawur, attended only by t w o or three members of his staff", and would have "settled in an hour's
personal chat with the Ameer whatever needed settlement". " He would have made no more fuss about it
than hc did about the flying visit which he paid to the
ah Scindia, a t Gwalior, in November 186 6.""
Mal~araj
Instead of" grovelllllg in supplication at the feet" of the
English, Sher Ali "has risen t o swagger among them as a
patron." " He was allowed to brag and bluster as only an
Afghan can." " Sher-Ali at Umballa represented little I&yond his ,own interest^",-‘^ his attendants, save two or .
three, were little better than menials, and vindicated their
nationality by their dirty clothes.'k " British influence in
~fghanrstanis staked on the fate of one ungrateful and
half-crazy individual, who clarnkm to us for more gold as
his only chmce of escaping snnihilation."f
He says that there are "in the national character and -
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" When h e displayed thomost nm?ignifiecl mistrust on the part of the

Imperial Government,

and insulted a meribrions Prince, by compelli~~g
ScinGa t o bred< up his camp of exercise, and disperse the tr2ops about
t h e country.
t Portwiglrtly Review, March 1870, 279, 286, 287, 301.
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customs "o the Afghans inherent defects", which render
"the erection of a strong Goveri~ment"on their soil " a complete impossibility". " W e all knowJJ,Be coutinrres, " the
,homely Bhge about a silk purse and the material out of
which it can't be made:'. Aud then, after quoting several
authorities as tb the turbulence end lawlessness of the
~ f ~ l l Chieftains
an
and people, he inqnires :-'r What is t o *
be done wiith fellows of this kidney ? W e cannot make
the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots."*'
The "inherent defects" in h e constitution and customu of
the Afghan State and of Afghan society, are-as MI..Wyllie
perceives-tha very defects which the Alneer Sher Ali
has been persistently endeavoru-ing to cure, but all such
endeavours on his part are "Utopian", and all atternl~ts
on our part t o help him must be " artificial". " The Sirdars, or Chiefs of clans", he explains, " are all Sovereigns
within th&r respective domains". " The authority which
the AmJeer, the head of the principal clan, nominally
exercises over them all comprises, at best, little inore than
a right t o levy a fixed proportion of troops and money from
each for the common defence."t

.

" Hitherto", he observes, "Afghanistan had been parcelled out
among Governors, each of whom received and usod the taxos of
his province after his own fashion, and remitted fo the central
authority ody so much balance as he thought i t unsafe t n withhold. Sirnilai.ly the army had been nothing more than an assembly
of the contingents which, on sound of war, the heads of the various clans severally brought to the royal camp. These foderal and
f~uddarrangements Sher Ali eudea~ouredto replace by a system
of monarchical centralisation. Ho wantoil a stmandingarmy of his
own ; and, still more, he wanted local treasuries of his ~ w n so
, that
the taxes might reach him entire, and the emoluments of the provincial govwnors fake the form of tixed tialarie~.'~S

Sher Mi Khan, t h l t :'half-crazy individual": having
recurred, after his reinstatement, t o "the self-same scheme
for exalting the kingly power", which had plvved su un' popular " soon after the commencemeut of his reignJJ,is
declared t o have, "like the Bourlynu of the Restoration,
learned nothing in adversity and forgotten notlGng."$
* Fqrtniyhtly Review, March 1870, pp. 304, 306.
t Ibicl.,p. 304.
q $ Ibid, p. 298,
0 1bi2.
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One might have thought it would h a m be'en clear
to the student of history, that there is a period in
tllo progress of nations when the exaltation of kingly
po~\~er
is a step forward, although there m a y b8 bnother *
period when it would be a retrogression. Louis XI. was
a true reformer, though Charles X. was a ~ e a c t i o n a r ~ .
I t might have been equally clear to tho practical ndmiilistrrttor that the " unpopular measures"" 013 which tlre
Ameer Xher Ali was persistently bent were indispensable
for the formation of a regular and orderly government.
But no ! " Can the Ethiopian", he asks, " c11stllg.e his skin,
or the leopard his spots ?" The " normal canst-ltution" of
Afghanistttn is that of " discordant tribes," " of several
we& and antagonistic principalities."? The A f g l ~ a nPrince
was " a half-crazy indivic1ual"-in short, a fool-to dream
of rushing in where an administrative angel, even a British
Resident or Commissioner, might fear t o t r e a d .
I n the four years, however, that have elapsed s i h e ridi~
upon his efforts, the Ameer Sher Ali has
cule I I thrown
manifestly gone a great way towards overcoming " the illherent defecis" of the national character, and transforming
the " normal constitution" of Afghanistan, It would be
too much to say that he has brought aJl t h e treasuries
and all the troops tluoughout his dominions under his
direct command, thc~tall the feudal Chieftains have sunk
into proviilcial governors, still.less that all the " discordant
and antagonistic" tribes have been reduced t o order and
obeclience. But most of the Chieftains, including -Ule
Princes of his own'fan?ily,one or two of his s o n s excepted,
Aave been deprived of control over the local finances alld
forces, their jayhires being resumed and comlmutcd into a
money pilyment, and their persona,lifollowdrs dis'banded o r
enlisted into the Ameer's n e w l y - ~ p u i s e dregimellks. And,
according to the best ancl latest informatioll, the cultivators of the resumed estates throughout t h e Afghan tcrritories rejoice a t the change, and find the A1aeer's assessments much easigr thqp the indefinite demallcls of the
t
Chief'taiils, whose insecure tenure m d e them gloaspi ~ all
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that codid bo got in each year. There can be no doubt
tlmt these were " unpopular measures" with the Princes
and Chieftains and all their class. Thus i t was that Sirdar
Isinael E l ~ a nthe
, Ameer's nephew," being aggrieved a t his
'reduction from the pcasition of a territorial feudatory to
that of a salaried commmder, was twice detected in treasdnable conspiracy againlst his uncle's life, and, having;
been once fwgiven, was, after the second attempt, finally
placed in the custody of the Government of Indin a t Lahore, where he died in 1872.
A very recent article in the Zdidnwglt RCV~BZU,
evidently based .on the most authentic official information,
bears testimony to the " s-trong natural affections " of the
Ameer Sher Ali, arld describes how measures of combined
coercion and conciliation at leilgth brougl~tt h e most able
and ambitious ofhis sons, Yakoob Khan, to his feet, and
led to "bursts of penitential confession on the part of
Yakoobf who said he lived only to be forgiven, and would
welcome death a t his father's hands if pa-d011 were once
obtained ".t His father gavc the greatest proof not only
of ~mdirnillisl~edpaternal affection, but of undisturbed
confidence and cool temper, by restoring the pUclonecl
rebel t o the government of Herat. When, in additioii to
these later instances of his clemency and self-command,
we call to mind his repeated and ill-requited forgiveness
of his brothers, Afzul and h i m Khan, and mark his
efforts at reform-even if they be, in some respects, prep $ m c and purely imitative-it
will be no more t11a11
justice to acknowledge that in prosperity, as in adversity,
the Ameer Sheer Ali-very unlike the Bouq-bons-ha3
evinced a great faculty for learning, and a great and
geilerousi%lacribyin f o ~ e t t i n g . Such a ruler mnerits our
sympathy and support. ,

Imperial st:ttesmen ought fully t o redise one great fact,
v

IChan, who was killed, fighting
against him, in t11e same battle before Cendahar in wbich his own sou
,? BcZinburyh Review, July 1673, p. 2'56.
fell. Ante, p. 21.
W o n of his brother, Mhomed Ameer
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~vhichIndian officials always seem to lose R;;ghC of, t h a t
Asiatics are men endowed with intellectual faculties very
similar tie our own, actuated by motives, passions, a n d
ambitions, good and bad, very much like ours:. If t h e
relations between the British Ernpip and t h e many alien
States and communities beyond its immediate bounds, oy
,encircled by them, and more or less under its rnle, pr6tection or influence, are ever to assume a lwalthy clmracter, with some promise of permanence and consistency,
n India must be tanght
our nlost exalted fuilctionaries i
certain lessoas, which, judging from their conduct a n d
counselv up to the present day, they will aLever learn for
themselves. They must be tauglll: by detailed instructions from home in all mattem of Imperial policy not t o
despise Asiatics, whatever their complexion or creed-not
t o despair of the progress of an Asiatic State, though left
t o its own devices. It will not help us much towards a
clear understanding of their wants and capgbilities,
t h r o ~ ~ gwhich
h
we might win them t o our p ~ ~ r p o sand
e,
guide them in to a better ~ ~ aifywe
, halsitnate ourselves t o
think of the Afghaas only as " picturesque ruffians,"* or
dwell exclusively upon what we call their " treacheryJ'
when struggling against foreign invaders. L e t u s rather
look a t the brighter points of their mtional character, recognise such evidence of moral a.nd social progress as their
"
recent annals present, and assure ourselves t h a t they
know far more about their own afhil-s, and are far more
competent to manage them, than we have been hithersg
disposed to allow. Let u s be very kind t o their virtues
qnd successes, and not entirely blind t o our own hilings
and failures. W e shall then be in a better position t o
survey the present necessities, and ,to form a p k n for our
future cofiduct. W e meddled qost injuriously with Afghan affairs from 1839 t o 1842 ; we neglected them most
injuriously f ~ o m16 63 t o 186 8. Though I am far froln '
c e example have been of
saying that British i n f l ~ ~ e i ~and
no avail, for I believe boLh Dost Mohammed and Sher Ali
profited by ihem lergelyfit is in the main t r u e t h a t in the
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last quafier oif a century the two Afghan Ameers, acting
almost entirely without our help, and with very little of
our advice, have made great progress by concentrt~ting
their stmlgth, improving their administration, and hu*mmlising their political practice. Were friendly and confidential relations fully in play, our example and instructibns, through the persorial agency and influence of two*
OY three fixst-rat;e British officers. mi&
do much for
the good of the Afghan Government aGd people, without
any approach to those contemptuous displacements and
sweeping innovations that have clmracterised in general
our political guidance of India W e must help our friends
across the Indus t o build on their own foundations.
I n the circumstances attending the accession of the
Ameer Sher Ali, and his deferred recognition, the best
possible illustration %rill be found of an opportunity for
what I call assisting the Afghans to build on their own
foundati%ns,-an opportunity, which was, uufurtunately,
rejected and perverted by the Government of India. The
Ameer D ost Mohammed, well knowing his country's history, the chuacter and habits of its people, and the qualifications of each of his own sons, aud desiring to prevent
a civil war, publicly nominated his heir and successor, had
the i2omination recorded in s treaty of perpetual friendship with the British Government, and on the death of
the first heir-apparent for~nallynotified a second nomination. B u t when the crisis arrived, which the old Ameer
bad foreseen,-when good faith and good policy both
cafled for the prompt and cordial retognition of the heir,
whose nomination had been solemnly confirmed a t hig
father's death-bed, the praisewortliy efforts of our Afghm
ally were i ~ u l l i f i dby tlae dubious and dilatory progeedings
of the authorities at Calcyttw. The germ of n law of succession, which, a t the touch of a true statesman, might
have blossomed into a pact and a precedent,*was blasted
' by the cold and disdainful treatment it received from an
Anglo-Indian offici.d. The lost o p o r t ~ b i t ymay still be
regained. The most,urgent prob em of Afghan politics
is that pf the sucbession t o the tl~ruue. However strong'
may be the ties of natur3l affection and mutual respect
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between the Ameer and Yakoob Khan, the most%ble and
ambitious of his sons,-complete as may be the father's
authority aiid tlhe son's obedience, while their relative positions and obligations last,-there can be no doQbt as t o ,
Yakoob Khan's determination t o succeed his father, or as
to the Ameer's desire t o secure the throne for his favourite
.son, Abdoollah Jan, whom he has publicly nominated ks
his heir. Unless an effectual process for peaceably carrying
out the next succession,-or, better far, a permanent rule
and procedure of inheritance,--can be settled while Sher
M i lives, his death will be the signal for another fratricidal contest, involving once more the Afghan State in
anarchy, and threatenin-g. its dismemberment. If we are
unprepared for this crisis, Russia, we may be sure, will
not overlook its approach. If, when it comes, we are
still separated from Afghanistan by lofty mountain
ranges, while the Russians are in contact along the Oxus,
they will be able by gentle aud unobtrusive riieaus, to
which we could oppose nothing but military violence, t o
manage t h e crisis in their own way. Without moving a
bayonet across their acknowledged frontier, the rulers of
Russian Turkestan would be able either t o bend the
Afghan State under oppressive obligations, or t o break it
up for their own benefit, fiussian patronage aiid a little
money would suffice t o turn the scale in favour of their
chosen candidate, o r Balkh and Badakhshan might be reclaimed and occupicd by their vassal, the Ameer of
Bokhara. A pretext and an occasion would never be
wanting in the mids tmofa civil x-ar.
It may& said that the Russian Government cannot
compete with ours in the expenditure of money, and tlut
if Russiawere to enter any Afghmqroviilee, eitber opeilly
with her own troops, or by pusl$iig on Bokl~ara,we could
bl-iag a superior force into the field and easily repel the
invaders. But that is not the question. No sane person,
surely, would advise us at any time to engage in a corn- '
petition of subsidies with Russia. 'It would spoil the
Ameer Slier Ali and his successors,~bothas rule~sand as
' d l i ~ No
~ sale person, surely, loolrs upon a caml~ignill
Centrul Asia-whether
with Q~ssia, againat us as all
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avowed Enemy, or not,-as a desirable or indifferent contingency.
There cau be no doubt that the military ressurces of
+the Indi'dn Empire available for employment in Central
Asia, far exceed, at present, those that could be opposed
to them by R~bsia. W e need not sllrink, on milita1.y
gPounds, from a campaign beyond the Indus, or beyond n
the Oxus. .Our troops would be welcome in Afghanistan
or in Bofiara, if it were clear that they only went there
to drive out the Russians. But such operations woulcl be
very expensive, and an ignorant "impatience of taxation"
is beginning t o manifest itself in India, whence, in con.
formity with precedent, the funds would have t o be
drawn. R ~ ~ s s ithough
a,
poor in comparison with Great
Britain, is rich in co~npasisonwith India, and can raise all
the money she wants without any political anxieties. And
if we look a t the comparative cost of establishments, we
shall find that money goes a great deal fhrther in Russia
thau it does in India. W l ~ e r e v ea~Russian army may
march, its coininissioned officers are paid mncl~less than
that average annual rate of 2650 which is required for
the officers of the Indian army. A Russian General of
I)ivkion, even on active service, does not receive the
fourt,h part of the emoluinent~sof an Anglo-Indian General
of Division in tinze of peace, amounting t o 24,500 a year.
' The Commandant of 50 0 Cossacks does not get S2,0 00 per
annum, like a Lieutenant-Colonel commanding a regiment
sfJndian Cavalry. The pay and allowances of a Major a t
the head of 650 Sepoys, about X1,50a year, consiclersbly
exceed the pay of a Russian officer in coinrnanchof an Inir
fantry Battalion. All the cost and charges of our Army
in India Qe on%he sawe grand scale, and would have to
be very midl aggravated,before we could pass the OXLK
Without feeling any excessive anxiety as t o the troubles
of such a tame creature as the Indian tax-pqer, neither
* Indian financiers nor Indian fundholders ought, perlmps,
on cool reflection, to feel quite satkfied & such n prospect
of enhanced expenditnre.
The geal ~ ~ ~ ~ e s therefore,
tidn,
is not whether we can*beatl
Russia in subsidising or,in fighting. The real problems
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to be solved by the Indian statesman are how'To avoid
both military and monetary operations beyond our frontier, howdo avert a civil mar in Afghanistan, and, should
a contest commence, how to keep its issues wtthin our.
own control, and insure its being a d o s t one. To attain
these objects the Afghan State mast be &ally conllected
.with India, and made a recognised part of our Imperikl
system. The great political want of Afghanistan, t h e
chief obstacle to t h e establishment of an orderly and progressive administration in that co~mtry,and to the formation of any weighty and permanent engagements with
its ruler, is the absence of any law of sucoession. This
crying want we should induce the Afghans to supply ;
this grievous obstacle we should persuade them t o remove.
W e ought not to endeavour t o do the work for them, or
to dictate the details ; but t r y to lead them to do i t for
tl~emselves,and as much as possible in their dwn way.
W e should help them to build on their own foundations.
An article of great merit and interest, entitled " Recent
Events in Afghanistan," in the Edinbul*gk Review for
July 1573, which, if not oEcially inspired, is written
with full official information, warns us to take no part on
either side in the contested inheritance, and tells us that
during t h e Umlsalla interviews of 1869, although Lord
Mayo gave "good counsel as t o conciliation rather than
severity," h e "was careful to say no word in favour or
disfavour of any particular successor." " Such a word,"
t h e writer continues, " would have immediately rousgd
the jealousy of foreigv intervention, which is, perhaps, the
dominant passion in that strong-passioned and uncontrollable race."*
With dl this I fully concur. Not a word Should be
said by us in favo~u.or disfavopr of any particular successor. More than tllat, the Government of India should
encleavo~u-t a divest itself of any predilection for any particular candidate. The personal element should be, as far
as possible, discaded fsom our calculations, and entirely
from our propositions. Our object ehould be to, promote
m
#

Edinburgh Review, July 1873, p. 297.
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in ~ f ~ h c n i s t gthe
n growth of legal principles and formal
procedure, so t h a t good and orderly government may gradually cgme to depend less on t h e personal abilities and
.character of the reigning Prince than it does a t present.
It would be a great step in the right direction if we
c ~ u l dget the Bmeer, with the assent of his family, his
ministers, and the leading Cliiefiains, to promulgate a rule"
f i r settling the succession, and a method for securing its
peaceable observance. Such an important advance could
&ever be made without some po-w&fi~lmotive operating
upon all the parties concerned. The advisability and
wisdom of the course recommended, though by no means
above their comprehemion, would not suffice to subdue
contending passions and interests. But the motive held
out by the British Government to the Ameer and his
Durbar might be made all-powerful and irresistible. No
Prince or Chieftain would venture or would be allowed to
i9
impede with his private ambition the restoration of the
Afghan provinces conquered by Runjeet Singh. No
course need be proposed that would be in the least humiliating or burdensome to the Afglmn State. The British
Government, before transferring provinces t h a t have been
under its administration, is obviously bound in honour and
duty to take measures for saving them from the anarchy
and misery of civil war. Such conditions would, therefore, be sl~ggestedas might best p e v e n t the recurrence
of a disputed succession. The Ameer would be asked to
carry out effectually the programme of his illustrious
father. W e should ask that an hei? and a rule of inheritance should be chosen, not so as to please us, Eut so as
please thgse in the family and the State who might have
power t o distulrb or s~rpporta succession. And if it were
once well ~mderstood that the settlement when duly
made and recorded, would be no mere idle form, but would
, be placed, virtually if not expressly, under tiie safeguard
of the Indian Empire, there would be lit$le or no danger of
any one a t any time revoking hi% acceptance or suffrage.
The odds again& hifn would be too great; these very
Trans-hdus Provinces would constitute a material* guarantee for good order md good faith, in this and other
points, always within our grasp.
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Tl~us,by granting tlie boon of $erritorin1aggrandisement
to the Afghan State, ~vitllno loss or expense, but witlt
profit a d advantage to ourselves, i t will be qui:? possible
for us t o extend the benefits of our superior knowledge.
and acquirements to a nation conf&sedly jn a lower stage
of civilisation, p l d at the same time t o bring her mgre
closely uucler our influence and control, without conquest,
without any forcible intervention. If everyfacility ahcl
encouragement be given to commerce, the constant experience and observation of a mild rule and an orderly administration of justice on one side of the Indus, will tend
t o ensure the maintenance of similar institutions on the
other side, in the districts where we have already planted
thein.
Of course there are those-especially if they have
gracluatec. in the Calcutta Foreign Office or fallen under its
influence,-who will for ever dcclaim against the incurable
defects of Afglmn chamcter and cristorns, who wil19continuc
t o ask if the leopard can change his spots, or if a silk purse
can be made out of a SOW'S ear, and will protest t h a t t h e
formation of a strong Government on Afghan soil is a
coinplete impossibility. If we did not know something of
the blinding effect on tlie English nlincl produced b y t h e
climate of Bengal and 11y purely official relations w i t h
Eastern races, we should be inclined to suppose t h a t
officials high in tlie Indian Civil Service and StaE Corps
-competitive examinations notwithstanding-had never
heard of the Wam of the Roses, or of the long Carkist
war and numerous in"surrections i n Spain during t h e laat
60rty y e a s . Spain has made great progress, materially
and morally, since 1833, in spite of, partly gerhaps i n
consequence of, those cruel warsrof sutcession. \Vhen
gentlemen who have won academic honours and high
official rank talk of predatory tribes a.nd petty jurisdictions a s abbrmal phenomena, peculiar t o Central Asia,
we can only wonier if they have heard what the political
condition of Germany nr of Scotland was in the Middlo
,Ages, or of Italy towards the close'of the 16th. century,
during the Poiitificate of Sixtus V. I s it possible t h a t
they can have ever tried to forrn~somenotion of the emly
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years o r OLII?Heiwy the Seventh's reign, when half the
property of England changed hands,-when every man
who ha4Aelped Richard the Third in the slightt8st degree
became the new King's " rebel" or "traitor," and his
lands or goods were inade forfeit to the Crown, because
he had eidecl'and abetted "the late Duke of Gloucester, King of England, in deed but uot in right"?'
I-Inve tlley7any clear idea of the forces a t work and the
feelings prevalent in these islands when the following
words were penned by a well-informed person of high
rank and culture, t h e letter being dated in November,
1748 ?
"'New dangers threaten ns from the trntameable bigotry of the
Scotch Jncob~tes,encouraged by the insolence of their friends i n
maiiy parts of Englaud. We hear thut one of the Frnsers, who
was witliess against Lord Lovnt, is already murdered iu Scotland,
and his liouso burnt down to the ground. Lod Elcho aud some
otlicrs ofihis fellow rebels aro returned to the Highlands, and the
youagost son of Lord Lovat, who was lately at Utrechb, is come
over nud joined his father's clau, and seems i~esolvedto keep
possession of the esbate.""

"

.

It may be that as late as, the middle of the eighteenth
century there weye English and even Scottish politicians
who, with Pharisaic piety despaired of the Highland clans
and their Chieftains ever being converted into orderly
citizens. But surely we have learned something since
17'45 in both historical and political science.
ry
Those who within the last cl~mrterof a, c e n t ~ ~ Lave
k l d oa~ortunities
of local observation a i d intercourse.
1 *
may be of opinion that such rudiments ,of refoqp
and improvement.as are discernible in the doctrine and
practice af tlm Afgh9n State, are due to our rii~fluence
and example. There ma7 be a great deal of truth in this,
and wc may well be proud of it. Moreover, it has been.
said that a decided change in the public opilGon a i d poli"
tical nlaxims of the country may be traced t o the reports
and recollectioils of what was accompRshed or attempted
during our brief s~qmrvisionof ~ L a SujahS
h
Govermneut,
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This is very probable. Good often rises outrof e k ; and
we may hope that the Afgl~ansdid really reap some permanent advantage from that iniquitous aggressios. That
in spite of all enmities and heartbnmirgs, a distinct impression was left of some of our better cpalities as men
and as rulers, may well be believed. Of the great persons1
*influence exercised for good by certain British officers
there can be no doubt at all. The name of Rawlinsoli,
for instance, will never be forgotten or unhonoured a t
Candahar. And yet in this direction, also, it is equally
true that we must have something more solid than a personal basis for our policy in Afg11anista.n. We must put
our trust neither in her Princes nor in our PaIadina.
Such personal influence is not all in all ; nor is it always
to be had. Certainly I do not undervalue those rlistinguished men who have wrought out great results for their
country's glory, and for the good of Eastern races, by their
gallantry, their talents, and their devotion to dut?. It is
not I who undervalue them, but those who seem to think
that the supply of such men is unlimited. I by no means
believe that an Edwardes, a George Clerk, or a Henry
Lawrence can be picked up in every messmom, or even
in every compei;itive examination. Even if they could be
fonud, they are not wanted in great numbers. The personal influence of exceptional men from our own ranks,
were they always at hand at the light moment, codd
never be all in all in our relations with the Eastern world.
Their fine qualities and rare acquirements are rightly a p
plicable for the adv'ncement of our interests among
Qriental mtions, and for the benefit of those nations
themselves, only with the predetermination that their
action shall be temporary,-chiefly for rn'l1ital-y and diplomatic affairs, sometimes for carts of organisation and
settlement in c~iticalemergencies.
When we'are compeIled to unde7_.takethe thorough reconstruction of a, dependent State,-whether in confor, mity with the provisiow of a Treaty, or simply on prudential grounds,--the act is revolfitio~aary,and should
be limited in extent and time t.o the positive necessities
of the case. This is the work w a were doing in Mysore,
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until thd oE&l 1)ro~ensitiesof Calcutta turned it into a
field for patronage. This is the work we are doing with
most beneficial effect in Bhxwulpoor. This is $he work
*we now i%ve a noble opportunity of aiding in the Nixam's
Dominions, during the infancy of the reigning Prince.
The establishment of a regular financial and judicial systm.n in an Easteril State, under the mai~agementof English
officers,-should it unfortunately be necessary t o employ
more than one or two,-must never be the aim and end
of our reforming operations. Our work will not be fairly
done until we have replaced Native agency at the head
of every department. I do not object t o the use of leading strings, but only t o their being kept on for ever.
Good administration is not identical with good government, so long as it can only be worked by'foreigners,
and maintained by military force.
The most urgent problem of Eastern statesmanship is
how to iyxoncile self-government for India with Imperial
supremacy for Great I3Rrain. My doctrine is that the
more we concede the former, the more we confirm the
latter. Many who dispute, or would indefinitely defer,
the applicability of this problem to Indian affairs, will
admit it with reference to Afghanistan.
L

A

-

The possibility of leading the turbulent cornmunities of
the Hills t o abandon their wild habits, to become peacef~d
c;~ltivatorsand punctnal taxpayers,-if any regular Govehment codd get at them,-has beon sufficiently proved
by the successful transformation of that sort effected,
among the cognate tribes of the Trans-Ind~~s
Provinces.
These are +he trhlest and brightest -tl.iumphs of $ir. John
Lawrence's administrdion of the Punjaub. Some interesting Notes ole Btmnoo, &he most Northerly part of the
Derajgt, immediately adjoining the Kohat Di6trict of the
Pesl~nwurDivision*) by Major H. B. Urmston, Deputy
Commissioner, written in 1 86 6, printed *early in 156 9 at
the Government P r e ~ s Ldlore,
,
nlny be nsefully quoted
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on this 'ku~iect. For what has been done inlhis9istrict.
recently u<dar his own chwge, Major Urmston gives th;
highest wedit, as was due, t o those distinguished officers
who first ruled in Bumoo,-Herbert
Ed.cvasdea, during
our guardianship of the Malmaj41
Dhuleep Sing, Johu
Nicholson, and Reynell Taylor since the annexation, of
whom the lastrmentioned alone ii Li+.ng.*

-

.

"Eighteen years have now passed away since Sir Herbert (thbn
Lieutonant Edwardes, AssistBnt to the Resident at Lahore), in
the name of the Sikh Govelnment, tools possession of the country,
and laid the foundations of the fort of Dhnleepghur. Many of
the leading characters described with so much life in his book
(A Y e a y 01% t h e A ~ w j a u Z ,lirontio~)have disappeared from the
scene; some we still living who delight to speak of the first
English d e r ; while the younger branches, now well advanced in
manhood, have not foTgotten those early days when their fathers
were called upon to level their 400 forts, and b a d their necks for
the first time to the yoke of the Peringhee Eakim. Nor have sisteen yeam of peaceful rule been unmarked by progress; many a
blood-stained sword and dagger hnve been converted into s
ploughshare,-many a fighting 'goondceJ, or faction, into loyal and
obedient agriculturists. True-the 'goondees' do still exist to a,
certain extont. They will not, perhaps, ever become wholly extinct; but their quai~.~els
are now quietly referred to the Courts
of Justice, instea,d of, as in olden times, to the force of allme. This
of itself is one great stride in civiliscztion,-a sure sign of ct strong
and settled Government. Indeed, it is impossible tromix wilrh the
people, or talk with the old grey-beards of a village, without
being struck by thei~.opinion of the revolution caused by British
rule and British laws. One and all acknowledge the blessings,political and social,-which have been conferred.
cr These benefits are qanifest in marked increase of value gitreh
t o property, improved appearance and condition of the people,
mnd their appreciation of lights in the soil. Land previously
fallow for &any generations has, within the present decade, been
brought under cultivation to the extent of mmy thoBsand acres,
which were, till recently, covered ~ i t jungle,
h
infested by mild
beasts and highway robbers.."t

* ~njoF~e;eral,Commimioner of the Umritaur Division, and after
more than a quarter of a century of continuou~lydistinguished usrvico
only a C.B. and EL C.S.1.
t Notes o n the Bunnoo ~is'TiCt(Xelcctions,fwxn the Recorch of the Pun'jaub Government, No. I), by Major H. B. Urmston,CDeputyCUmmissioner.
Govefilment Press, Lahore, 1869.
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It may be asked whether we are justified in riading the
continued existence of these remarkable reforms, by trailsferring British territory and s~lbjectsto the t e n d b ~mercies
*of an E ~ e t e r ndespot. Such a policy i ~ a ybe denounced
as an unworthy abdic~kionof power and abandonment of
duty. It is not 911 abdication, but an ass~mptioaof power.
The Kingdom of ~ f g h a & t a n is drawn by this policy from
a emote a i d unapproachable seclusion into direct contact
and intimate association with the Imperial Goverllment of
India. What is that but subordination to British power ?
With jud.icious management, the result cannot be doubtfill. It is not ail abandonment, but a f~dfilrnentof duty.
A charge is imposed upon the Ruler of Afghanistan which
he can perform with our aid and counsel, but which, even
with his assistance, is beyond our ability, ancl he is
the~kbyled from Eastern despotism towards a Sovereignty
of law and order. The plant of progress, exotic and precarious 31nder foreign iiursing, is acclimatised and made
hardy by being trusted t o native cdtivation.
Of course the Ameer would not be placed in possession
of any territory that had been under British management
without ample securities for the maintenance of good
government, religious toleration and equality before t h e
law of all sects and races, as at present established. Those
w11o"have felt and enjoyed those blessings will not be inclined to give them up ; and it may be hoped that a short
experience by Prince and people of their advantages on
this side, would soon carry them over to the other side of
the Hills, no longer a barrier between separate jurisdictions. The greater freedom and fkequency of intercours$
and commerce between the two sections of the Afghan
State, and, betw$en the Afghan 8tate and British India,
the force conferred o$British counsels, the fadities accpired for British instruction and guidance, must all work
towards the same goal,-the absolute pred~minance of
British influence in the regions between the Oxus and
the Indus.
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Treaty betzaeen t l ~ eBritish Goverwnent und His Higlmess A m e w
Dost Mc~hom?nedKhurb, TTc~leeof Ck~bz~l
nnrl of those Uoz~~ztries
of
Afghanistaw now in 72is possession, colzcl~ded,on' the part qf the
B ~ i t i s hCove?~~ntent,
by John La~urelace,Espzhe, Chief Comnzissioner of the Pzmnjnb, i n virtue of fidl powe~svtxted hz him by the
etc.,
Most Noble Jamcs Andrew, M u r p i s of Dalkousie, l<.!ll.,
t
A,mee?%f UubuZ,
Governor General of Jndirt, a ~ on
~ the
d p u ~ ofths
Dost Nolzanzmed Khaq By Sirdas Gkolum Eyclw Khan, in uirtzm
of $dl authority grafited to I ~ i mBy His Higlz?~ess.

ARTICLE
PST.
Between the Honourable East India Compr~nyand His Highness
Arneer Dost Mahommed Khan, Walee of Cnbul and of those Countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, and the heirs of t h e
said Ameer, there shall be perpetnal peace and friendship.
The Honourable East India Company engages to respect thgse
Territories of Afghmistm now in His Highness' possossion, and
never to inteisfere therein.
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ARTICLE~ R D .
His HighnessArneer ~ o s~tn h o h m e d ~ h a%she
n,
of Cabul and
of those Countries of Afghanistan new in his possession, engages
on his own part, and on the part of his heirs, to respect the Territories of th@Honouralsle East India Company, and never to in- ,
terfkro tharein; and to be the friend of the friends and enemy
of
"
the enemies, of the Honourable East India Company.
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Done atpeshaw~lrthis Thirteeuth day of DIarch, 011%thousand
* Eight hundred and Fifty-five, corresponding Qith tho
b
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Elewnth day of Rujjub, One thousand Two buddred and
Seventy-one Hijree.

-.'

(Signed)
JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Comnzissioum of the Punja b.

.

GHOLAM HYDER,
E e i Apparent,
~
A: the 12epreso~tativeof Ameel, Dost &la.
hommed X l m n nlzcl in yewon. on his o w n
9
account as H e i ~A p p a ~ e n t ,
Ratified by the Most Noble the Governor,General at Ootacamnnd, this First day of May, One thousand Eight hundred and
FiYty-five.
(Signed)

-

By order of the Most Noble the Governor-General,

O

(Signed)
G. I?. EDMONSTONE,
S e c ~ e t a r yt o the G o v e ~ n m e dof India,
T i t h the Governor-GcnwaZ.

(B.1
"THE OLD FOOTING OF TRUST AND GOOD WILL."
(Page 37.)
bord Mayo's reception of the Ameer Sher Ali at Omballah, and
the subsequent negotiations at that place in April 1869, may have
brought about n, better understanding, but the following extract
from the letter of a well-informed observer, will suggest, perhaps,
a doubt whether the 2clinburgh Reviewer did not rather anticipate
emtters, when he wrote of " trust and good willJ' in 1866.
"It is said that the negotiations we& not cawied to their present satisfactory conclusion without some difficulty. Everytllipg
has, however, at last terminnied well, and the Ameey, who was at
/&-st veyy & t r u s p Z of British policy, will go away pleased with
He says he %tends to
i i s fisit and satisfied of our since+.
l a d e no secret of the agmement between himself and us. ' I
hate paper work,' he siid, and secret diplomacy. I like a clear,
plain policy, I shall announce what has beon & g e e dupou, for I
am not going to give grounds for suspicion that there are two
treaties; one secret, the othel- public.' I kava o6gewecl that ho '
&stwstecl u s ntJirst n y l made n o sVoret of his f e e l i q . To one '
officialhasaid : ' T h e B ~ ~ t iGovernment
sl~
is +espoq&le f o the
~ blooc8sl~eclof the last t h e e yeam.' To another, who begged him48 speak
v
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out his wishes and intentions in order that the British Gomrnment
might know how to frame its policy, he rejoined sharply, 'What is
the policy of t h e British Government Py

.

jJ*

(C .)
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RUSSIA I N CENTRBL ASIA.
(Page 43.)

..

@

Mr. Gladstone's remarks in the House of Commons on the 8th
of April, 1869, concerning the exchange of opinions between the
British and Russian Gove~nmentson the state of Central Asia,
wit11 reference
e proposed mobion on that subject by Mr. E. B.
r Pend~yn,are thus animadverted upon in the
Noscow Gaxette :CC W h a t w e have foreseen for a couple of months has come to
pass. England and Russia have entered upon acnegotiation of a
most friendly and satisfacto~ycharactery respectingdsiatic affairs.
It is uot very intelligible, though, why Mr. Gladstone, in letting
Parliament into the secret, should have thought it necgpsary to
oonfiue his disclosures to the few words we have just quoted.
Ordinarily, i t is only in the case of difficnlt negotiations, or when
wal. and peace are a t issue, that British Ministers deem i t incumbent upon t h e m t o give evasive auswers to questions of .a diplomatic nature p u t to them i n Parliament. Neither being the case
in t h e present instance, we are at a loss to divine why gseator
communicativeness on the part of the Ministers might, as he sQd,
interfere with the satisfactory progress of the affair. What progress ? W h a t affair ? Probably the British Government have
reasons of their own for wishing to prevent the matter being discussed by t h e representatives of tho country. However that may
bo, t h e press, not being fettered by dipIomatic consideratio!:.
ought to sift this particuly subject all the more carefully, Oplnions enunciated by independent papers, though not binding upon
G y r n m e n t s , mag. yet serve to throw consideral~lelight upon the
R L L ~ J und&
~ C ~
discussion, and had better be published while as yet
it is not tog late to influence the decisiong to be alerivebat. *We
have watched the English press sincg i t first began to speak of
the necessity of effecting some arrangement between Russia and
England touchipg Dentmi Asia. Among the expedienk proposed
by the Euglish papers, there mas one suggesting that Afghanistan
:should be converted iyto a neutral State on the Belgian pattern,
and the adjoining Khanates be included in the pl,iviloges of Euro* pean national law. But me cannot bring oarselyes to beljeve that
D
e
**
LctrCu: from U~nbdltl,April 4th, ITourczua?.d ilIc~il,
&Kay 3 4 1869.
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English .politicians should have really hit upou the device of
making us engage not to extend our frontiers beyond a certain
point, or not to do such and such things in our relations with the
Khanate% There is too mnch political good sense in'England to
make them adopt a basis of negotiation which could not produce
any practical results. 8 u r suppositions in rogard to this are
strengthened by the circumstance that England has hastened to
secnre, without foreign codcurreuco, the neutrality of Afghauistan,
o~ rather the goodwill of the Afghans for herself. After a long
interval, in "which Eug1,zncl contented herself with the part of a
vigilant observer, she has recently paid subsidies to Sher Ali, and
rocognised him as the legitimate Ruler of Afghanistan. Quite recently this newly-made potentate has been received with much
th'eatrical display by the Governor-General of India, and, it is
rumoured, been promised an annuaI salary of 22120,000. Thus
England is endeavouring to place herself on good terms with the
Ameer of Afghanistan ; and if Russia is obliged to let her do as
she pleases, England in turn muat be content with our treating
the Ameer of Bokhaila as we please. A political agreement being,
then, entirely out of the question, the negotiations alluded to by
Mr. Gladstone can have reference only to commercial interests.
Our comnlercial stake in Central Asia is quite as important to us
as our political; and if My. Gladstone is right in expressing himself with so mnch complacency upon the attitnde assumed by our
Government in their confidential palavers with him, it is but too
probable that what he regards as satisfactory will not be equally
so to our mercantile community. As to the wish of the English
papers to see Consuls installed in Turkistau, and Russiau Consuls
in fidia, we cannot ouyselves see the good it mould do. We have
no direct commerce with India. There alle neither Russian factories nor Russian subjects to be found in tho country. Why,
then, should we burden our Budget with the salaries of superflup ~ representatives
s
? And why, indeed, should England wish to
station a Consul at Tashkent ? Would not his onlv occuaation
consist iu watching the action of our Government, and is hi, perhaps, to intrigue with the Natives and to al-m themeagainst ud?
But recenily M. QambBry, in a letter to tho Times,advised the
English to send donsulsdio the towns of Central Asia. M. Qambdry is the implacable enem of Russia, and counsels vouchsafed by
him ought to serve as a time y warning to ourselves. Only extreme
necessity has forced us to extend our Asiatic frontieqfurther South.
We believe we have a right to expect some reward for the sacrifices made on that occasion, and, if our h o ~ e sare hlfilled, shall
not only retain possession of the vagt ma
Turkistan, but
through $ gain acGgss tt, Chinese Tartary,
able from every other side. I t is but nn
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should t r y t o throw impediments in our way iu thaWiTe&ion., I ~
conclusion, w e cannot but repeat the opinion expressed by us on
a former occasion, that in tho evcnt of an Eastem war Turkistnn
will b e a folmidable basis of operations for us against thaEnglish.
If, however, we are let alone by the Euglisll, and our interests 81-e
not interfered with, we have certainly IUI cause to menace theil.
Indian Empire."
I n a similar strain, but i n nluch mord v i ~ l e n language,
t
is C O B posed a n article in t h e St. Yetersbu~gGoloss. Acco1;ding to thig,
the more advanced organ of the National p a l + - " T h e colnrnorcial
war already being waged between England and Russia, on the
Northern frontiers of Afghanistan, is not at all unlikely to give
way some day to a combat with more sanguinary weapons than
weights and measures. I n this case, the rifles presented to ti&
Ameer by t h e Darl of Mayo would stand him in good stead, though
for the matter of that, t h e Ameel; after taking pounds sterling, is
quits as likely as not t o t r y Toubles for a change."
A Berlin correspondent of the Times remarks on the above :'<Ibelieve I am right in saying that the spillt manif'ested in these
words porvades nearly all Russian utterances on the subject, much
as the languago used by the individual papers may Val3 If an
inference can be drawn from the attitude of the press and the
tone of Russian society a s to the policy likely to be pursued by
the St. Petemburg Cabinet, it i s not imp~obablothat an attempt
will be mado to benefit by the advice contained in the concluding
passage of t h e JiIoscoeu Gazette."

..
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RECENT EIILfi EXPEDITIONS.

.

( P a p 48.)
0 '

" I n order p om ow hat to hcilitnte Colonel Keycs' incursion into the
13ozotee country Don1 Kohat, a strong demoustration was contempomn e h ~ s l ymade from the Peshawnr side. Successfill as Colonel Reyes'
inroad on t h e Bezotoes" (on Fcbrun1.y 24th, 1969) '' was, it ha~dlyto
be cou-ccytlel.iscrhiecelct1 c l s i b e c ns a surprise. The cliastisetnent was a&mlly
givon to a, village foi- which it was not intended. I t mas intended for
Dnna Khooln, but fcll upon Gam. f i e MuUiclru of the so.cdled
'friendly Bezotecs' who accompnnied the party, had nssured Captain
Cavagnari and ~%lonelICcyes that n o opposition was to be apprehended
(from the people of Garn, which is the first villa@ within the.nntwa1
fort~wssof the OoLlnnt As tho force approached Gara the kdliclcs
.n tho Rillabitnnts thni no harm would be done
wwc sent ahead
n
their own condnct. NoverCheless, d ~ Colonel
d tho villagers busy removing their nettle nnd
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faalies, andC the force had no sooner got within rangc than some shotR
were fired s t it. The village was then attacked and carried at once.
&., consiclerable number of the enemy mere Idled on tlle spot-Captail,
Cavagnnri Qooting two with his o m hand-and t h e ent&e villnp
destroyed, the grnin burnt, and d l the live-stock carried off. As the
fugitives from Gara had takea the direction of Dana Rhaola, there was
clearly no chauce oE surprising the latter place, and accordingly t,he
ktachment returned, having irrflicted probably ten tinles as m11c11 loss
as i$ suKered, and, above all, having 'lifted the pu~tkch'(t.11~veil) of
the Ooblun, theg virgin fortress whose strength and inaccessibility had
defied Coke and his successors, and been confidently vnunted all ovc?
the Hills as a nut that would nlmays be too hard for British cmcl~ing."'

1%
this cl~astiscmentand destruction of a village, CCforwhich it
was not intcudecl", our loss was thirty-three killed ancl wounded.
111A l c n ' s Indicm Nail of April 5th, 1869, the general opinion is
said to bo that the expedition was inconclusive, :tnd t h a t t h e
Bezotees "have not learned tlieip lesson as they should."
They
certainly did not learn their lesson thoroughly on t l m t occnsion, for
t h e y were giving the British authorities "some annoyance" in
April 1874,-see p. 54.
4

* The Calcutta Pio?zee~,extracted from the Homezrwd JItril of April
5th, 1869.

